Turkey's Role in the New Syrian Crisis: A Calculated Gamble or a High-Risk Move?

In the latest crisis engulfing Syria following attacks by rebel forces led by the Islamist group "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham," many observers, including some officials from the Islamic Republic of Iran, have pointed fingers at Turkey. Some even claim that Ankara, in coordination with Israel, has sought to weaken the so-called "Resistance Axis" comprising the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Syrian government by exacerbating these conflicts. Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, stated: "We did not expect Turkey, with its long history in Islam, to fall into the pit created by America and the Zionists." Meanwhile, on December 3, when Abbas Araghchi, Iran's Foreign Minister, was discussing with his Turkish counterpart in Turkey, a group gathered in Tehran in front of the Turkish embassy, comparing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on their placards. Although the Turkish flag has recently been seen among some of Assad's opponents, Ankara continues to deny any involvement in these conflicts. The U.S. officially designated Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization in 2018. The European Union, the UK, Turkey, and several other countries have also listed this group as terrorist. Turkey's alleged involvement in the Syrian crisis is particularly focused on Idlib province, which borders Turkey and was a central point of conflict during the early years of the Syrian civil war; it has now become the focal point for a new round of clashes in the country. This area, home to over three million people, has been the main stronghold for opposition groups, including Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which split from Al-Qaeda's "Jabhat al-Nusra." Despite Turkey classifying this group as a terrorist organization in August 2018, its relationship with the group has never been severed. Critics of Erdoğan's government claim that in 2019, Turkey even hosted Muhammad al-Jolani, the group's commander, and his associates for medical treatment. For several years, Turkey worked with the governments of Iran, Syria, and Russia to maintain Idlib as a tension-free zone and sought to impose this issue on other actors in the 2017 Astana and 2019 Sochi agreements. However, the resurgence of hostilities from this province has pointed fingers at Turkey. Alongside these agreements regarding parts of Idlib province, another noteworthy point at the beginning of this new round of conflicts is that the "Mujahideen" or Assad's opponents have begun their attacks from areas against the Damascus regime that the Turkish army had previously conducted four operations in since 2016—"Euphrates Shield," "Olive Branch," "Peace Spring," and "Spring Shield"—to "prevent threats from Syria." With these operations, Turkish armed forces were stationed in northern Syrian cities such as Idlib, Jarablus, Al-Bab, Azaz, and Tal Abyad or handed control of these areas to allied forces. In addition to Turkey's support for some of Assad's opponents and the initiation of movements from areas under its control, allegations of Turkish interference in Syria's internal situation have also been raised for other reasons, including the provision of new military tools for rebel groups. Notably, the addition of the "Shahin" drone unit to these groups is seen by many observers as a direct result of Turkish support. Furthermore, the increase in the number of fighters, especially the presence of "Turkic Mujahideen," is another sign of Turkish involvement. Reports estimate the total number of these fighters to be around one hundred thousand, which is nearly three times higher than estimates during the fragile peace period. During the first phase of the Syrian civil war, Turkey's main goal was to overthrow Bashar al-Assad's government, and officials from this country repeatedly emphasized the necessity of his resignation. However, under current conditions, Turkey's objectives in the recent conflicts appear to have become more complex and diverse. These objectives include creating a balance against the Assad regime, achieving new agreements with influential actors, limiting Kurdish influence, and preventing a new wave of refugees towards Turkey's borders. Nevertheless, the removal of Assad remains on Ankara's list of demands. In his speech on December 3, Erdoğan emphasized the importance of preserving Syria's territorial integrity and called for an end to hostilities based on the "legitimate demands of the Syrian people." From Turkey's perspective, the most important demand of the Syrian people is the removal of Assad from power and a political transition that can end the country's crisis. Over the past year, even on the eve of the recent rebel attack, Turkey made numerous efforts to get closer to Damascus. However, Bashar al-Assad rejected all these efforts and declared the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory as a precondition for any cooperation. Meanwhile, last month, Erdoğan expressed hope that there was still a possibility of agreement with Assad. At the same time, Turkey has repeatedly reacted to potential security threats emanating from Syria with threatening statements, such as Erdoğan's famous line, "We may come suddenly one night." It seems that the recent attack, from Turkey's perspective, is both a serious threat and a tool for diplomatic bargaining. If the rebels manage to consolidate their control over strategic areas like Aleppo, this could significantly increase Turkey's leverage over the Assad government. This dual strategy, combining military pressure and diplomatic engagement, reflects Ankara's multilayered approach to achieving its regional objectives. Turkey has two main reasons for seeking a new agreement in northern Syria. First, the presence of over three million Syrian refugees in Turkey has become a key financial and political challenge for Erdoğan's government. Economic pressure and rising anti-refugee sentiments within Turkey have intensified calls for finding a solution to facilitate the return of refugees. Recent reports and street interviews in Turkey indicate a relative satisfaction among parts of society with recent developments in Syria, as they believe these developments could pave the way for the return of refugees. One of Erdoğan's key strategic focuses has been to create a "safe zone" in northern Syria for the return of refugees. However, ongoing instability in Syria has posed serious obstacles to this plan. The second reason for Turkey's interest in northern Syria is the presence of Kurdish forces in these areas. These forces, which played a significant role in combating ISIS during the Syrian civil war, are viewed by Turkey as a security threat. Ankara claims that terrorist attacks against Turkey are organized from these regions. Turkey has repeatedly urged the governments of Syria, Iran, Russia, and the U.S. to either resolve the issue of Kurdish-controlled areas or allow Turkey to implement its desired actions. Turkey aims to establish a zone at least 30 kilometers free of the presence of PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups along its borders. With the recent escalation of hostilities, Turkish officials have reiterated that they will "not tolerate any terrorist organizations across the borders" and will continue efforts to "eliminate terrorist threats." Field developments are also progressing in favor of Turkey's objectives. Jihadist forces, particularly the Syrian Free Army, which has direct support from Turkey, managed to capture the strategic Tal Rifaat region on December 3 and identified Manbij as their next target. The attack by "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham" is a calculated move amidst changing regional dynamics. Recent military actions by Israel in Gaza and Lebanon have led to a relative weakening of Iran's position and its key ally Hezbollah, creating opportunities for opposition groups in Syria. Turkey's green light to these groups has been aware of these changes to use the Syrian conflicts as a tool for readjusting its regional strategy. The timing of this attack, coinciding with the reduced capacity of Iran and its allies, indicates Ankara's efforts to increase its influence in Syria and exploit shifts in the regional balance of power. However, the entry of these forces into a new war—of which Turkey, despite being aware of its benefits, denies involvement—is not without risks. Interference in Syria may escalate tensions with Iran, which views Ankara's actions as a threat to its influence in Syria. Additionally, Turkey's cooperation with groups like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which are officially recognized as terrorist organizations, is likely to provoke criticism from Ankara's Western allies and weaken Turkey's position in international coalitions. Recent diplomatic efforts, including communications from Turkey's foreign minister with the U.S., Iran, and Iraq, reflect Ankara's calculated approach to leverage field changes as a bargaining tool in negotiations. This method is not unfamiliar to Erdoğan; he has repeatedly engaged in significant gambles throughout his political career. This strategy carries considerable risks. Turkey's dual role as both a mediator and a provocateur could increase battlefield pressures on Ankara. Although Iran and Russia, due to weaknesses in organization and declining legitimacy among the Syrian people, have not yet been able to mount a decisive response, this situation may not remain stable. As Darin Khalifa from the "Crisis Group" has warned, "Turkey is playing with fire, but it believes it can control the fire." However, the long-term consequences of this gamble—for Syria, Turkey, and the entire region—remain uncertain; although for now, Turkey holds the upper hand.