Vienna Talks on Syria in a Russian Bus

With the conclusion of the Vienna 3 negotiations regarding Syria and an agreement on the main points while avoiding entering into details such as the political future of Bashar al-Assad, hopes have emerged for ending the Syrian crisis. Although there are many obstacles on the path to such hope, and each party will attempt to interpret the agreements in their favor based on regional conflict points, the most important aspect of the Vienna talks is the ceasefire that will soon enter the Security Council, which will obligate everyone through a resolution. By taking this step, within six months, the groundwork will be laid for the formation of a 'transitional governing body' rather than a 'transitional government', and in the second six months, a new Syrian constitution will be drafted, followed by elections in the third six months. Meanwhile, the central Syrian government and its supporters may seek to make changes to the agreements reached or introduce clauses in their favor, but the structural changes that have occurred, which I will elaborate on below, leave no way back for Bashar al-Assad unless the entire Vienna negotiation process is dismantled. 1- The agreements reached occurred without the presence of representatives from Bashar al-Assad's government and his opponents. This means that the solution to Syria has moved out of the hands of the Syrians themselves and into an international process. In these negotiations, the two conflict axes, namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey on one side and Russia and Iran on the other, clashed. Both sides clearly insisted on their demands, but the US and Europe emphasized a middle path, which, without referencing the points of contention, ultimately led to the aforementioned agreements. The internationalization of the Syrian issue and the adoption of practical steps for it ultimately works against the Damascus regime as it inherently questions the legitimacy of the Assad dynasty and opens the way for international decision-making over which Bashar al-Assad has no control. In this context, the harsh words of Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, against the Vienna talks showed how concerned the officials of the Islamic Republic are about the internationalization of the Syrian crisis. 2- The allies of Bashar al-Assad's opponents in previous Vienna negotiations managed to include a point among the 9 agreement clauses that future Syrian elections would be held under the supervision of the United Nations, especially as this issue includes areas outside Bashar al-Assad's control and also Syrian migrants abroad. This clause, which was signed by Bashar al-Assad's allies, namely Russia, China, and Iran, raised concerns for the current Syrian government and provoked criticisms from the Syrian regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In Iran, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, attacked Russia, while Mohammad Javad Zarif, who had signed the 9-point text of the Vienna 2 negotiations, was forced to defend his actions in these talks. Currently, half of the Syrian population resides in areas outside Bashar al-Assad's control, and if we add the Syrian migrants to them, the demographic equation will shift in favor of the opponents. Furthermore, if a completely free election is held without interference from the intelligence, security, and military organizations supporting Bashar al-Assad in the areas under the control of the Damascus regime, we will see that not all people in these areas will vote for Bashar al-Assad. 3- The designation of 'Jabhat al-Nusra' as a terrorist organization alongside 'ISIS' will lead many of its Syrian forces to join other groups that Russia and Iran could not classify as terrorist groups in the Vienna 3 negotiations. Groups like Jish al-Nasr, Jish al-Fath, and Jish al-Islam, the latter of which even condemned the recent ISIS suicide attacks in Paris and expressed sympathy with the French people. Additionally, the Assad regime and the Islamic Republic expected that by attacking the south of Aleppo city and engaging the opponents on this front, ISIS would easily finish off the 'Jish al-Sham', the Nour al-Din al-Zenki group, and the Sultan Murad Brigade, which are major opposition groups in northern Aleppo. ISIS took advantage of this opportunity to attack the aforementioned groups, but immediately Turkish air forces intervened and heavily bombed ISIS fighters in this area. Turkish air cover halted ISIS's advance in these regions and reclaimed the areas captured by them. On the other hand, the terrorist operation in Paris and the slaughter of innocent people by ISIS led to widespread condemnation in the Arab and Islamic world against these inhumane acts. In such an atmosphere, not only will ISIS no longer be able to add new forces, but other fighting groups in Syria will create a large and strong alliance against it. The Assad regime, which previously exploited the conflict between ISIS and other groups to its advantage, will find that with the clarification of boundaries, all groups except ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra will unite against Bashar al-Assad, and the statements issued in recent days in southern Aleppo are in this direction. 5- From a military perspective, Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, along with Russian planners for the attack on Syria, hoped that by mobilizing all forces and employing Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani militias, they could change the equation of war, especially in the Aleppo region, and use it to gain leverage against the opposing axis in the Vienna negotiations. This attack initially met with some success, and the IRGC forces along with Shiite militias captured several villages in the southern Aleppo axis. However, with the intensification of clashes and increasing casualties, particularly among Iranian commanders, some of the captured areas were retaken, and no significant change occurred in the war equation in this region in favor of Bashar al-Assad, and it seems unlikely that such changes will occur in the future. Meanwhile, the opposition forces also made significant advances in the Hama front. 6- The heavy defeat of ISIS in the city of Sinjar in northern Iraq and the severing of the supply route between the two ISIS capitals in Iraq and Syria, namely Mosul and Raqqa, heralds the decline of this terrorist group's star. Although the 'Islamic State' is currently trying to cover its defeat in Sinjar with attacks in Paris and threats against several other Western countries, the victory of the Kurds in northern Iraq will soon show its effects in both Syria and Iraq, and Bashar al-Assad's opponents, especially in their contact points with ISIS, will gain more mobility. The northern Aleppo front, which is currently completely tied to the presence of ISIS forces, will allow the opponents to assist the southern Aleppo front as this terrorist group weakens. The Ahrar al-Sham movement, which is very active in this area, issued a statement strongly condemning the slaughter of innocent people in Paris and announced its readiness to expel ISIS from these areas. On the other hand, the outcome of the war in southern Aleppo shows that the last efforts of Iran and Bashar al-Assad to change the ruling equation have led nowhere, and therefore Russia cannot emphasize this approach forever. Moreover, Russia's economic situation is not reassuring, and it cannot continue its war in Syria for a long time. However, when Russia can reconcile with countries opposing Bashar al-Assad, it can open many opportunities for itself and gain numerous advantages. Internationally, Russia can claim that by its practical entry into the Syrian war, it was able to end this dangerous crisis. Additionally, by cooperating with countries opposing Bashar al-Assad, Russia can maintain its strategic interests in Syria while gaining advantages in raising oil prices. The currently low oil prices are putting severe pressure on the Russian economy, and an increase would be a reward that the Russians would gain from their cooperation on the Syrian issue. The Russians are too wise to lose all these advantages and cling to the issue of Bashar al-Assad's survival. 'The ruler of Damascus' is merely a playing card and holds value only as long as it is used appropriately in the right place, and it is believed that the Russians have utilized it and now it is time for them to think about their own advantages. This means that the Russians will go through the Vienna negotiations to the end, and there is no way back. Perhaps the criticisms that some Iranian officials have raised against Russia are, in fact, criticisms of riding on a bus that the Russians are driving. In this bus, the officials of the Islamic Republic do not know where they will go and what goal they will end up at, and it is too late to get off because the Russian bus has already left.