Trump's Threat and Khamenei's Dilemma in Continuing Dual Approach to the JCPOA

The statements of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in response to Donald Trump's policy regarding the JCPOA once again highlighted the fact that he has a favorable view towards the drafting and implementation of the JCPOA and still assesses the benefits of continuing the joint nuclear action between Iran and the 5+1 countries to outweigh its costs. The concept of 'heroic flexibility,' which was unveiled with the start of Hassan Rouhani's presidency and led to the signing of the JCPOA in nearly two and a half years, had a nearly five-year secret period that was directly guided by Mr. Khamenei. Although those negotiations did not yield results, they played a significant role in paving the way for the nuclear agreement. The Supreme Leader has so far avoided accepting responsibility for the JCPOA through dual behavior and ambiguous statements, portraying himself as a pessimistic critic to maintain his social base and strategic view of anti-Westernism. He does not consider the JCPOA to be an ideal agreement or a great victory, but he evaluates it as having minimal characteristics that make its implementation permissible. Understanding this duality requires attention to the specific conditions created by the power dynamics within the system and external equations. Mr. Khamenei, due to concerns about the intensification of internal and external consequences of continuing the confrontational nuclear policy and the crushing sanctions, and in his own words to 'nullify the plans of the enemies,' was forced to retreat and initiated nuclear reconciliation. However, this decision was not his preferred policy but a choice he had to make due to pragmatic considerations. He adopted a dual policy to conceal the retreat while avoiding responsibility and maintaining conditions for potentially activating nuclear adventurism again, aiming to control and guide the negotiations behind the scenes so that the nuclear infrastructure would be preserved and as few concessions as possible would be given to the other side. Furthermore, the JCPOA has remained at the level of a temporary and case-specific agreement and has not transformed into a transformative strategy in foreign policy. Nuclear negotiators, led by Javad Zarif, have repeatedly stated that decisions during the talks were made under the guidance and agreement of the leadership. However, with Donald Trump's hardline approach, which has made his threats to withdraw from the JCPOA more serious than ever, the continuation of this dual policy becomes more difficult for the leadership of the Islamic Republic and will not be without costs. Mr. Khamenei recently claimed that he does not want to waste his time responding to the 'toothless' President of the United States, while during the 2016 presidential election, he described Trump as an honest person and his orientations clearly indicated a preference for his presidency over Hillary Clinton. In reiterating his previous positions and those of other officials, Mr. Khamenei emphasized that the Islamic Republic will not be the initiator of leaving the JCPOA, but if Trump tears it up, we will shred it. The rhetorical and propagandistic aspect of these statements has intensified, effectively calling into question the leadership's critical stance towards the JCPOA. When the U.S. exits the JCPOA and fails to meet its commitments, the Islamic Republic will have no choice but to leave the JCPOA. Mr. Khamenei essentially reveals the regime's need for the survival of the JCPOA by making a vow with burnt oil at the Imamzadeh. This approach indicates a tactical limit for his hostile and anti-American foreign policy strategy, conflicting with the apparent positions he has taken regarding the JCPOA. In a letter dated August 10, 2015, to Hassan Rouhani, the President and Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, he emphasized vigilance against the hostile enmity of the U.S., stating in paragraph two of Article 3: 'Throughout the eight-year period, the imposition of any sanctions at any level and for any reason (including the repetitive and self-made pretexts of terrorism and human rights) by any of the negotiating countries will be considered a violation of the JCPOA, and the government is obliged to take necessary actions according to paragraph 3 of the parliamentary resolution and suspend JCPOA activities.' The Supreme Leader, within the current conditions, seeks the continuation of the JCPOA, and what ultimately leads to Iran's continued presence in the JCPOA is the will of the Supreme Leader, which he seeks to conceal with ambiguous statements. However, the increasing contradictions of this approach, which are easily understood even by the social base targeted by Mr. Khamenei, especially the Basij forces, make the dual approach to the JCPOA very difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, Mr. Khamenei shows that contrary to the apparent claim of a full revolutionary approach in foreign policy, he is calculative, but a calculative approach that does not bind itself to the doctrine of national interests and conventional rational standards, rather a calculation that is conducted within the framework of Islamic fundamentalist interests centered on Shia. Wherever the pressure exceeds tolerable limits, he considers measures to deviate from steadfastness and to reconcile. Thus, he may adopt similar behavior regarding the development of missile capabilities and regional influence if he finds himself in a deadlock, reluctantly conceding to flexibility. Although he currently does not see himself in this situation and insists on continuing current policies, his approach in the JCPOA, which has been accompanied by years of adventurism and retreat while minimizing concessions in the face of hard pressures and lack of agreement at the beginning of disputes, shows vulnerabilities that encourage radical political factions in the West to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic.