Washington, Brussels, and the Nuclear Agreement; The Convergence of Two Opposing Views?

The coordinated statements on Tuesday, December 5, by Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State, and Federica Mogherini, the EU's chief diplomat, indicate a rapprochement between Brussels' supportive view of the nuclear agreement and Washington's opposing stance, ahead of the Congress's sixty-day deadline to vote on the continuation or withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal. Brussels' positive view of the nuclear agreement is influenced by European countries' commercial interests in Iran and their short-term security considerations, citing the prevention of the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Washington administration, in a different perspective from the previous government that was responsible for designing and promoting the nuclear agreement with Iran, has introduced the JCPOA as contrary to U.S. national interests and the security interests of its allies in the Middle East, calling for a unilateral exit from it. The majority of the U.S. Congress also opposed the nuclear agreement; however, due to the lack of a 60-vote threshold in the Senate, Congress's opposition faced a veto from the then-President and went nowhere. Donald Trump, who faces opposition within the Republican Party, especially in the Senate, regarding domestic issues, needed sufficient time to prepare for the announcement of withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic. Engaging Congress in drafting a new nuclear diplomacy with Iran gave the White House the opportunity to attempt to mitigate the opposition of America's European partners, who strongly insisted on maintaining the JCPOA in its current form, while also repairing its domestic position against Congress legislators. Thus, contrary to its internal desires and announced policies, the Trump administration confirmed 'Iran's compliance with the commitments arising from the nuclear agreement' at the end of two 90-day periods that Congress had mandated as a precondition for continuing the suspension of sanctions against Iran. However, on Friday, October 13, before the expiration of the third 90-day deadline, Trump delegated the responsibility of determining the government's position on whether to exit or remain in the nuclear agreement to U.S. lawmakers, asking them to vote on this matter within a sixty-day deadline (by December 15). A negative vote from Congress could trigger the re-imposition of nuclear sanctions against Iran and officially end U.S. participation in the JCPOA: a development that, willingly or unwillingly, would pull Europe along with the U.S. and sooner or later lead to the complete practical end of the JCPOA. Mogherini's statements on Tuesday, after her negotiations with Tillerson, regarding the 'EU's readiness to work closely with the U.S. on all issues outside the nuclear agreement but related to Iran,' one day after the joint statements by Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Foreign Minister, and Sigmar Gabriel, the German Foreign Minister, opposing Iran's missile activities and the necessity to stop what they called 'the Islamic Republic's hegemonic behavior in the region,' indicate that the U.S. government, after consulting with Congress representatives, has reached a relative agreement with the European community regarding a 'soft exit' from the nuclear agreement with Tehran. At the same time, a moderate and conditional vote from Congress in the coming days could, without issuing a definitive ruling on the U.S. exit from the JCPOA, impose new restrictions on Iran under the guise of 'non-nuclear sanctions,' while also satisfying the Trump administration and achieving relative approval and cooperation from the European Union. The role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy is that Congress is interested in taking a position and aligning with the public on foreign policy issues where the majority of public opinion is clearly formed. During polls conducted during Obama's presidency regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran, perhaps due to the extensive propaganda of the then-government in the media and Congress in favor of the nuclear agreement, public opinion aligned positively with government policies. Since the current U.S. administration took office, perhaps due to the cessation of financial resources for conducting previous targeted speculation, the definitive stance of public opinion on the nuclear agreement has not been clearly expressed. No independent and comprehensive polling of American public opinion regarding the nuclear agreement has been conducted under the Trump administration, and one or two limited polls have faced issues with the credibility of their organizers. In this regard, Congress's position is not very clear concerning U.S. public opinion towards the JCPOA. Despite the Republican majority of four votes in the Senate (52-48) and holding 240 out of 435 seats in the House of Representatives, due to differences of opinion between the president and some of his party's representatives in the Senate (including Senator Bob Corker and Senator John McCain), the issue of fully and directly reinstating sanctions against Iran to the status prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is surrounded by ambiguities. At the same time, a moderate action that Congress cannot avoid, which could, while gaining relative satisfaction from the European Union, deprive the Islamic Republic of the major benefits of the JCPOA, would involve imposing heavier but non-nuclear-related sanctions and binding the U.S. government to automatically reinstate the full set of sanctions if Iran is proven to have violated the terms of the nuclear agreement. Inspections of suspicious military sites in the precise implementation of the Additional Protocol, addressing the issue of the so-called 'Annex T' in the nuclear agreement, which is the responsibility of the U.S. government, placing the condition of Iran refraining from conducting ballistic missile tests in accordance with the definitions in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, as well as countering Iran's military presence in the region, could be referenced in Congress's resolution in response to the Trump administration's requests. The 'Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act,' passed in May 2015, which granted U.S. lawmakers the right to review the nuclear agreement, received support from 98 in favor to 1 against (Republican Senator Tom Cotton) in the Senate and 400 in favor to 25 against in the House of Representatives, thus safeguarding it from the threat of a veto by then-President Barack Obama.