U.S. Claims About Iran's Missile Program: Justified or Excessive?

Following the launch of the Simorgh satellite carrier rocket, which failed to place the civilian satellite 'Payam' into orbit, Brigadier General Amir Hatami, Iran's Minister of Defense, expressed hope on Wednesday, January 23, that the technical issues with the satellite carrier would be resolved quickly and that another satellite would be launched into space. On Wednesday, February 6, some American media reported that Iran had failed in another attempt to send another satellite into space. The Islamic Republic has not yet reacted to this news. Iran's attempt to launch the Payam satellite faced reactions from the U.S. and Israel. A few days before the launch of the mentioned satellite carrier, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo equated the technology used in Iran's space program with that used for building ballistic missiles, including intercontinental missiles, stating that this action by Iran violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231. After this launch, he reiterated on Twitter that Iran's action poses a threat to Europe and the U.S. Similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Iran is lying about its program to send a scientific satellite into space and that its goal is nothing but testing the first stage of an intercontinental missile, contrary to all agreements. U.S. President Donald Trump also remarked on Thursday, January 17, during a ceremony announcing the new U.S. missile defense policy at the Pentagon, that if Iran succeeded in this endeavor, it could achieve the capability to build intercontinental missiles that could even reach the U.S. He also urged Iran to cease all activities related to ballistic missiles. The essence of these claims, which are part of Pompeo's twelve demands from Iran, raises several questions, including: 1. What does Resolution 2231 say about Iran's missile tests and what limitations does it impose? 2. Are the Islamic Republic's missile tests in violation of this resolution? 3. Is launching a rocket to carry civilian satellites, while today two out of every three satellites launched into space are for military purposes, contrary to international law or existing legal norms? 4. Is the U.S. demand in this regard aimed at undermining the Islamic Republic and exerting pressure on it, or does it have broader implications that target Iran's national interests? The limitations in the resolution Paragraph 3 of Annex 'B' of Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), requests Iran to refrain from any activity related to the development of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Additionally, Paragraph 4 of the same annex prohibits Iran from selling and transferring any missile-related equipment and technology. Furthermore, the duration of these Security Council restrictions is eight years after the acceptance of the JCPOA, thus ending on October 18, 2023. Moreover, based on Paragraph 4 of this annex, the transfer and sale of any materials, equipment, goods, and technologies listed in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which can be used to produce any nuclear weapons, is prohibited. The MTCR is a voluntary and informal regime that has been joined by 35 countries, but based on the Security Council's decision, the sale of items listed in this regime to Iran is prohibited. Nonetheless, since the technology and items of the MTCR are not necessarily used for producing nuclear weapons, the sale and transfer of the mentioned items to Iran may be possible if the seller country's contract is approved by the Security Council and necessary guarantees regarding the use of those items are provided to the council. Iran's adherence to the JCPOA and unnecessary pressure on the agency Iran's nuclear activities are under control within the framework of the JCPOA. Following repeated inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, the agency has announced that Iran is adhering to the provisions of the JCPOA. A recent assessment by 16 U.S. intelligence agencies published on Tuesday, January 28, stated that Iran is 'currently not pursuing key activities related to the development of nuclear weapons.' Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia have also accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency's report. However, Israel, which has opposed the JCPOA from the beginning, along with the Trump administration, has pressured the agency to inspect 'secret nuclear warehouses' and other sites of their interest in Iran. In fact, these demands align with the third demand from Pompeo's twelve demands from the Islamic Republic, which is unconditional and unrestricted access, in addition to nuclear sites, to all military bases, arms factories, and military and civilian research centers in the country. Of course, access for inspectors to places, including military ones, is possible with the provision of acceptable documentation and reasons, and there are special mechanisms for this. The Islamic Republic has accepted the safeguards (IAEA monitoring regulations), the Additional Protocol, and the subsidiary arrangements of Code 1-3, which are considered the highest standards for monitoring a country's nuclear programs. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Israel are dissatisfied with the agency's performance. Recently, Yukiya Amano, the agency's director-general, pointed out that the agency's credibility is its greatest asset, stating, 'If our credibility is questioned, and especially if there is a desire for micromanagement or pressure on the agency for verifications, it will be unconstructive and extremely damaging.' The irrelevance of nuclear warheads; mind-reading The insistence of the U.S., Israel, and some European countries that Iran's missile tests are in violation of Resolution 2231 lacks a solid basis. These countries believe that these missiles 'are capable of carrying nuclear warheads,' while they explicitly and implicitly suggest that Iran secretly has a program to access nuclear warheads or at least continues its research so that after the expiration of the sunset clause in the JCPOA, it can equip its missiles with nuclear warheads. While France, Germany, and Britain emphasize that Iran cannot evade discussions about its missile program and that the range of its missiles exceeds its security needs, the U.S. demands, based on the fourth demand from Pompeo's twelve demands from Iran, that Iran completely abandon its ballistic missile development program. The reality is that missile tests are neither in violation of Resolution 2231 nor subject to international prohibition. This resolution does not prohibit conventional deterrence. In other words, Iran has not built or possesses a nuclear warhead, thus the idea that Iran's ballistic missiles 'are capable of carrying nuclear warheads' is irrelevant and 'nonexistent.' This is akin to someone wanting to discuss the breathing of a dead person. Furthermore, raising the issue that Iran intends to build a nuclear warhead in the future is mind-reading and filled with hypothetical scenarios, which is one of the main reasons the U.S. has imposed sanctions against the Islamic Republic. The capability of carrying nuclear warheads by missiles? Another point is that, contrary to the claims of some American officials, most of the ballistic missiles tested do not have the capability to carry nuclear warheads. Experts in nuclear weapons have concluded that the design and performance characteristics of the tested missiles, including the lifting force, the size of the payload sections such as the special section for re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, and the conical nose of the missiles, indicate that there are signs of the ability to carry nuclear warheads in the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr missiles (medium-range with multiple targeting capabilities). Other types of Shahab missiles, along with Qiam and Sajjil missiles and various types of Qadr missiles with conical noses do not have the capability to carry nuclear warheads. The demand to limit the range of missiles Overall, the ultimate goal of the U.S., as emphasized by some experts in that country, is to reduce the range of Iran's missiles to below 300 kilometers. This range is determined based on the aforementioned Missile Technology Control Regime. According to this non-binding regime, any missile with a range exceeding 300 kilometers that can carry more than 500 kilograms of explosive material is considered a weapon of mass destruction. Similarly, some European countries, including France, have stated that the range of Iran's missiles exceeds its security needs for defending its borders. As has been repeatedly claimed, Iran's missile program is not a 'global threat' but rather part of the dynamics of security in the Middle East and cannot be viewed abstractly. In the absence of an effective air force, Iran considers its missile capability as the most crucial deterrent against regional countries, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, which are equipped with very modern and advanced Western weapons and receive logistical, technical, and intelligence support from the U.S. and several European countries. The inconsistency of the satellite carrier rocket launch with the resolution? The vehicle that launched the Payam satellite into space, contrary to reports from some media, was not a missile but a satellite carrier rocket (SLV), and the claims of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu that the launch was a test for producing intercontinental missiles have been rejected by many American experts in the fields of armaments and defense, and fundamentally, Iran's space program is unrelated to Resolution 2231. While it is undeniable that the technology used in satellite carrier rockets can be applied in the production of intercontinental missiles, there are fundamental differences between the two. The payload of ballistic missiles, namely the warhead and its other components, must withstand extreme pressure and challenges of re-entry into the atmosphere, which requires advanced thermal systems and mechanical protections. In contrast, the satellite carrier rocket releases its payload, which is the satellite, into space and does not face the challenges of re-entering the Earth's atmosphere. Ballistic missiles and satellite carrier rockets follow entirely different paths after launch to execute their missions, and the types of engines used in them differ. Some Western experts have explicitly stated that the satellite carrier rocket used for the Payam was not powerful enough to be classified among intercontinental missiles or to serve as a cover for producing such missiles. Iran uses old technology in its satellite carrier rockets that is not at the level of producing intercontinental missiles. For the launch of the Simorgh rocket, Iran utilized the old engines used in Shahab-3. Furthermore, the history of technology development for building intercontinental missiles indicates that in some cases, intercontinental missiles can be converted into satellite carrier rockets, but the reverse has not occurred. The repeated claims phenomenon: the illusion of truth Such exaggeration, distortion, mind-reading, and awareness of the hidden thoughts of the Islamic Republic, especially by the U.S. and Israel regarding missile tests and Iran's space program, is not new. The repeated claims of the U.S. and Israel regarding these tests and programs, despite being rejected in most cases by Western experts and specialists, are aimed at making these claims believable, and it should be emphasized that they have largely succeeded in this regard, which is considered a form of psychological and propaganda warfare. The formation of an international atmosphere against Iran, stemming from the destabilizing behavior of the Islamic Republic, has also been compounded by the people's frustration with this regime. The incessant repetition of U.S. claims against Iran's missile program is reminiscent of the 'carrot's property for enhancing vision' myth or the consumption of vitamin C for treating colds, which is, in fact, untrue. The British Air Force discovered a new radar technology during World War II that allowed its pilots to shoot down German planes at night. However, the British government, to keep this technology secret, announced that the success of British pilots was due to eating carrots! Psychological research has also concluded that repetition increases the believability of issues, and thus politicians repeat topics multiple times. Repetition is one of the components of political advertising and can make false claims believable. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the 'illusion of truth,' whereby a person perceives repetition as equivalent to truth. Iran is the essence, not the Islamic regime Given the multitude of claims and various demands from the U.S., Israel, and European countries from the Islamic Republic, if we take Pompeo's twelve demands as a basis for discussion, the first four demands related to the JCPOA and Iran's missile program have no relevance. The Islamic Republic, as the agency has repeatedly emphasized, has adhered to the provisions of the JCPOA. The other eight demands from Pompeo, which are separate from the nuclear issue and the JCPOA and relate to the behavior, actions, and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic, encompass undeniable realities that are intertwined with the Islamic Republic's destabilizing actions in the region and its enmity with the U.S. and Israel, which are in many respects contrary to national interests. Since the U.S. Secretary of State considers acceptance of his twelve demands as a precondition for dialogue with Tehran, and the Islamic Republic views most of these demands as its red lines, there is little room for diplomatic efforts and dialogue to resolve the current situation.