U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Lausanne Nuclear Agreement

The following text translates the details of the recent nuclear agreement between Iran, the European Union, and the 1+5 group countries, published by the official website of the U.S. State Department. The following are the key points of the comprehensive Joint Action Plan regarding the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was approved by the parties in Lausanne, Switzerland. These points will serve as the foundation upon which the final text of the agreement is to be drafted by June 30. These points represent the progress made in the nuclear negotiations between Iran, the European Union, and the member countries of the 1+5 group. It is noteworthy that important implementation details are still under discussion between the parties, and no agreements will be finalized until all matters are settled. With this goal in mind, efforts will be made in the coming months to prepare the final text of the agreement based on these points. Enrichment: Iran agreed to reduce about two-thirds of its installed centrifuges. Under the recent agreement, Iran will decrease its number of centrifuges from the current 19,000 to 6,104, of which 5,060 will continue to enrich uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be of the 'IR-1' type, which is Iran's first generation of centrifuges. Iran agreed not to enrich uranium above 3.67% for at least 15 years. Iran agreed to reduce its current stockpile of 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg of 3.67% enriched uranium for 15 years. All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and will only be used as replacements for active centrifuges and equipment. Iran agreed not to construct any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. Iran's breakout time, which is the time needed to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, is currently estimated at two to three months. Under the current framework, this time will be extended to at least one year for a minimum of ten years. Iran will modify the Fordow facility so that it will no longer be capable of enrichment. Iran agreed not to enrich uranium at Fordow for 15 years and will repurpose the facility solely for peaceful purposes, transforming it into a research, technology, nuclear, and physics center. Iran agreed not to conduct any research or production activities related to enrichment at Fordow for 15 years. Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years. About two-thirds of the centrifuges and infrastructure at Fordow will be relocated. The remaining centrifuges will not be used for enrichment. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be under continuous IAEA supervision. For 10 years, Iran will only enrich its uranium with 5,060 first-generation 'IR-1' centrifuges at the Natanz facility. Iran agreed to enrich its uranium with only first-generation 'IR-1' centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges from operation. Iran will remove 1,000 'IR-2m' centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and will place them under IAEA supervision for ten years. Iran will not use 'IR-2', 'IR-4', 'IR-5', 'IR-6', or 'IR-8' centrifuges for enriched uranium production for at least ten years. Iran will use its advanced centrifuges for limited research and development projects, with the agreement and approval of the 1+5 countries. For ten years, Iran's enrichment and related research and development activities will be limited to a breakout time of at least one year. Beyond this ten-year period, Iran must adhere to its enrichment and research and development program, which will be submitted to the IAEA and must align with the nuclear agreement and the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which impose specific limitations on Iran's enrichment capacities. Inspections and Transparency: The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities, including Natanz and the former enrichment site at Fordow, and will conduct inspections using the latest monitoring technologies. Inspectors will have access to the supply chain of Iran's nuclear program. To prevent the diversion of the nuclear program to a covert program, new transparency and inspection mechanisms will closely examine materials and/or components of the nuclear program. Inspectors will have continuous access to uranium mines and mills, where Iran has been producing yellowcake for 25 years. Inspectors will continuously monitor the production of storage equipment, special cylinders, and rotors of Iran's centrifuges for 20 years. Iran's centrifuge production center will be suspended and placed under continuous supervision. All existing centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure at Fordow and Natanz will be relocated and placed under continuous IAEA supervision. As a step for additional transparency, a special supply channel for Iran's nuclear program will be established, through which the supply, sale, and transfer of dual-use materials and technologies related to Iran's nuclear technology will be monitored and approved on a case-by-case basis. Iran agreed to implement the IAEA's Additional Protocol, providing much greater access and information about its nuclear program to the Agency, including both declared and undeclared facilities. Iran will be required to ensure that any suspicious sites or facilities accused of covert enrichment, conversion facilities, centrifuge production facilities, or yellowcake production facilities are accessible for IAEA inspections anywhere in the country. Iran agreed to implement Code 3.1, which means early notification of the construction of new facilities. Iran will implement a series of agreed mechanisms to address the IAEA's concerns about the potential military dimensions of its nuclear program. Reactors and Reprocessing: Iran agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak based on a design agreed upon by the 1+5 countries, which will not produce weapon-grade plutonium and will support peaceful nuclear research and the production of radioisotope materials. The reactor core, which has the capability to produce significant amounts of weapon-grade plutonium, will either be destroyed or removed from the country. Iran will remove all spent fuel from its reactor for the lifetime of the reactor. Iran has committed indefinitely not to engage in reprocessing or reprocessing research on its spent nuclear fuel. Iran will not store excess heavy water from the modified Arak reactor and will sell any heavy water in the international market for 15 years. Iran will not construct any new heavy water reactors for 15 years. Sanctions: If Iran verifiably adheres to its commitments, sanctions against the country will be suspended. U.S. and EU sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program will be suspended after the IAEA confirms that Iran has taken all nuclear steps. If at any time Iran fails to meet its commitments, these sanctions will be reimposed. The design of U.S. nuclear sanctions against Iran will remain in place for most of the duration of the nuclear agreement and will allow for reinstatement in the event of significant noncompliance. All UN Security Council resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear program will be lifted simultaneously with the completion of Iran's nuclear actions to address all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, potential military dimensions, and transparency). Although the main provisions of the Security Council resolutions, those related to the transfer of sensitive technologies and activities, will be reestablished through a new UN Security Council resolution. This new resolution will endorse the nuclear agreement and call for its full implementation. The resolution will also establish a supply channel – mentioned above – as a mechanism to ensure transparency. Significant limitations on conventional weapons and ballistic missiles will also be included in this resolution, along with provisions allowing for cargo inspections and asset freezes. To resolve any disputes between the parties, a special authority will be established that will allow either party to pursue the resolution of disputes regarding the implementation of the nuclear agreement. If a significant issue cannot be resolved through this mechanism, all previous UN sanctions can be reimposed. U.S. sanctions against Iran for terrorism, human rights violations, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under this agreement. Phasing: For 10 years, Iran will limit its domestic enrichment capacity and research and development, ensuring that its potential breakout time from the agreement will be at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will remain limited to its long-term enrichment and research and development program – which it has informed the 1+5 group about. For 15 years, Iran will also limit other aspects of its nuclear program. For example, Iran will not build any new enrichment facilities or new heavy water reactors, will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium, and will accept a process of additional transparency. Significant inspections and transparency measures will continue beyond the 15-year period. Iran's adherence to the IAEA's Additional Protocol will be permanent, including requirements for transparency and access to its facilities. Detailed inspections of Iran's uranium supply chain will continue for 25 years. Even after the most stringent limitations on Iran's nuclear program expire, Iran will remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran and places the IAEA in charge of monitoring the country's nuclear program.