Volcano of People's Anger and Fault Lines in Iran's System

In response to global media reactions to protests in Iran, the think tanks "National Interest" and "Foundation for Defense of Democracies" have addressed the causes and origins of these unrests in the performance of the Islamic Republic system. Clifford May, president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, in an article published on the NGO's website, states that the Islamic Revolution of Iran since 1979 has been a grand experiment, and since then, Iran has been under the control of an Ayatollah who has a deep familiarity with Islamic Sharia. He must be the "Supreme Leader," a respectful term for "dictator." He must be worthy of this position, as he carries the title of "God's representative on Earth." Mr. May continues that the previous Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, was a charismatic figure, the fire of God's wrath, and an unparalleled supporter of jihad against America and the West. When he died in 1989, Khamenei became his heir, who has shown no willingness to compromise with the regime's ideological change, but rather calls the Islamic Revolution a turning point in contemporary world history. The report adds that currently, the Iranian regime has influence in Iraq, maintains the Assad dynasty in Syria, controls Lebanon through Hezbollah, and supports the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and although the Iranian leader may have postponed his nuclear ambitions after the nuclear deal, he certainly has his eyes on nuclear weapons in the long term and is currently expanding capabilities for missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The analyst from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies writes: "Revolution is like a volcano; no matter what tremors you see or how much smoke rises, you can never predict when it will erupt. But there is a general rule: the harsher the regime, the closer its downfall. In other words, ruthlessness has a cost." Mr. May continues that such ambitions come at a cost. "The people of Iran, who were hopeful for their freedom and prosperity after the overthrow of the Shah, have become disillusioned, and worse, the dreams of a people who expected to benefit from the influx of billions of dollars into the country after the nuclear deal have been dashed. These people have ultimately taken to the streets in hundreds of thousands, risking their lives to protest, and so far, individuals have been killed in street protests in over 20 cities in Iran, and hundreds have been arrested." He adds that some Western media have generally ignored the issue, while others introduced the rising prices of eggs as the cause, but the slogans indicated another demand: "We do not want the Islamic Republic, the clerics must go, death to the dictator, the clerics are playing God, either death or freedom, leave Syria and think about us, not Gaza or Lebanon, my life is for Iran, we will die and take back Iran, and ..." Not naive! This is not just an economic protest movement. Is another revolution on the way? The author of the article continues that talking about revolution and predicting such issues is indeed problematic. Revolution is like a volcano; no matter what tremors you see or how much smoke rises, you can never predict when it will erupt. Mr. May continues that there is a general rule: the harsher the regime, the closer its downfall. In other words, ruthlessness has a cost. "The Iranian religious regime – contrary to many of its defenders in the West – is extremely ruthless: the IRGC and Basij have no qualms about brutally suppressing dissenters, Iran has the highest execution rates in the world relative to its population, power holders torture opponents, imprison human rights defenders, rape women in prison, execute homosexuals in public, and this list goes on." He adds that the last time Iranian protesters took to the streets was in 2009; they shouted, "Obama (the then President of the United States), Obama, either with them or with us," but the U.S. President did not respond to their voice. "It is very naive to think that Obama's stance was an experiment. The general view of the elite has long been that Iran is inherently a 'normal state' whose leaders seek stability in the region, and if Obama reaches out, they will quickly open their fists for reconciliation. But now the result of this experiment is clear to everyone. The U.S. foreign policy elite were wrong, and those few who said that the clerics in power in Iran are irreconcilable enemies were indeed correct." Mr. May states that last weekend, the U.S. State Department criticized the Iranian government for "turning a rich country with a rich history and culture into a rogue state with a destroyed economy whose exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos." Trump tweeted that the whole world knows that the good people of Iran want change, and several other influential U.S. officials also made strong statements. The article adds that, however, support for the rights of the Iranian people and their aspirations has not been sufficient. Why? Democratic moderates and those with progressive views do not want to be implicitly seen as critics of Obama's decisions in 2009, and on the other hand, they do not want to be aligned with Republicans in the next step, which is supporting the protesters and applying pressure on the Iranian government. The Fragile Iranian System "National Interest" also, in an article by "Mohammad Ayoub," a professor at the University of Michigan and an expert at the Washington Center for Global Policy, writes that two weeks ago, a huge number of experts were praising the recent successes of Iran's foreign policy in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Qatar, claiming that a superpower has emerged in the Middle East, but the spontaneous anti-regime protests in Iran over the past week, which resulted in the deaths of at least 21 citizens, have shown how fragile this system is. This report states that the recent protests have confused most foreigners, but with a closer look at the Iranian scene, this should not be surprising: economic problems, high inflation along with recession, unemployment, especially among the youth who make up a large part of the country's population, and the urban-rural divide have all made society ripe for protests. Mr. Ayoub continues that right after the nuclear deal and the lifting of sanctions, a wave of hope for improving the country's economic situation and its impact on people's lives arose, but these expectations, especially due to the Trump administration's hardline approach, turned into despair: "The imposition of new non-nuclear U.S. sanctions against Iran, the fear of European companies and other entities of U.S. punishment, and especially the possibility of further sanctions against Iran dashed hopes." The report adds that the unemployment rate among youth is about 40 percent, the worst situation since the nuclear deal. Trump, who refused to certify Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal last October, has raised the possibility of undermining this agreement. National Interest writes that widespread corruption in regime-affiliated institutions has worsened the situation. Hassan Rouhani's efforts to reduce corruption faced protests from these giant economic entities. They are close to one or more power centers within the regime and generally operate under the title of companies affiliated with the "Headquarters" (Executive Headquarters of Imam's Command). On the other hand, the IRGC, with its economic arm, Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, currently has a 10 percent share of the total GDP, and one of the main protests of the people has been this giant economic entity's claim to the government budget, which has faced revelations from Rouhani's supporters. Extralegal and Interfering Institutions The analyst from the National Interest think tank states: the recent protests have confused most foreigners, but with a closer look at the Iranian scene, this should not be surprising. Economic problems, high inflation along with recession, unemployment, especially among the youth who make up a large part of the country's population, and the urban-rural divide have all made society ripe for protests. This report adds that the hybrid system of Iran's economy has not only created a bloated and subsidy-dependent state but has also paralyzed the country's policymaking system due to deep divisions among various sectors of this system. The report then refers to the name "Islamic Republic" and its Islamic components, such as institutions like the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts on one side and the parliament and government of Iran on the other, stating that the velayat-e faqih was supposed to be at the top and act as the final arbiter in case of disputes among power holders, but this was more evident during the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, not Khamenei, who was not on par with the position and status of the previous leader and often sided with part of the system rather than being moderate. Mr. Ayoub continues that the result has been twofold: the emergence of a vast number of religious institutions that do not believe in collective voting and, on the other hand, their excessive power in political affairs, which even interferes in elections, as seen in the 2009 elections. This report also states that the lack of accountability of the giant religious economic institutions and their allowance to make any decision causes part of the system, like the government, which is elected, to be blamed for all problems. Mr. Ayoub continues that the emergence of other extralegal institutions like the IRGC in the economy and political power has complicated the situation, where even their interests do not align with those of the conservative and extremist clerics in some cases. This report adds that there are speculations about the behind-the-scenes hands of Rouhani's rivals trying to undermine him by bringing people to the streets of Mashhad, which ultimately got out of their control, and the people chanted against the entire regime, including Khamenei himself. The report then compares the protests of 2009, stating that firstly, in the current protests, the entire regime is being criticized, and secondly, this time, instead of the elites and urban residents, residents of small towns have engaged in widespread protests, and finally, the protesters have criticized Iran's policies and interventions in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and other countries. This report adds that if the Iranian regime seeks to deal with the current protests with greater violence, it will likely face the same outcome that befell the Pahlavi regime in 1979.