The helicopter crash of Ebrahim Raisi significantly disrupted the political equations in Iran. His death and that of his companions in late Ordibehesht 1403 dashed the hopes of some power stakeholders and revitalized the spirits of critics and opposition groups outside the power structure. According to the constitution, the government had only 50 days to designate a successor to Ebrahim Raisi. Candidate registration began quickly, and six government-loyal candidates passed the Guardian Council's filter: five from one faction and one from another; as usual, the government did not allow any critical or opposing figures to register. Contrary to expectations, Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidential election. He had served multiple terms as a member of parliament and now, with his decree confirmed on Mordad 7 and after the swearing-in ceremony on Mordad 9, he must seek a vote of confidence for his cabinet from the same parliament where many representatives were aligned with his other electoral rivals. The following nine sections look at the stages leading to Masoud Pezeshkian's presidency and the challenges he and his cabinet will face in this position.
The government had only 50 days to designate a successor to Ebrahim Raisi.
Candidate registration began quickly, and six government-loyal candidates passed the Guardian Council's filter. Five representatives from one faction and one from another; as usual, the government did not allow any critical or opposing figures to register.
Masoud Pezeshkian unexpectedly won the presidential election. He had served multiple terms as a member of parliament and now, with his decree confirmed on Mordad 7 and after the swearing-in ceremony on Mordad 9, he must seek a vote of confidence for his cabinet from the same parliament where many representatives were aligned with his other electoral rivals.
The following nine sections look at the stages leading to Masoud Pezeshkian's presidency and the challenges he and his cabinet will face in this position.
The death of Raisi: Where does the political landscape lead?
Mohammad Mokhber, Ebrahim Raisi's first deputy, unexpectedly did not register, paving the way for Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf to pursue the presidency more easily. Qalibaf barely entered the parliament in the March 1402 elections in Tehran with just over 400,000 votes. Some ministers from the thirteenth government who registered were disqualified; only Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, the head of the Martyrs Foundation, was confirmed as in the previous election. He considered himself a continuation of Ebrahim Raisi's path, but no one saw him as having a chance or took him seriously. Alireza Zakani, the mayor of Tehran, was also confirmed again. However, from the outset, he was labeled a cover candidate. Some principlist candidates needed his sharp rhetoric in debates to stay safe in his shadow. Saeed Jalili had come again to test his luck in the elections, a luck that had never opened in previous elections. He had either lost or withdrawn from every election he had participated in, whether parliamentary or presidential. Some members of Ebrahim Raisi's government and hardline principlists supported him. Meanwhile, the Reform Front of Iran, consisting of over 30 reformist parties and organizations, announced that if at least one of their designated candidates, Abbas Akhoundi, Masoud Pezeshkian, or Isagh Jahangiri, was not confirmed, they would not participate in the elections and would not support any proxy candidates this time. To everyone's surprise, Masoud Pezeshkian was confirmed, disrupting all electoral equations even for the principlists.
The government's fear of low participation
Low participation, below 50 percent in the last three elections (parliamentary 1398, presidential 1400, parliamentary 1402), had severely worried the government. In the second round of parliamentary elections in Tehran, only 8 percent participated. Signs of widespread protests against the Islamic Republic were evident. Although the government had not taken any steps, however small, to change or address the demands of critics. The widespread protests of "Women, Life, Freedom" in 1401, the killing of protesters, shooting at their heads, eyes, hands, and feet; news of widespread corruption, such as the issue of the Dabbesh tea or land grabbing related to Kazem Sediqi, the Tehran Friday prayer leader, even distanced parts of the religious community from the government.
Some ministers from the thirteenth government who registered were disqualified; only Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, the head of the Martyrs Foundation, was confirmed as in the previous election. He considered himself a continuation of Ebrahim Raisi's path, but no one saw him as having a chance or took him seriously.
Alireza Zakani, the mayor of Tehran, was also confirmed again. However, from the outset, he was labeled a cover candidate. Some principlist candidates needed his sharp rhetoric in debates to stay safe in his shadow.
Saeed Jalili had come again to test his luck in the elections, a luck that had never opened in previous elections. He had either lost or withdrawn from every election he had participated in, whether parliamentary or presidential. Some members of Ebrahim Raisi's government and hardline principlists supported him.
Meanwhile, the Reform Front of Iran, consisting of over 30 reformist parties and organizations, announced that if at least one of their designated candidates, Abbas Akhoundi, Masoud Pezeshkian, or Isagh Jahangiri, was not confirmed, they would not participate in the elections and would not support any proxy candidates this time.
To everyone's surprise, Masoud Pezeshkian was confirmed, disrupting all electoral equations even for the principlists.
Low participation, below 50 percent in the last three elections (parliamentary 1398, presidential 1400, parliamentary 1402), had severely worried the government. In the second round of parliamentary elections in Tehran, only 8 percent participated. Signs of widespread protests against the Islamic Republic were evident. Although the government had not taken any steps, however small, to change or address the demands of critics.
The widespread protests of "Women, Life, Freedom" in 1401, the killing of protesters, shooting at their heads, eyes, hands, and feet; news of widespread corruption, such as the issue of the Dabbesh tea or land grabbing related to Kazem Sediqi, the Tehran Friday prayer leader, even distanced parts of the religious community from the government.
Iran and the presidential election; from political blockage to artists' indifference
The propaganda regarding the population at government rallies and the two ceremonies for the deaths of Ebrahim Raisi and Qassem Soleimani differs from the actual state of society. Even if we refer to the official government statistics regarding participation rates in elections, this time the government anticipated lower participation despite having undertaken "homogenization" and even "purification" in recent years; this time, they sensed the threat more than ever; thus, they slightly opened their closed guard and approved a less risky and lesser-known candidate from the reformist spectrum in hopes that their presence might compensate for the low participation of the past. They brought forth the least risky figure of this movement in terms of outlook, method, expression, and belief in the government.
Crisis in the principlist camp
A few months before the presidential election, a duality of "Chenar" and "Pachnar" or "Pajush" emerged in the principlist camp for the parliamentary elections. The principlists around Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Gholamali Haddad Adel called themselves Chenar, while members of the Stability Front or figures like Hamid Rasai, a member of parliament, and Ali Akbar Raefipour, the secretary-general of the Iran Morning Front, were referred to as Pajush. Rasai and Raefipour spoke against Qalibaf regarding his family corruption case and the corrupt figures around him more than anyone else in the parliamentary elections, even calling some of Qalibaf's allies "bag-snatchers." Contrary to expectations, Qalibaf's allies (Chenar) suffered a severe defeat in the parliamentary elections in Tehran against the Stability Front (Pajush). Mahmoud Nabavian, Amir Hossein Sabati, and Hamid Rasai were the top three candidates in the parliamentary elections in Tehran, with Qalibaf coming in fourth. Qalibaf became the speaker of parliament with the help of the Independent and Moderate faction, of which Masoud Pezeshkian was a member.
Shortly after the parliamentary elections, the announcement of the approved candidates for the presidential election by the Guardian Council caused an earthquake in the principlist camp. The approval of four principlist candidates plus Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the secretary-general of the Combatant Clergy Association, made it difficult for them against the only reformist rival. The daily growth of Pezeshkian's votes in polls became alarming for the principlist camp and their supporters in the power structure. The consensus between Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Saeed Jalili in the principlist camp faced ambiguity. Even if they wanted to, their entourages and advisors were not willing to easily cede the power scene to another; just as they had faced each other a few months earlier in the parliamentary elections.
Campaigns; from symbols and faces to erroneous consultations
Unlike other candidates, Masoud Pezeshkian was a lesser-known figure. However, his campaign had more symbols and faces. These features covered some of his weaknesses, such as verbal and professional unpreparedness. Some well-known university professors, journalists, analysts, and political and economic activists participated in various programs in his favor. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister, was the most prominent of these figures. He had taken off his jacket and was traveling from city to city gathering votes for Pezeshkian. When asked if he would lose his reputation if he did not win the election, he said, "Did I want to take my reputation to the grave? I should spend it right here." Although electoral rivals labeled Masoud Pezeshkian as the "third Rouhani government," it seemed that this propaganda had no effect. Some voters saw the symbol of lifting sanctions in the previous government as Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was now working for Pezeshkian's presidency. In contrast, figures who considered sanctions a blessing were either candidates themselves or present in the campaign teams of other principlist rivals.