Wave of Regret; Rouhani's Populism or Rivals' Conspiracy?

The wave of regret for voting for Hassan Rouhani has spread so widely that it has become the most important political topic in the country in recent weeks. This political phenomenon has been so impactful that Hassan Rouhani reacted to it during a speech at the Citizens' Rights Conference, stating: "As President, I will remain committed to my promises until the end, and I ask you, the people, to stay committed as well. We started this work together, and we must continue together. Rouhani emphasized that throughout his second term, he needs the people's votes, opinions, support, and criticism." Alongside Rouhani's request for continued support, other senior moderate and reformist figures have expressed similar concerns and have opposed Rouhani. Some have even attributed the situation to an 'intelligence' and 'security' aspect; the initiator of this reaction was Hesamoddin Ashna, a former intelligence figure and close associate of Rouhani, who claimed that the project of regret over Rouhani was designed by certain intelligence agencies. Following this, Mohammad Khatami entered the fray, announcing maximum support for Rouhani and labeling the regret and opposition to him as a conspiracy by rivals. This type of positioning, while not fitting within the framework of democratic culture and the recognition of individuals' right to free expression and ethical standards, poisons the atmosphere and makes the fragile coalition of moderates and reformists more vulnerable. If political positions are to be reduced to conspiracy theories and suspicions or merely judged based on objective consequences and the geopolitical constraints of politics, ignoring the will and decisions of political actors and citizens, then the ground will be prepared for strengthening a view that has seen Rouhani's presidency since 2013 as a ploy and engineering by the institution of the Supreme Leader, mediated by the country's intelligence apparatus. However, more important than this issue, which will ultimately harm the moderate-reformist coalition, is identifying the main source of this event and assessing the impact of this wave in the political arena, which in turn requires an analysis of political reactions. Monitoring developments clarifies that regret over voting for Rouhani, or at least disillusionment and doubt, is a real occurrence among a significant portion of his voters from the 2017 elections. Although its permanence is uncertain and it may be a transient phenomenon, it is nonetheless impactful and could serve as a thermometer for future political events, especially the 2020 parliamentary elections. The distancing from Rouhani, compared to Mohammad Khatami, has emerged at a time when Rouhani's second government has not yet reached six months in office. The root of this event and its main factor is the significant gap between Rouhani's promises during the election campaign and his performance. After forming the twelfth government, Rouhani has shown a completely different face from the Rouhani active in the 2017 election campaign. Contrary to distancing himself from the existing political situation and aligning with the demands of the protest movement during the elections, making numerous political and cultural promises and raising expectations, his five-month performance has not only displayed a clear breach of promise but has even been weaker than during his first term. Rouhani's support base, especially those who voted tactically and negatively, expected that after the realization of the JCPOA and the politicization of the twelfth presidential election, the moderate government would move towards fulfilling its programs in political and cultural areas, albeit at a slow pace, and outline a hopeful perspective. However, the weak and disproportionate composition of Rouhani's second cabinet shocked many from the outset, and the subsequent retreat from commitments and alignment with the institution of the Supreme Leader and entities responsible for repression and organized violations of citizens' rights, such as the Revolutionary Guards, sowed seeds of despair and hopelessness. In this context, Rouhani's insistence on ignoring criticisms and resorting to verbal therapy and evading accountability has exacerbated frustrations. The record of Rouhani's second government and the current outlook of his positions have created a different kind of populism, particularly in the economic and political arenas, which lacks a dual approach and a program to meet the expectations of voters, especially in political and cultural domains. The reactions of political forces have varied. Analyzing the positions of reformists towards Rouhani's new persona does not reflect a unified approach. Some have resorted to open criticism and are worried about losing votes, while others have justified Rouhani's actions, denying his weaknesses and merely warning against despair, emphasizing the superiority of the current situation compared to the presidencies of Raisi and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Among these, an odd assertion has also been made that evaluating based on the promises made during the election is incorrect and a sign of being 'non-political.' The logical extension of this theory, in addition to denying a demand-oriented approach, justifies populism, allowing a candidate to promise anything to the people and then, upon gaining power, bear no responsibility for the promises and statements that attracted votes. Some, in contradictory positions, have confirmed Rouhani's 'deviation' from his commitments to the people and labeled him 'arrogant,' calling for not passing over Rouhani. The positions of reformists and aligned political forces, which either deny criticisms and protests or condemn them politically, or have disparaged them, or urged people to avoid despair, all share a commonality in ignorance or neglect of the source of protests. Assessing effectiveness or ineffectiveness ultimately results from performance. Neither opponents can dishearten the will of the people nor can defenders instill hope through justification. The current sense of despair and distancing, which appears to be increasing, is a logical outcome of Rouhani's negative performance and his evasion of accountability regarding the gap that has emerged between words and actions. Public opinion is not owned or controlled by any individual or political current. The people, as a synthesis of various social tendencies and different voting groups, have not made a permanent bond of brotherhood and eternal connection with political currents. A limited portion of society has an organic connection with political parties and currents, and relying on them for victory in political arenas is insufficient. The essence of politics is based on change and dynamism. Ultimately, the names of individuals and factions, whether principlists, reformists, or moderates, do not matter; rather, the achievements and outcomes of their actions are what determine significant differences. In this framework, attention to the various groups that voted for Rouhani is also important. It is natural that government-centered views and those believing in top-down reforms, which recommend participation in the flawed electoral structure of the Islamic Republic, bear the brunt of the current despair. Recent events, like the four years of Rouhani's first presidency, have once again shown that meaningful and sustainable changes in political, cultural, and social arenas cannot rely on electoral institutions given the dominant position of the institution of the Supreme Leader and its continuous and comprehensive opposition to changes in the current situation. However, the approach that explained voting for Rouhani from a negative and tactical perspective has been relatively less affected. Of course, this approach is also under criticism and doubt at a level where its formulation is not very realistic in distinguishing between Rouhani's presidency and Raisi's. The fate of each of these political approaches and, at a higher level, the internal competitions within the power bloc and the confrontation of government-centered and movement-centered approaches in the arena of change-seeking will partly depend on Rouhani's performance in the coming months and the political conditions of the country. If the current trend of the twelfth government's performance continues and especially if it fails to create significant breakthroughs in the economic sphere, then the current wave of regret will expand, and Rouhani's populism will face a fate similar to that of Ahmadinejad's populism. However, beyond these speculations, the lasting consequence of Rouhani turning his back on electoral promises and being absorbed into the status quo, which seems more concerned about his position after the end of his presidency, is the intensification of the crisis of trust in the political arena. Now, some voters feel deceived, which, regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of this perception, will lead to a widespread distrust of politicians and their positions in general, which will have a detrimental effect on the comprehensive development of the country.