Uncertainties About the Future of the JCPOA Ahead of Elections in Iran

The previous presidential election in 2013 took place under circumstances where candidates faced an Iran grappling with significant economic challenges. These issues were exacerbated by intensified international sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. Consequently, one of the hot topics during the 2013 election campaigns and televised debates revolved around foreign policy rather than domestic issues. Hassan Rouhani, the current president, was no exception. Having been the chief negotiator with world powers during the early years of Iran's nuclear file, he entered the presidential race claiming he was there to resolve the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear program. In 2013, Rouhani stated: "Development cannot be achieved by fixing one screw while the development factory is stalled due to that screw. The screw must be fixed, and the whole factory must move. This requires a lot of wisdom. We have the solution in the Hope and Prudence government program on how to continue development with lower costs, maintain technology, and, God willing, break the sanctions. Of course, this is not a matter of one or two months; those who say that if we become president, we will break the sanctions in a few months may not understand how complex today's world is; however, we must break the sanctions, and this is achievable, and for this, we need unity and consensus." Rouhani won the 2013 election partly by promising to find a solution for Iran's nuclear file and lift the associated sanctions. However, as he had predicted, a complicated path lay ahead for Iran and the P5+1 to reach a comprehensive agreement. From June 2013 to July 2015, weeks and months of negotiations took place in various cities until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was finally reached. During the announcement of the agreement, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, spoke of a collective effort to achieve the JCPOA: "Thanks to the constructive interaction of all parties and the commitment and capability of our delegations, we successfully concluded the negotiations and resolved a dispute that had lasted over ten years." Less than two years after this statement was read in Vienna, multiple preparatory stages were completed, and the parties reached the implementation phase of the agreement. In January 2016, the limitations Iran had imposed on its nuclear program were confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the lifting of international sanctions imposed due to the nuclear program began. Now, Iran is on the brink of another election. This time, nuclear negotiations will not be a topic of competition among candidates, but the fate of the agreement reached is certainly a matter that many are closely watching. Among these individuals is Ali Vaez, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group in Washington, who states: "Foreign policy usually aligns with domestic policy; and the JCPOA is indeed a domestic political issue for Iran, and undoubtedly, given that it is considered the greatest achievement of President Rouhani's foreign policy and his economic achievements are also related to the JCPOA, there is no doubt that the nuclear agreement will be one of the electoral issues in Iran." The continuation of the JCPOA after the elections is a phase that is currently underway. Both parties, according to their statements, have acknowledged each other's commitments so far, despite some shortcomings at times. In such an environment, hopes and fears about the outcome of the presidential elections in Iran have emerged. The question remains: What form will the JCPOA take under the next government of the Islamic Republic, and will this election affect the implementation of the JCPOA? The domestic political landscape in Iran regarding the JCPOA is almost bipolar. On one side, Rouhani's government and its supporters have defended the method of nuclear negotiations and the agreement reached, while on the other side, conservatives and principlists have criticized the lengthy negotiations and various aspects of the agreement in different ways. Some argue that the benefits gained from the JCPOA have not met expectations, while some principlists claim there has been no benefit at all. Although such a bipolar image exists regarding the JCPOA, many analysts believe that the JCPOA will continue to exist regardless of which faction comes to power in Iran. Barbara Slavin, an analyst at the Atlantic Council in Washington, is among those who believe that the Iranian elections will not affect the implementation of the JCPOA, stating: "Even if Rouhani is not re-elected, I believe his successor will also adhere to the agreement. Just as the U.S. and others are committed to this agreement, we have recently heard from the U.S. that Iran is committed to the JCPOA. This confirmation was necessary for the president's upcoming action to renew the presidential mandate for lifting sanctions. Therefore, if the process continues smoothly, there will be no problems." Another American analyst who believes the JCPOA will continue is Michael Rubin. Rubin, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute and a serious critic of the nuclear agreement, does not view the outcome of the elections in Iran as democratic. He believes: "Ultimately, like in the U.S., it will be difficult for any faction to abandon the agreement, regardless of their views on it." Rubin adds: "Because this agreement has progressed significantly in its implementation phase. Iranians have likely regained a significant portion of their frozen assets, and many sanctions have been lifted – although they want more – and of course, the financial value of the agreement lies in reviving investment. Many companies, especially Asian ones, will not invest if they are concerned about the consequences of their investments or international instability. Adding to this is the nature of Iran's economy, especially considering the position of the Khatam al-Anbiya, the economic branch of the Revolutionary Guards, leads to the conclusion that these more radical and principlist groups have an interest in not abandoning the agreement. Because due to the structure of Iran's economy, an unbalanced portion of foreign contracts goes to the bank accounts of the more radical elements of the government." The role of the Supreme Leader in the future of the JCPOA is multifaceted. On one hand, it is highly dependent on various internal factors in Iran, including security and economy, and on the other hand, it is an achievement of actions in the foreign policy arena; an area where the executive branch is not the only actor. For this reason, Ali Vaez in Washington states that changing the JCPOA, which is the result of a consensus decision-making process, does not happen with an election. Vaez adds: "In any case, in the Supreme National Security Council, elections may change half of its members, but the other half will not change, and the leadership, which has the final say in foreign policy decisions and determines the overall policies of the system, will also not change. For example, it should not be forgotten that the decision to resolve this issue and negotiate directly with the U.S. was made during Ahmadinejad's presidency because the system's leadership decided on it, and this policy continued during Rouhani's presidency, just as the confrontational policy based on the leadership's decision was adopted at the end of Khatami's presidency and continued during Ahmadinejad's presidency. As a result, Iran's policy has a foundation that is not significantly influenced by elections, but its interaction and tactics are implemented by those who are elected by direct popular vote. However, this scene is not black and white, and we are in a gray area." In this context, Jalil Roshandel, an international affairs analyst and political science professor at East Carolina University, states that although the constitution has made the leader responsible for determining principles, it has not stated that he must determine and approve every action of the government. This analyst adds: "When the government initially started moving towards the JCPOA, it may have received a green light from the leader, and gradually the monopolistic faction realized that there were advantages hidden within the JCPOA that should not be registered in the name of the government. On one hand, they said that the leader was aware of every action taken in the JCPOA, but on the other hand, whenever the JCPOA encountered difficulties, they blamed the government. Therefore, I think it is not entirely accurate to say that everything is under the leader's control and that the government is merely the executive agent of the leader." Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself has also made references in some of his speeches to the extent of his powers in the constitutional realm. Among these instances was a statement made about a year ago in a meeting with students: "Keep in mind that I have repeatedly said that the leadership cannot constantly intervene in the case-by-case decision-making of various governmental bodies and keep saying this should be done, that should not be done; this is not possible. Neither the law allows it, nor does logic allow it." This approach arises while Jalil Roshandel does not see non-political conditions such as the health status of the Supreme Leader and the issue of his succession as unrelated to this topic. This political science professor believes that under certain conditions, the government can challenge the leader's opinion with a courageous approach. Roshandel states: "It really depends on what conditions the government is elected under. There are many doubts about the decline in public participation. If the government has the necessary support in terms of votes and elections and feels that public support is still behind it, the likelihood of it taking bolder steps increases, but if that support is not sufficiently obtained, the government will inevitably have to fall back on the leader and at least increase the leader's support." The spirit of the JCPOA and the future of 'non-compliance' with it is another side of the coin of implementing the JCPOA, which is currently referred to as the 'spirit of the JCPOA.' Both Iran and the U.S. agree on the adherence to this side of the coin. Both accuse each other of not adhering to the spirit of the JCPOA, with the difference being that the new U.S. administration considers the JCPOA a bad agreement, while the Iranian government defends it. Donald Trump, the new U.S. president, who promised to tear up the JCPOA before being elected, has not done so but criticized the nuclear agreement again in late April: "This was a very bad agreement. It should not have been signed, and it should not have been negotiated this way. I welcome many agreements, but this one was bad, the worst I have ever seen. They are not adhering to the spirit of the agreement. We are carefully analyzing and reviewing it and will speak about it soon." Trump's remarks, as well as those of his secretaries of state and defense, Rex Tillerson and James Mattis, refer to Iran's actions in the region, including in Syria and Yemen, as not aligning with what the JCPOA aimed for. They also consider Iran's continued missile program as another issue that does not align with the goals of the JCPOA. However, Iran has also been speaking for months about the violation of the spirit of the JCPOA by the U.S. Even before Trump's election, Hassan Rouhani, when discussing the economic achievements of his government following the JCPOA, emphasized that if certain obstacles, such as those in the U.S. Congress, had not occurred, these achievements would have been even greater: "Of course, if our counterpart had adhered precisely to everything it was committed to and acted well according to the appearance and spirit of the JCPOA, we would have had better conditions today, and the achievements would have been more and faster." However, the warning to Iran, the review of the JCPOA, and the threat of imposing new sanctions related to Tehran's non-nuclear actions have another side. Michael Rubin, who is a critic of the JCPOA, believes that the way the U.S. government operates could benefit the Iranian regime. He states: "What I fear is that by discussing the approval of new sanctions, the Trump administration may reduce the internal pressure on the Islamic Republic, because the JCPOA has not been able to save Iran's economy; the problem was not the sanctions but the mismanagement of the Islamic Republic's officials. However, by increasing the likelihood of new sanctions in front of public opinion, especially ahead of the presidential elections, the Trump administration provides a mechanism for individuals like President Rouhani and his foreign minister, Zarif, to blame the U.S. for the shortcomings." The warnings and threats, and what is today humorously referred to in the political atmosphere of Iran and the U.S. as the summoning of the spirits of the JCPOA, continue while the U.S. government has announced a 90-day review of its policies regarding Iran, and the JCPOA is part of this review. As Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State, has stated, Washington is examining how Iran's provocative actions and the JCPOA fit into the balance of U.S. national interests. As Gary Sick, who was previously a senior advisor at the White House during the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy, says, every government that comes to power orders a review of previous policies regarding various issues, and this is a common practice. He adds: "One way to explain why the government decides...