Valiati: The Shadow Foreign Minister

Ali Akbar Valiati has recently played a prominent and advancing role in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei on international affairs. Valiati, who served as Iran's Foreign Minister from 1981 to 1997, has always been trusted by Ayatollah Khamenei. The increase in Valiati's travels to regional countries, particularly Lebanon and Syria, meetings with high-ranking officials of these countries, and his comments on various regional issues raise the question of whether Ayatollah Khamenei has taken the helm of diplomacy from Zarif and entrusted it to his advisor. The sudden resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri occurred just one day after Valiati's visit to the country. Although the reason for Hariri's resignation is still unclear, this visit has raised suspicions about a connection between the two events. During this week, Valiati spoke of Iran's support for Islamic resistance in meetings with Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria. Roshandel states that the delineations in Middle Eastern affairs are determined by Valiati and communicated by the Leader. For instance, it briefly seemed that Zarif could open a channel with his Saudi counterpart Adel al-Jubeir to resolve issues between the two countries, but these initial steps quickly reached a deadlock. It appears that Zarif's expertise lies more within the framework of Europe and the West than in the Middle East and neighboring countries. Valiati has always emphasized the Islamic Republic's support for what he calls the resistance axis and considers the Palestinian issue as central to Iran. He describes the role of the IRGC as a 'factor for the protection of the Islamic Republic and Islamic ideals.' Last month, in a television interview regarding strengthening Iran's defensive capabilities, he stated that this is the desire of all Muslims worldwide, adding, 'The hopes of the world's Muslims are on us, and our regional influence is to assist our regional allies and maintain and strengthen the resistance line.' In recent months, following American officials' remarks about the need to address the shortcomings of the JCPOA, he has taken a strong stance against these comments. As a member of the JCPOA oversight committee, he has consistently rejected renegotiation and believes that 'Europeans must compel the U.S. to fulfill its commitments under the JCPOA.' Meanwhile, European countries, while declaring their commitment to the JCPOA, have repeatedly expressed concern about Iran's missile program and its behavior in the region. Valiati also stated regarding the potential visit of Yukiya Amano, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to Iranian military sites, 'We will not allow Amano or anyone else to visit military sites.' The advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei also took a strong stance against Masoud Barzani after the Kurdistan independence referendum, calling him 'an Israeli broker for the disintegration of Islamic countries' and deeming the referendum illegal. One day after the Iraqi army and Hashd al-Shaabi militias captured the city of Kirkuk, he stated, 'The plot of Barzani against regional security has been broken.' He claimed Barzani's goal was 'to seize the oil wells of Kirkuk for the benefit of Israel.' Valiati also places special emphasis on Russia's role in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. In response to new sanctions imposed by the U.S., he stated that Iran can advance its issues through its relations with China, Russia, and some European countries. However, what is the reason for the increasing role of Ali Akbar Valiati in the country's foreign policy and such statements? Why has the diplomacy of Rouhani's government been sidelined compared to his first presidential term? We discussed these questions with Dr. Jalil Roshandel, a political science professor at East Carolina University. Roshandel states, 'Ali Akbar Valiati has had strong familial ties with Ayatollah Khomeini and Jamaran since the beginning of the revolution. In 1997, despite the Leader's wishes and somewhat due to the political and international circumstances of that time, including accusations in the Mykonos case, he was removed from his official position and has since served as a senior advisor to the Leader on international affairs (an apparatus that operates parallel to the Foreign Ministry).' Roshandel emphasizes that Valiati is of special interest to Ayatollah Khamenei, adding, 'In many cases, one can clearly observe the shadow of Valiati's thoughts and ideas in the general lines of foreign policy determined by the Leader. It has now become clear that Rouhani's second presidential term has been accompanied by behind-the-scenes dealings, and although his cabinet has not faced significant issues in appointing proposed ministers except in one or two cases, the Leader's opinion has certainly been decisive regarding key ministers.' This political science professor adds, 'Mohammad Javad Zarif is considered the theorist of the policy of rapprochement with the West and the designer and executor of the nuclear agreement, but he has never had the freedom to implement foreign policy in a way that he has designed. The reality is that even in the stages of the nuclear agreement's formation, the directives and opinions of the Leader were influenced by long consultations with international affairs advisors, including Ali Akbar Valiati.' Jalil Roshandel believes that Mohammad Javad Zarif's performance as Foreign Minister in Middle Eastern interactions has been much more limited. According to Roshandel, 'The delineations in Middle Eastern affairs are determined by Valiati and communicated by the Leader. For instance, it briefly seemed that Zarif could open a channel with his Saudi counterpart Adel al-Jubeir to resolve issues between the two countries, but these initial steps quickly reached a deadlock. It appears that Zarif's expertise lies more within the framework of Europe and the West than in the Middle East and neighboring countries. In the past, when Valiati was a minister and Zarif was a diplomat, Zarif's work focused on Europe and America, while others were active in relation to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, or other parts of the Middle East.' Roshandel compares Rouhani's second presidential term to Mohammad Khatami's second term, adding, 'Individuals and positions have a ceremonial and decorative aspect, while the parallel leadership structure, which can be termed 'shadow power,' engages in policymaking in secret. 'Shadow power' is present in all branches of the state, is decision-making and even executive, but its presence in the Foreign Ministry has been less tangible until recently. What is currently happening is the practical sidelining of Zarif's Foreign Ministry team and the replacement of him with 'shadow power.' But why did we not see the public changes in some ministries like the Ministry of Defense in the case of the Foreign Ministry? Jalil Roshandel states, 'Zarif is a credible card in relation to the West, and given the considerable volume of foreign transactions and relations, as long as he does not want to make decisions personally, his presence is still necessary and especially has a lot of decorative value.' Roshandel adds, 'However, the main condition is that this credit card remains in the hands of its owner and shows that it is valid but cannot conduct a transaction on its own. Wherever they want this card to have the authority to promise and fulfill promises, then Valiati will appear instead of Zarif. However, we must wait and see whether this credit card has permanently lost its validity or, for the sake of the Islamic Republic's interests, will return to the Iranian diplomatic arena again.