What Benefits Does Iran Gain from Exporting Ballistic Missiles to Russia?

Reuters has reported, citing its sources, that the Islamic Republic of Iran is preparing to export short-range ballistic missiles, specifically the Fateh 360 and Ababil, to Russia and has begun training Russian forces to use the Fateh 360 missiles. Since Russia began its extensive invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, multiple reports have emerged claiming that Iran has sent or is preparing to sell its ballistic missiles to Russia. The accuracy of these reports has not yet been confirmed by U.S. or Ukrainian officials, and Iran denies sending weapons to Russia or any preparations in this regard. Analysts who spoke with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty expressed confidence that if the new information is confirmed, it would be beneficial for Russia's war efforts and would present both opportunities and challenges for Iran. The delivery of Iranian missiles to Russia would face a "swift and severe" response from Washington. The use of North Korean ballistic missiles by Russia had temporarily alleviated concerns that Moscow might also turn to Tehran to complete its missile stockpiles. However, according to Nikolai Graviski, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, it is unlikely that the extensive demands of the Russian army on the battlefield exceed North Korea's capabilities to supply missiles. Graviski told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Russia's efforts to acquire Iranian ballistic missiles could be a strategy "to reduce dependence on North Korea" and allow Russia to pit Pyongyang and Tehran against each other, thereby maximizing its "potential strategic interests." The visit of Sergei Shoigu, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council and former Minister of Defense, to Tehran on August 7 has strengthened suspicions that Moscow is seeking Iranian missiles. Months after the start of the war against Ukraine, Russia was accused of using Iranian-made Shahed and Mohajer 6 drones in the battlefield and in attacks on Ukrainian cities. The Iranian government initially denied this but later acknowledged that it had sent a "limited number of drones" to Moscow before the war. Despite abundant evidence, Tehran continues to deny the use of Iranian drones by Russia against Ukraine. However, the U.S. and the European Union have imposed new sanctions on Iran for its assistance to Russia, disregarding Tehran's claims. Nikolai Graviski states that Iranian drones "have relative superiority in terms of technology, construction, and operational application compared to Russian drones," but in the case of ballistic missiles, "quantity matters, not quality." By sending ballistic missiles to Russia, the Iranian government not only enhances its credibility but also gains valuable information about the performance of the Fateh 360 and Ababil in battle. Additionally, according to Nikolai Graviski, "operational experience and potential reforms by Russian military experts could be beneficial for Tehran in addressing some deficiencies in Iranian missiles." Earlier reports indicated that Russia was considering acquiring short-range ballistic missiles such as the Fateh 110 and Zulfiqar. However, Behnam Ben Talablu, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, believes that exporting such missiles to Russia would lead Iran to violate restrictions established under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) regarding range and warhead weight. In contrast, the export of the Fateh 360 and Ababil, with a range of under 300 kilometers and a warhead weight of 500 kilograms, complies with the regulations of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Behnam Ben Talablu also states, "This does not mean that the issue of (selling short-range missiles) should be taken lightly, as acquiring these missiles would allow Russia to maintain its domestic weapons stockpile. This also indicates the deepening relationship between Russia and Iran." Supplying ballistic missiles to Russia, even without violating the Missile Technology Control Regime, places the Iranian government at risk of angering Western countries. United Nations restrictions on Iran's missile imports and exports expired in October 2023, but the United States and three European powers (the UK, France, and Germany), as well as the European Union, have extended sanctions related to the Islamic Republic's missile program. Iran unveiled the Mohajer 10 drone last year. According to Nikolai Graviski, "three European countries have firmly warned Iran that the delivery of ballistic missiles to Russia complicates any solution regarding Iran's nuclear program." Negotiations to revive the nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA have long been stalled, and by mid-2025, the time for it will expire, thus weakening the likelihood of implementing this agreement, which may lead the Iranian government to seek to strengthen its relations with Russia further. Iran participated in the annual exhibition of military-technical equipment held in Moscow from August 22 to 24, showcasing some of its latest achievements, including the Mohajer 10 drone, which is an advanced version of the Mohajer 6 that Russia has used in Ukraine. Nikolai Graviski emphasizes the importance of the presence of General Ali Shadmani in Moscow to highlight the significance of the Mohajer 10 drone. Shadmani is the deputy coordinator of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, which is responsible for commanding and operationalizing the armed forces of the Islamic Republic. Behnam Ben Talablu also states that the Iranian government has received not only gold and cash in exchange for sending drones to Russia but also other concessions, and "cooperation in this area will deepen further." He also believes that the Iranian government is "determined to free itself from the position of a small partner for Russia, and this is one of the reasons why it is unlikely that cooperation between the two in supplying weapons for the Russian army in Ukraine will cease."