What Are the Confidential Matters Between the Agency and Iran?

Mehran Barati - Following the nuclear agreement in Vienna, speculation and questions have arisen regarding what needs to be resolved confidentially between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, clearly stated in his television interview on July 27 that everything exchanged between the Agency's inspectors and Iranian officials to resolve the potential military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program (PMD) will be confidential. It is likely that a text has been prepared in Vienna that is both agreed upon and secret, allowing for the issue of interviews with nuclear scientists and inspections and sampling at Parchin to be approached under the guise of 'technical expert meetings.' In this context, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also stated on July 28 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the U.S. does not have access to such an agreement but has received reports on its content. This means that the entire process of questioning regarding the potential dimensions of Iran's nuclear program (PMD) will restart, but the Islamic Republic has been given the opportunity to provide credible answers and documents to make the past excusable and the future reliable. For this purpose, according to Iranian officials, a working method has been chosen where the Agency will bypass the request for inspection (Visit) and sampling at Parchin and will only suffice with interviews with some 'nuclear scientists' and military commanders. In this regard, Mr. Abbas Araqchi, Deputy Foreign Minister and chief negotiator, stated in his news interview on July 20, '...it is supposed that during these investigations, if the Agency has documents, it should present them, and if there are questions, it should present them, and we will provide the necessary answers, and if further actions are needed, discussions will take place between us and them, but certainly, visits to military sites, even in a managed manner, are not supposed to happen...' However, in reality, it is strongly suspected that this will not happen as Araqchi says, and the PMD issue will not be easily resolved; if it could be, there would be no need for a secret agreement with the Agency. From the implementation of the 2011 safeguards to the 2015 roadmap alongside the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its annexes, another text titled 'roadmap' has been agreed upon between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which refers to the implementation of safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements and regulations related to Security Council resolutions regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the first clause of the ten clauses of the 'roadmap' (1), which is of special importance, it is stated that 'the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran agree to create a separate arrangement to resolve the important remaining issues in the IAEA Director General's report, the annexes of the 2011 report to the Board of Governors, and the agreements and regulations related to Security Council resolutions regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran (2)...'. In clauses 43 to 45, the implementation of the 2011 safeguards covers almost everything that has been under suspicion by the Agency regarding 'the development of a nuclear explosive device' in the Islamic Republic, including: • Efforts to produce nuclear-related equipment and dual-use materials by individuals and military entities (Annex, Section 1.C and 2.C). • Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear materials (Annex 3.C). • Acquisition of information and documents for the development of nuclear weapons from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex 4.C). • Work on developing a domestic nuclear weapon design, including testing components (Annex, Section 5C12-C). • Some specified activities in the annex that have dual military and civilian applications, another section that pertains to the hard work of nuclear weapons. • According to received information, before the end of 2003, the above activities were conducted under a structured program. There are also indications that some activities related to the development of a nuclear bomb continued after 2003 and some have not yet been completed. Additionally, in parts of the JCPOA that relate to Iran's actions, this roadmap and the implementation of the NPT safeguards are also referenced. In section C of the nuclear-related section of the JCPOA (3), regarding Iran's 'transparency and confidence-building measures,' it is stated under number 14 that Iran will fully implement the 'roadmap for clarifying outstanding issues of the past and present' agreed with the Agency, including arrangements to address current and past concerns related to Iran's nuclear program, as stated in the annex of the IAEA report dated November 8, 2011 (GOV/2011/65), and the complete implementation of activities that Iran undertakes under this roadmap will be completed by October 15, 2015... In section M of Annex 1 of the JCPOA (number 66 of Annex 1, Persian translation), which relates to 'past and present concerns,' it is also stated: 'Iran will complete all activities specified in paragraphs 5, 4, 2, and 6 of the roadmap, 'clarifying remaining issues of the past and present,' so that they can be verified in the new regular reports of the Director General of the Agency regarding the implementation of this roadmap.' The manner in which the remaining issues identified by Iran will be clarified and verified by the Agency is unclear due to the 'confidential' nature. The Parchin site and the problems related to it are also mentioned in clause five of the 'roadmap,' referring to an agreement that allows the Agency to resolve its related issues. Here it is stated: 'Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency agreed on a separate mechanism regarding the Parchin issue,' but what this mechanism entails has not been published and remains confidential. However, in the report of November 8, 2011, the Director General of the Agency provided some information on how the Agency's concerns regarding Parchin could be alleviated, as mentioned above. These points have been taken as a basis in clause one of the 'roadmap' of July 2015, and Iran is obliged to respond to unresolved issues in this report. In that report, the request for access (Visit) to the Parchin site in clause 50 of section C7 'Agreements and regulations related to Security Council resolutions regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran' (November 2011) is argued as follows: 'As a result of information received from a member state in early 2000, which provided evidence of tests of high explosives - possibly related to nuclear materials - at the Parchin military complex, the Agency was allowed to visit this site twice in 2005. At that time, through satellite imaging, the Agency identified significant points, but none of those points included the one currently believed to contain the presumed explosive cylinder.' Here, the Agency's clear intention regarding the 'presumed explosive cylinder' in the Parchin military complex is evident. The secret agreement in the Agency-Iran deal In clause c of Article 5 of the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is stated that the negotiating country must provide access to locations designated by the Agency, apart from those mentioned in clauses a and b of this article, for environmental sampling specific to that location. If a member state cannot provide access to these locations, it must immediately make reasonable efforts to meet the Agency's requests from adjacent areas or through other methods. Article six specifies the components of 'access': objective observations, collection of environmental samples, use of detection and measurement devices for radiation, and the use of various seals and means of identifying and detecting tampering, reviewing records related to safeguards concerning production and transportation. Thus, the Islamic Republic, insisting that its military centers and their secrets cannot be subject to access by Agency inspectors, has no choice but to resort to the possibility of 'adjacent areas or other methods' and define Parchin and its surroundings as a military complex, allowing buildings within a radius of one to ten square kilometers around Parchin to be made available for inspection by Agency inspectors for all that is intended in clauses five and six of the Additional Protocol. The specifics of what these 'adjacent areas' could be remain confidential, as no necessary agreement has yet been reached between military and political decision-makers. Overall, it appears that the details of the agreement made regarding the commitments related to Parchin and how they will be implemented have not been made public to avoid sensitivities. The technical expert meetings and informational interviews In clause 4 of the roadmap, referring to technical-nuclear meetings, it is stated: After the International Atomic Energy Agency presents questions regarding any ambiguities in such information to Iran, technical-expert meetings, technical actions, and discussions as agreed upon in a separate mechanism will take place in Tehran to resolve these ambiguities. From the Agency's working method, it first sends its questions to Iran, and Iran will provide written answers to these questions. After these answers are provided, the Agency will request 'technical and expert meetings and other technical actions' to resolve its ambiguities regarding these answers, and Iran will be obliged to facilitate this. There has been no publication regarding the addresses of these meetings. It is suspected that an agreement has been reached regarding a list of nuclear scientists and military officials. Given the existing sensitivities in the Islamic Republic and the desire to prohibit informational contact with nuclear specialists to compel Iran to fulfill its accepted commitments, the term 'technical-expert meetings' has been used, which gives opponents of the agreement between Iran and the West less opportunity for resistance and propaganda. The unresolved Iranian nuclear file In clause 8 of the text of the 'roadmap,' it is stated that 'by December 15, 2015, the Director General will present a final assessment regarding the resolution of all remaining past and present issues, as determined in the annex of the Director General's report (65/2011 GOV), for action to the Board of Governors. Before the issuance of the report, a technical summary meeting will be held between Iran and the Agency. The interpretation beyond this clause is that with the Director General's report to the Board of Governors, the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program is not confirmed; rather, as Abbas Araqchi also stated after the Vienna agreement in an interview on Iranian television, the summary of the questions and answers between the Agency and Iran can be finalized, but 'the unresolved issues between Iran and the Agency will remain,' and this file will remain open until Iran fulfills all its accepted and confidential commitments as desired by the Agency. The secret agreement between the Agency and Iran may be that unresolved issues are deferred to avoid hindering the implementation of the JCPOA and, over time, are considered past and excusable. The issue of corrective code 3.1 The corrective code 3.1 is an addition to the safeguards agreement related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons between Iran and the Agency, which was signed before the revolution in May 1974 and has been validated (4). According to that agreement, any nuclear activity at any scale must be reported to the Agency six months before radioactive materials are injected into centrifuge devices. However, under the new corrective code 3.1, every country is obliged to inform the Agency from the moment a decision is made to build a nuclear site/program, without any centrifuge being installed. This means that by accepting corrective code 3.1, not only the Agency but many countries will be informed about a country's nuclear programs and the location of new nuclear sites, and some may even be able to prevent projects. Khatami's government accepted the Additional Protocol voluntarily, including the implementation of code 3.1. However, after the sealing of nuclear facilities in 2005 and the referral of Iran's case to the Security Council, the Iranian government halted the implementation of the Additional Protocol and under code 3.1.2. Following this, Amano always began his reports with the caveat that according to the safeguards agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to implement the provisions of corrective code 3.1.2 of the general provisions of the safeguards agreement. In any case, if Iran had implemented corrective code 3.1.2, it would not have been able to construct the underground nuclear power plant at Fordow or the heavy water plant at Arak, or it would have faced insurmountable difficulties in carrying out similar projects. Although with the acceptance of the Additional Protocol, the legal documentation for rejecting the Agency's request for the implementation of code 3.1.2 would be minimal, the Agency's request is disputed in international law, as there is no provision in all commitments related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that requires information on design to be provided before the establishment of a nuclear site when no radioactive material is involved. Now it remains to be seen what solutions have been considered in the 'secret agreement' regarding the implementation of the 2011 NPT safeguards and what security restrictions of the Islamic Republic (the possibility of military attacks on reported and future nuclear centers) have been addressed.