Warning and Praise: The Islamic Republic's Propaganda Strategies in Nuclear Negotiations

The nuclear negotiations in July 2015 have been of vital importance to the Islamic Republic, both in terms of efforts to lift sanctions and in manipulating the negative image of the Republic in global public opinion. However, entering these negotiations has not been easy for Khamenei and the military and security forces loyal to him from the outset; they have always portrayed themselves as uncompromising individuals against 'arrogance,' and these negotiations, which cannot happen without 'compromise' for both sides, disrupt this self-presentation. The image created of the regime in these negotiations for the regime's supporters and other Iranians, as well as Shiites in the region, has been of great importance to officials. For this reason, the government adopted a specific propaganda policy directed at the negotiations. In this article, I explain this propaganda policy in five areas: objectives, channels/carriers, audience, strategies, and tactics. The objective of this propaganda policy has been to present these negotiations not as a weakness of the regime, which officials have entered out of necessity (under the pressure of sanctions), but as a strength for the government and high-ranking officials. The goal of this propaganda strategy has been that whether the negotiations yield results or not, the outcome should benefit the regime. As always, it must be shown that the Islamic Republic does not experience defeat and is victorious in any case: 'The enemy has entered every arena to threaten the Iranian nation, but has failed.' (Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Tasnim, July 22, 2015) The official media of the Islamic Republic, in the realm of nuclear negotiations, like other issues, have not sought to provide news (reporting events) and expert analysis, but rather reflect the statements of officials, which are mostly positions. Even news in these media is presented with a promotional packaging based on loyalty and disavowal. This propaganda movement encompasses Khamenei's statements in closely timed meetings to seemingly documentary political programs on television, from political advertisements on billboards and street banners to Friday prayer podiums, from film screenings at universities to slogans at the funerals of casualties from the Iran-Iraq war and demonstrations on Quds Day, and from political notes and warning interviews (especially by IRGC commanders) in newspapers and websites to directed news writing about the course of these negotiations. Extensive negative propaganda against Western countries, especially the United States, regarding contentious issues in the negotiations has been raised in detail by military and paramilitary forces in various government centers, such that the course of negotiations can be discerned from the propaganda of news agencies close to the IRGC. In this context, Khamenei has played the most important role by repeatedly setting red lines or warning internal forces. Groups that have criticized the negotiating team have mostly utilized street propaganda, although Khamenei's support for the negotiating team has mitigated their negative aspects. The audience of this wave of propaganda is not only insiders but also those who have been optimistically waiting for a nuclear agreement inside or outside the country. Insiders are targeted so that they do not feel that the Islamic Republic has entered negotiations under pressure; they must be assured of the officials' steadfastness. However, the general public has been addressed in terms of feeling pride regarding the officials' steadfastness on nuclear rights and the futility of the costs incurred to maintain the nuclear program. Knowing the audience's lack of conviction regarding the value of this program or its worth against the costs, several political notes in newspapers have been dedicated to the importance of nuclear energy for the country's progress. The propaganda policies directed at the nuclear negotiations have followed four strategies: 1. Displaying unity and solidarity: In domestic politics, as always, the quest for unity and consensus has been alongside rivalries. The display of unity among officials and factions in cursing Israel and calling for the elimination of Israel by Rafsanjani and Hassan Khamenei specifically aimed at strengthening the internal front during the negotiations. Rafsanjani has repeated his positions from the 1980s less in recent years. Another aspect of this strategy is the announcement of the presence of those in the Quds Day rally who have been referred to in government literature with titles such as seditionists, ignorant elites, and deviants. Such positions have been interpreted as national unity, while factional coordination made more sense. Of course, political competition continues, which manifested in warnings related to preventing a public nuclear celebration. The dispute over whether or not to celebrate in the event of successful negotiations is clearly related to political rivalry, lest a potential agreement strengthen Rouhani's government; the government welcomes a nuclear celebration. The governor of Tehran says: 'The government has not officially announced a nuclear victory celebration, but we support the spontaneous enthusiasm of the people in response to the success of the nuclear negotiating team, and the necessary facilities will be provided.' (ISNA, July 22, 2015) However, the police spokesperson states that 'no program regarding the nuclear celebration has been announced and communicated, and unauthorized gatherings are against the law and will be subject to legal action.' (Tasnim, July 22, 2015) Khamenei wants the agreement to be attributed to him while not accepting responsibility for some compromises and shifting the blame to others. 2. Stimulating national pride: During the months of Khordad and Tir, the official media of the Islamic Republic completely shed the skin of Islamism and donned the cloak of nationalism while reporting on the nuclear negotiations. They attempted to awaken national sentiments by stirring national pride with statements such as 'Do not threaten the Iranian' (quoting Zarif in negotiations) or reporting on his shouting at foreign ministers of other countries, which is, of course, a sign of rudeness and aggressive behavior, not a sign of steadfastness on positions. 3. Security-centric: In the political propaganda of state media and military officials, the issue of security is highlighted over human rights, democracy, and development and welfare so that people appreciate the current situation in the country compared to other countries in the region like Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. 4. Continuation of the struggle against the West: Ali Khamenei (and loyal political and military officials citing his words) has repeatedly emphasized three issues in the months of Khordad and Tir 1394 to ensure that the nuclear negotiations do not lead to a reduction of tensions between the Islamic Republic and the West: a) Lack of trust in the U.S. and its European allies; b) 'Continuation of the struggle against arrogance' because, in his view, sanctions and human rights are just pretexts, and the West has a problem with the regime itself; c) Distinguishing between nuclear negotiations and negotiations with the U.S. over mutual issues, as if the bilateral meetings between Zarif and Kerry are not negotiations between Iran and the United States. In the realm of tactical propaganda, state and semi-state media have focused on five axes: 1. Highlighting Khamenei's role in standing firm on red lines and bargaining, and realizing his skepticism about Western countries, asserting that 'we do not trust the West' in the event of unsuccessful negotiations. These statements have had a clearly laudatory aspect for the leader of the Islamic Republic, as if without him, the negotiations would have led to the humiliation of the Iranian nation. The government's propaganda apparatus, alongside praising the leader of the Islamic Republic, sometimes also praises the negotiating team (after Khamenei's support for them), such as the note that Zarif's professors at the University of Denver considered him intelligent. (Fars, July 22, 2015) 2. Presenting the idea that the U.S. is backtracking to place the failure of negotiations on this country. In such news, there was no mention of what previous position the Americans had withdrawn from. 3. Presenting the notion that merely entering negotiations, even without results, has been beneficial for the regime as it has disseminated officials' views in the world and showcased the country's diplomatic power or opened the hands of the United States in its lack of seriousness in reaching an agreement. 4. Warning Western countries about the activation of (a blow of) 100,000 centrifuges in the event of negotiation failure (Mohsen Rezaei, Tabnak), this threat is, of course, not directed at the Western negotiators but aimed at the Iranian people, emphasizing the officials' determination to continue the nuclear program in the event of lifted pressures. 5. Stating that we are not forced to compromise. This point is conveyed with an emphasis on Obama's need for a nuclear agreement. However, it does not specify why Obama needs an agreement so much to both lift sanctions and accept all of Khamenei's red lines.