What Do the Detailed Statistics of Voters in the 1403 Elections Indicate?

The Iranian presidential elections concluded with astonishing results. According to official statistics, at least 60% of eligible voters inside the country did not participate in the first round, and more than 50% abstained in the second round. When combining all potential voters inside and outside the country, this figure rises to 62% in the first round and 53% in the second, based on the announced statistics. This election cycle marked the most extensive electoral boycott in the history of elections held by the Islamic Republic, both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, the composition and objectives of those who did not vote are not uniform; they share a consensus on the necessity for structural changes and a negative outlook on the effectiveness of the electoral institutions of the Islamic Republic in addressing the country's problems and improving people's lives. It seems there is an unwritten agreement among them that without changing the foundational power structures, the situation will not improve. In this election, a decisive majority of Iran's civil society forces, including students, university professors, teachers, workers, women's activists, human rights defenders, doctors, journalists, trade unions, writers, environmental activists, and civil society organizations, chose to abstain from voting or called for a boycott of the elections. How can we understand the 60% who said 'no' to the elections? Supporters of participating in the elections had a relatively fragile advantage only among private sector activists, the digital industry, startups, and entrepreneurs. In an unprecedented event, almost all celebrities and prominent artistic and sports figures in the country did not support any of the approved candidates. The details of the votes received, broken down by city and province, have not been officially published by the Ministry of Interior and provincial governments, making it difficult to ascertain the geographical, age, and class distribution of the votes cast. However, in a general assessment, it can be observed that the most significant drop in votes occurred in medium and small cities, particularly those with the highest activity in the protests of the revolutionary movement 'Women, Life, Freedom,' and among the lower and middle classes. The center-periphery gap was somewhat activated, benefiting Masoud Pezeshkian. However, the majority of non-voters included all segments of Iran's society, encompassing economic classes, cultural tendencies, and ethnicities, with a significant share likely coming from women and individuals under 30 in the pool of uncast votes in the Islamic Republic's ballot boxes. The weight of men and individuals aged 40 and above was greater among those who voted. Among them, the number of voters in small and medium cities was higher than in large cities. This trend has always dominated previous elections, but the drop in votes in small and medium cities has been relatively more pronounced. In the following charts, the participation rates of the two rounds of the 14th presidential election are compared with the 13th round (1400) and the average of the previous 13 rounds. The statistics are extracted from the Ministry of Interior and provincial governments. In all provinces, the participation rate in the second round was higher than in the first round. This differs from the 1384 presidential election, where in most provinces, turnout in the second round was lower than in the first. Also, despite the competitive nature of this election within the factions of the regime, in most provinces, except for East Azerbaijan, Tehran, Ardabil, Isfahan, Alborz, Qom, and Yazd, the voting rate decreased compared to the previous round. However, comparing with the average of the previous 13 presidential elections provides a better understanding of the decline in the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic from the electoral perspective. The least decline was observed in the provinces of Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, Alborz, Hormozgan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Qom, and West Azerbaijan. The most significant drop was noted in the provinces of Lorestan, Kurdistan, Fars, Gilan, Khuzestan, Qazvin, and Tehran. In the first round, the votes were distributed in such a way that Masoud Pezeshkian came out on top, thanks to the presence of two high-profile conservative candidates. If Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf or Saeed Jalili had left the scene in favor of the other, it is unlikely Pezeshkian would have emerged first. Mostafa Pourmohammadi also received fewer votes than invalid ballots. The decline of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf was another phenomenon of the election. His votes this time were fewer than those he received in the 84 and 92 elections. His votes decreased by 46% after 11 years, and he even received fewer votes than Mohsen Rezaei in the previous presidential election. This decline and significant failure can be linked to Qalibaf's notoriety for economic corruption. Support from the regime's mourning networks and certain figures among current and former IRGC commanders, such as Mohsen Rezaei, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and Mohammad Bagheri, as well as government clerics like Alireza Panahian and Mohammad Javadan, did not yield results for Qalibaf nor prevent his humiliating failure. Qalibaf's tactics in debates to avoid polarization and confrontation also did not work. The shadow of Mirbagheri and the controversy surrounding Saeed Jalili; four points about Saeed Jalili. Saeed Jalili, backed by the organized faction and a new, young conservative spectrum, along with the support of governmental institutions, especially the official IRGC and Basij, and the Raisi administration, managed to change his nearly two million vote deficit from Qalibaf in the 92 elections to a lead of about six million. It can be roughly estimated that 9 million of Jalili's votes came from the social base of conservatives. Fluid votes (individuals who vote with non-political motives and based on their assessment of the candidates' positions for short-term economic improvement, and do not have consistent voting behavior across different elections) were scarce in Jalili's vote pool. Fluid votes decreased in the first round compared to the 13th presidential election. Part of this drop was compensated by reformist votes, with at least 80% of their social base appearing to have participated in the second round. Half of Masoud Pezeshkian's votes can be considered a product of fluid votes. His first-place ranking in the first round was due to the composition of the Guardian Council and the intra-factional competition between Qalibaf and Jalili. In the second round, with the increase in votes received, Pezeshkian's lead over Jalili widened. In this round, Pezeshkian secured first place in the provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Alborz, Ardabil, Ilam, Tehran, Fars, Qazvin, Zanjan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Kurdistan, Golestan, Kermanshah, Mazandaran, and Gilan, while Jalili won in the provinces of Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan, South Khorasan, Yazd, Markazi, Hormozgan, Hamadan, Isfahan, Bushehr, Khuzestan, Semnan, Qom, Kerman, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Lorestan. The number of provinces where Pezeshkian won was one less than Jalili (15 to 16). This occurrence is unprecedented in the history of presidential elections, where the election winner did not secure first place in most provinces. Ebrahim Raisi had ranked first in all provinces during the 13th election. In the 96 presidential election, Hassan Rouhani also secured first place in most provinces, only ranking second in Hamadan, North Khorasan, South Khorasan, Razavi Khorasan, Qom, Zanjan, and Semnan. In this round, all reformists participated in the elections. Additionally, a very small portion of the opposition viewed the elections positively, and fluid votes were somewhat added. However, the main factor in Pezeshkian's victory over Jalili in the second round was the ethnic identity factor of the Turkish population. The total vote difference between Pezeshkian and Jalili in four provinces with a majority Turkish population, including East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan, was only about 15,000 votes less than their overall national vote difference. Analyzing the votes, it can be inferred that of the six million additional votes Pezeshkian received in the second round, 1.5 million came from political votes (reformists and opponents). However, in the remaining 4.5 million, more than half of the fluid votes came from provinces with a majority Persian-speaking population, and the rest from provinces with ethnic and Sunni majorities. In some provinces like Qazvin, Fars, and Alborz, it seems that under low participation conditions, the Turkish population played a role in Pezeshkian's advantage. Comparing the results of Fars province with Kerman, Isfahan, and Razavi Khorasan also indicates that the support of the Qashqai Turks contributed to Pezeshkian's fragile lead in the second round. In Alborz province, where at least 36% of the population is Turkish, Pezeshkian's advantage is significant. In Tehran province, it seems that all of Qalibaf's votes (673,000 votes) in the first round shifted more towards Jalili in the second round. These votes primarily belonged to the fluid vote category. In the first round, the majority of conservative votes in Tehran went to Jalili's pool. Pezeshkian and Jalili, respectively, received 700,000 and 608,000 more votes in the second round than in the first. The vote difference between them in the second round was about 423,000 votes. In the first round, Pezeshkian received 346,000 votes less than the total votes of Qalibaf and Jalili. Therefore, the influence of reformists is not significantly seen in Tehran either, and here too, the impact of Turkish voters and fluid votes is evident. Thus, the fear of Jalili and the identity of reformism did not play a specific role in Pezeshkian's victory. The influence of these factors was neutralized by Jalili's advantage in some non-Turkish provinces, and therefore the Turkish identity factor was the main reason for Pezeshkian's final advantage. Activating this gap for Pezeshkian in the future will not be without challenges. Jalili's advantage in both rounds of the election in Yazd province is another sign of the decline of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's social base. Jalili managed to secure four million votes from Qalibaf's conservative votes and fluid votes. The portion of fluid votes that had gone to Raisi in the 1400 elections mostly shifted to Pezeshkian in this round. Given the Raisi administration's poor performance in the economic sector, it was expected that they would shift. In this context, if Pezeshkian had participated in the previous election instead of Abdolnaser Hemmati, it is unlikely he would have won, considering the negative economic performance of Rouhani's second government. It can be estimated that less than 40% of Pezeshkian's votes come from the social base of reformists. The rest belongs to fluid votes and opponents, with no guarantee that they will vote for them in future elections or lean towards conservatives. Overall, the main event of this election occurred outside the ballot boxes, revealing that the Islamic Republic faces serious obstacles in attracting the majority of society's participation and has realized that changing elections from non-competitive to limited competition among insiders is also insufficient. Of course, Pezeshkian is not a reformist, and his proximity to Ali Khamenei and the hard core of power, along with his discursive and theoretical commonalities with them, is even greater than that of Ali Larijani. However, compared to Abdolnaser Hemmati, he managed to make the competitive atmosphere serious. The leader of the Islamic Republic, despite his desire for Qalibaf's victory, did not intervene directly in the elections, but at the same time, his macro management facilitated Pezeshkian's victory. Simultaneously, the regime's voting machine worked in favor of Saeed Jalili to determine the fate of Ebrahim Raisi's successor in competition with Pezeshkian and his ability to reconcile with the gray segments of society. The majority of the people also did not participate in either round of the 14th presidential election, sending a strong message that they are serious about pursuing structural changes. Thus, the path formed after December 2017 in Iran's political arena continues, and the government's efforts, in collaboration with state-centered reformists, to restore the focal point of political developments within the mechanisms of the Islamic Republic's power and to dissuade them from fundamental changes in the power structure have failed. This was the first election in which reformists won under conditions of minority participation in the elections. Pezeshkian's victory was primarily the result of Khamenei's macro management, internal divisions among conservatives, and the activation of the ethnic gap (Turkish). The social position of reformists and moderates has not undergone significant changes.