Ways for the U.S. to Engage with Iran in Conversation with Michael Singh

In light of the developments that have occurred in Tehran-Washington relations since Donald Trump's presidency began, Radio Farda conducts interviews with analysts and political experts from various factions and mindsets in the U.S. regarding this matter. In the following interview, Radio Farda speaks with Michael Singh, who is the Managing Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and previously served as Senior Director for Middle Eastern Affairs at the National Security Council. He was also a senior advisor to Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential election. Recently, Michael Singh published recommendations to the new U.S. government regarding policy towards Iran in a study titled "Deterring Iran." Mr. Singh, I want to start this interview with one of the points you made in your recommendations to the new U.S. government regarding Iran. You wrote that the U.S. deterrence strategy towards Iran should be such that Tehran understands that challenging U.S. interests will have costs, while also recognizing that playing by the rules, both regionally and internationally, will benefit Tehran. The cost aspect is clearer; I want to know what you mean by the rules of the game and what benefits it could have. For example, if the U.S. and its international allies in the P5+1 reached a nuclear agreement with Iran, we had a dynamic discussion in the U.S. about whether this agreement was good, or strong enough, or restrictive enough. However, I think there is not an active discourse among analysts about this general principle: that if Iran truly wants to set aside any aspirations towards acquiring nuclear weapons and accepts limitations and inspections of its nuclear program, we must be prepared to lift sanctions. I think this is a good example that shows Iran can benefit from constructive actions and policies. We do not impose sanctions just for the sake of sanctions or because we dislike Iran; we do it because of specific actions, and if those actions stop, we are also ready to lift the sanctions. In your article, you addressed an important part of this nuclear agreement. Among your recommendations, you mention a sunset clause for the agreement and suggest that the U.S. should work with its allies to ensure that limitations on Iran's program continue. On the other side of such negotiations, an incentive must be created for Iran. What do you think this incentive could be? I believe what Iran must accept is that in the West, Europe, and even in Asia, there is a perception that Iran is attempting to acquire weapon-making capabilities. Even if it does not intend to acquire weapons, the mere possession of such capabilities is a destabilizing factor for the Middle East and creates an incentive for Iran's neighbors to pursue similar capabilities. Since the United States and others seek stability in this region and instability in this area affects Europe and elsewhere, we cannot accept destabilizing actions. Therefore, what we want is for the limitations and requirements imposed on Iran's nuclear program to be expanded and extended. Iran's benefit in this matter is the prevention of the crises and tensions we have witnessed over the past ten or twenty years regarding Iran's nuclear program. This will also lead to continued trade with Iran and Iran's return to the international community and the global economy. We are speaking at a time when the first step in this regard has been taken. The agreement has been reached and has been implemented for over a year. Do you think Iran's expectations for, say, the economic benefits of this agreement have been met? Well, I think this agreement has removed barriers from Iran's path; it has lifted barriers to economic growth in Iran and progress in relations with neighbors and other countries, but these sanctions were not the only barrier. I believe if Iran truly wants to benefit from this agreement, it must also implement reforms within its own country, reform its economic structure, and change its behavior towards its neighbors in the region. With such actions, it can maximize its benefit from this agreement. You have suggested to the U.S. government that it should actively inform the private sector about sanctions and the laws surrounding them. This is somewhat contrary to what, for example, former Secretary of State John Kerry was doing, who met with heads of major international institutions. In any case, this issue was also encouraged in the agreement. Does the information you propose not worry economic actors about cooperating with Iran? What we want to see in the United States is that illicit economic activity (based on our laws) does not occur. I believe the best way to prevent that is to provide information and transparency. Simply saying that companies can operate, they will still be cautious because they do not have the necessary encouragement; rather, they need clarity on the situation. As a result, I say that if we still have sanctions on this or that entity, or a specific type of sanction is still in place, we must be very frank and clear with economic actors and explain what these sanctions are, how they work, and which entities they include so that they know they are conducting legitimate trade. In another part of your recommendations regarding the new government's policies towards Iran, and within the framework of the agreement, you refer to the International Atomic Energy Agency and state that the agency should be encouraged to publish more details in its public reports. My question is, why do you think this additional detail for the public could help validate Iran's program? There is a lot of skepticism in the West about Iran's nuclear program and Iran's true intentions. Well, Iran claims that it has no intention of building nuclear weapons or pursuing the capability to produce weapons. I believe that to end these doubts and build trust, there must be transparency. It should be addressed in great detail what exactly is happening in Iran's nuclear program. I think this is in the interest of anyone in the West who does not want to witness a nuclear crisis with Iran. And to be honest, this will also be in the interest of the Iranian government and people. But you are talking about an agency that, for example, has a Board of Governors with members including the U.S., and this board receives reports and details and can be aware of the scope of Iran's program. What obligation is there for the public to be aware of these details? Is it not enough for the U.S. government to be informed in this regard? I believe that because there is democracy in the West and we have more than one governmental institution and there is a separation of powers. In the U.S., we have a Congress that is very active regarding Iran's policies, especially concerning sanctions. I think it is important that this information is accessible to the public so that independent analysts can judge it because our habit is not to rely solely on our government's statements but to see and examine the information ourselves. If no illicit or wrongful actions are being taken, both Iran and the U.S. and other parties to the agreement should be satisfied with the judgments of independent analysts that the necessary trust is built. Mr. Singh, however, Iran says this is national defense secrets, and due to its commitments for the agency's oversight and the implementation of the Additional Protocol and safeguards, it provides this information to the agency but does not want the whole world to be aware of it. If Iran's nuclear program truly has a civilian nature and is, as the government claims, focused on electricity production and the use of medical isotopes, then the leaking of defense and political secrets becomes irrelevant. At the same time, I think priorities must be considered. In an ideal world, we would easily trust the agency and the Iranian government, but given the history of this issue, that trust has been damaged. I think as we move forward, ensuring the stability of the agreement, the stability of Iran's relationship with the West, and the continuation of the agreement's life are more important than preserving a confidential piece of information. I think these should take precedence, and I hope the Iranians see this as well. So you are saying that both the issue of trust in Iran and the agency is not at an adequate level? Exactly. It is clear that Iran has not been honest about its nuclear program in the past, and we reached this agreement with a degree of doubt. Regarding the agency, there is trust about the agency's intentions, but we also know that in the past, the agency has overlooked some details, for example, regarding North Korea or the nuclear programs of other countries. Therefore, it is also important that besides the agency, independent experts are there to examine this information. You have written that the policies of the Iranian government are certainly not the only problem for the new U.S. government in the Middle East, but you believe it is the most important one. We are talking about a region where several wars are ongoing in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, and we can add the fight against ISIS. The question is, why do you think Iran is the most important? From the perspective of the U.S. and Washington, when you look at Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or all these crises that arise in various corners of the Middle East, either Iran or one of its proxies has a role in them. The approach in the U.S. is that, for example, in Syria, without Iran's military support, the Assad regime would have had to engage in diplomatic bargaining. In Iraq, there is significant concern about the arming and training of militias that may operate independently of the Iraqi government's authority. In Yemen, there is also great concern that Iran is supplying weapons to the Houthi rebels, a group that has ousted the legitimate government from Sana'a. As a result, I think we are concerned about all these problems, but in all of them, there is a characteristic: Iran's role in exacerbating instability in the region. Mr. Singh, do you think that in this region, given the existing crises, the new U.S. government might be able to turn the situation into an opportunity and cooperate with Iran in these areas to resolve the crises? Not that Tehran would become an ally of Washington, but that they could engage in strategic cooperation? In some cases, the U.S. and Iran may have short-term common goals, such as defeating ISIS in Mosul, but this is not the case for long-term goals. I think what the U.S. wants to see in Iraq is an independent and democratic Iraq that is strong and pluralistic, but there is doubt in the U.S. that Iran has such goals. Tehran seeks to have more control over Iraq, more than we are willing to accept or is appropriate for one independent country to have over another independent country. Certainly, there is an opportunity for cooperation in the short term, but only if we can align those long-term goals as well. Right now, we are very far from such a moment, and there is a lot of doubt. Is that why you keep the topic of dialogue with Iran on the table in your recommendations, suggesting that this approach by Washington should be done with consideration of regional allies? Look, we should view dialogue as a means, not an end. Dialogue is something we use not only with Iran but with many countries to pursue our goals and interests. When we talk about Iran, I don't think the regional problems can be resolved solely through U.S.-Iran dialogue, and I don't think it is right for it to be so. The correct approach is that the framework for these dialogues should be multilateral. One of the problems in recent years is that the U.S. has engaged in dialogue with Iran but excluded regional allies from this negotiation. This process not only raised doubts about Iran but also caused our allies to have doubts about the U.S. And I think this is a negative issue for the regional atmosphere. However, during this time, there were also collaborations between the U.S. and regional countries, including significant military contracts signed between the U.S. and a country like Saudi Arabia. Yes, a lot of cooperation has taken place. But there have also been serious doubts from Arab countries about U.S. policies towards Iran. If we are talking about Syria or Yemen, it is important to have our allies on board because their interests are greatly affected by these issues, and they are not matters that the U.S. can resolve directly with Iran or Russia. My final question is about one of your final recommendations to the U.S. government regarding encouraging and promoting relations between the people of the two countries and continuing to issue visas. This recommendation has been made at a time when the second executive order of the U.S. president in this regard has been signed and has currently been suspended by court rulings, and Mr. Trump has stated that he will pursue it in the Supreme Court. Do you see such an order as opposing your recommendation or in line with it? This immigration order has sparked a lot of debate and discussion in the U.S. What is important is that this visa issuance restriction has been described as temporary to give the government the opportunity to review the security processes of this action. I think this is very important because immigration policies for the U.S. and any other country are a kind of give-and-take. There must be a balance between security and issues like tourism, etc. However, regarding Iran, I must say that there has always been a willingness to welcome Iranians into the U.S. and to have relations with them, and we must distinguish between government policies and people's approaches. I hope this approach continues in the future because it is important for the U.S.