Trump's Threat and the Unveiling of Zarif's New Face

A note by Ali Afshari--The verbal and cyber positioning of Javad Zarif in recent weeks has shown a significant shift. In one of his latest tweets, reacting to the strategic remarks of U.S. President Donald Trump regarding Iran, he claimed, "All Iranians are members of the IRGC and defend it against American threats!" He had previously warned U.S. officials that by sanctioning the IRGC, they would become even more hated among the Iranian people. Zarif's strong defense of the IRGC and exaggerated statements have painted a new picture of him that does not align with his previous moderate image, especially during the nuclear negotiations. Zarif's relationship with the IRGC during the eleventh and twelfth governments has been variable and had not been completely aligned until recent events. However, with the whispers of IRGC sanctions and Trump's move to amend the JCPOA and tighten pressure on the Islamic Republic in the Middle East, both sides rapidly and unnaturally moved towards unity and convergence. The matter began with a joint meeting between Zarif and Mohammad Ali Jafari, the IRGC commander, where Jafari, amid a shared photo with laughter, claimed Zarif's coordination in expressing aligned positions and addressed Trump, stating that the IRGC is one with the Foreign Ministry and the government. This claim was made while the IRGC had not held such a position in the past. About four years ago, in response to Zarif's comments about the fragility of Iran's military system against the U.S., Jafari praised his diplomatic skills but called him inexperienced in defense matters. Additionally, criticizing the Geneva nuclear agreement, he claimed that what Iran had given in these negotiations was maximal and what it had gained was minimal, and finally noted that since the regime's red lines had not been crossed, the IRGC had no objections. After the JCPOA was approved, IRGC commanders had a critical stance but did not object, always emphasizing the weakness of the JCPOA. In June 2016, in response to Rouhani's comments, Jafari stated: "The JCPOA is not a document of honor, and people reluctantly accepted it." The confrontation with Trump's aggressive strategy has accelerated the convergence of Zarif and Rouhani with the IRGC to such an extent that there seems to be no sign of previous rifts. This shift and the sudden disappearance of the bipolar atmosphere created during the election period have plunged Zarif and Rouhani into a crisis of trust, such that adherence to their previous statements is viewed with serious doubt. During the election period, Rouhani and his close circle portrayed a critical and distanced image from the IRGC in public opinion, leading to the perception that Ebrahim Raisi is the IRGC's preferred candidate. The opposition of senior IRGC officials to Rouhani's government was not limited to criticizing the JCPOA and the weakness of the negotiating team in obtaining more concessions but went further, implicitly accusing Rouhani and Zarif of colluding with the U.S. and paving the way for infiltration. Hojjatoleslam Ali Saidi, the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, claimed that Rouhani's government was seeking a relationship with the U.S. under the guise of the JCPOA. Javad Karimi Qodousi, the current representative of Mashhad and a former commander of the Basij, went so far as to state that Zarif changed his deputy for Asian and African affairs at the request of Western officials. The proposal for a JCPOA 2 by Rouhani raised tensions, warning two senior IRGC commanders that they would not allow another JCPOA to take shape. The 2017 presidential election was the peak of the confrontation between the IRGC and Rouhani. In the electoral debates, Rouhani indirectly accused the IRGC of sending organized forces to the campaign events of Ebrahim Raisi. After the election, the term "government with a gun" became a code name for Rouhani's attack on the IRGC, which spoke of the negative consequences of these interventions in economic and political arenas. However, this tension, right at the point where it was thought to be intensifying, reversed after a meeting between senior IRGC commanders and Rouhani, leading to a strengthening of close relations in less than a few weeks, to the point that Jafari explicitly expressed satisfaction with the performance of the twelfth government. The confrontation with Trump's aggressive strategy has accelerated the convergence of Zarif and Rouhani with the IRGC to such an extent that there seems to be no sign of previous rifts. Of course, it is natural that participation in a shared governing structure causes Zarif, in his position as Foreign Minister, to support the rights of his military force. However, the scope and intensity of Zarif's support and his resorting to exaggerated expressions about a force that is the main actor in preventing political development, applying organized repression, creating tensions in foreign policy, and one of the major sources of corruption in Iran, is unnatural and has caused an uproar. This shift and the sudden disappearance of the bipolar atmosphere created during the election period have plunged Zarif and Rouhani into a crisis of trust, such that adherence to their previous statements is viewed with serious doubt. During the election period, Rouhani and his close circle portrayed a critical and distanced image from the IRGC in public opinion, leading to the perception that Ebrahim Raisi is the IRGC's preferred candidate. In light of the points discussed, the question arises as to why this shift has occurred and what the real face of Javad Zarif is. First, it should be noted that Zarif has never taken a position against the IRGC. He presented a different view in foreign policy during the eleventh government but defended the IRGC at times. For example, after discussions about the duality between the IRGC and the government over the JCPOA following the approval of the comprehensive nuclear agreement, a source close to the negotiating team reported that Zarif defended the IRGC during negotiations: "In response to the remarks of some Western foreign ministers in one of the last meetings with 5+1 in Vienna, Zarif said: 'Do you know who you are talking about? Do you know that the people of Iran are always grateful to the IRGC for their bravery and sacrifices to defend their homeland against Saddam's aggression? When all kinds of weapons were at Saddam's disposal and your governments had blocked all access routes for Iran to weapons, the IRGC's youth defended the country with martyrdom and self-sacrifice. Our people appreciate them, and it is in your best interest not to be introduced to the Iranian people as opponents of the IRGC.' Zarif's new statements reveal more of his true face, showing that this seasoned diplomat, among his own foreign policy experts, is ultimately committed to the regime's interests and operates within the framework of the overarching views and policies of the institution of the Supreme Leader, with national interests not being his main priority or criterion. Factors such as convergence with the IRGC, distancing from his JCPOA image, and adopting rhetoric similar to Saeed Jalili lead to the bubble that had formed around Javad Zarif's character, which had gradually shrunk with his post-JCPOA positions, completely bursting and bringing society's perception of his views and identity closer to reality. Thus, it can be said that Javad Zarif has had a supportive view of the IRGC from the beginning, but during the JCPOA negotiations and the 2017 elections, he did not publicly address it much. The continuation of the IRGC Quds Force's adventurous policies and military intervention in Syria and the expansion of the IRGC's regional presence during the eleventh and twelfth governments, along with the Foreign Ministry's cooperation, is another piece of evidence that can be considered regarding Zarif's positive strategic view of the IRGC. However, this strategic commonality has also been accompanied by some tactical differences and perhaps transient ones that have prevented complete alignment between Zarif and the IRGC. A deep exploration of Zarif's views clearly shows that he seeks a pragmatic narrative of the Islamic Republic's confrontational foreign policy that can advance with minimal costs. He accepts the principle of confrontational policy with the West under the title of anti-hegemony but simultaneously wants this policy to be executed in a way that does not disrupt development. Zarif's interview with the economic newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad in January 2016 is enlightening for understanding his views and well reveals his main character, who wants to be both "a revolutionary child of the leader" and "an experienced diplomat." In this interview, he claims that the desired foreign policy is a balance point between idealism and realism. He places the value system of the institution of the Supreme Leader instead of ideals, and this is precisely the point that strategically and discursively connects him to the IRGC. In the current circumstances, this strategic aspect has reached a complete tactical convergence due to the necessity of confronting a common enemy and also submission to the commands of the leadership. There is no longer any sign of differences between two factions that had previously displayed not-so-wide differences in the path of diplomatic policymaking, at least until further notice. Of course, there is no guarantee that this unity will continue. Although this unity is not superficial and performative, it has substantial discursive and political foundations. It is also not far from prudence; Zarif's maneuvering for moderation and de-escalation in the nuclear challenge was done with the knowledge of the hardline power's agreement with the overall nuclear deal, and in this context, he sought initiatives to facilitate negotiations. However, now that he knows the dominant power's policy is to resist, his personal inclination, under the shadow of political conservatism and also the effort to get closer to the institution of the Supreme Leader and secure his political future, dictates exaggeration and the expression of false claims about this false equivalence between all the people of Iran and the IRGC. Falsehood and populist behavior from Zarif have a history; he has previously denied the existence of political and ideological prisoners in Iran! Considering the aforementioned points, it can be concluded that Zarif's new statements reveal more of his true face, showing that this seasoned diplomat, among his own foreign policy experts, is ultimately committed to the regime's interests and operates within the framework of the overarching views and policies of the institution of the Supreme Leader, with national interests not being his main priority or criterion. Factors such as convergence with the IRGC, distancing from his JCPOA image, and adopting rhetoric similar to Saeed Jalili lead to the bubble that had formed around Javad Zarif's character, which had gradually shrunk with his post-JCPOA positions, completely bursting and bringing society's perception of his views and identity closer to reality. It should also be noted that IRGC officials welcome his sympathetic positions, but at lower levels, they continue to discredit and delegitimize him, especially regarding his interactive policy with the West. Monitoring the positions of senior IRGC commanders and the discourse and political lines prevailing in the IRGC strengthens the perception that despite Zarif's conciliatory efforts, the current fabric of the IRGC will ultimately not consider him one of their own.