What Does the Formation of the 'Protection Unit' of Astan Quds Mean?

There are numerous sources of power. In a rentier-religious authoritarian government like that known as the 'Islamic Republic', anything can be a source of power. From the tomb of a holy figure to a credit fund, school, or religious center, and even social media and the distribution of food, all serve to reproduce power. Sources of power at the micro level, such as villages and neighborhoods, manifest through the distribution of offerings and prestige. However, at the macro level, power must be provided in a massive and widespread manner; otherwise, the authoritarian state apparatus will not be effective. In this context, institutions like 'Astan Quds Razavi' and its subsidiaries gain function and meaning. The reproduction of power in a religious-rentier governance often initially hides under the guise of religious piety and benevolence, but when necessary, hard power, especially the most severe form, namely outright repression, is also employed. This process can be seen in the expansion of 'Astan Quds Razavi' activities under the stewardship of Ebrahim Raisi. After his defeat in the 2017 elections, Ebrahim Raisi sought to mobilize and reorganize the resources available to him within the relevant institution to compensate for his loss and gain power through other means. The Astan Quds entity is one of the wealthiest religious, political, and economic institutions in Iran, comprising hundreds of organizations including companies, media outlets, publishing houses, educational, health, and medical institutions, and museums. Although these entities are technically public property, under the control of the government leadership and its affiliates, they have become a source for distributing rents and producing power for several factions of the regime. Authoritarianism under the guise of charitable activities is a widespread activity of Astan Quds. Justifying this cycle of rent distribution and power production, Mostafa Khaksari Ghahrudi, the assistant for the aid to the underprivileged at Astan Quds, states: 'There should be no distinction between cultural and economic services, as cultural service is not separate from economic service. We must have a comprehensive view of serving the people.' This institution is managed like a party to facilitate Raisi's chances of rising to regime leadership during unexpected historical events; the factions surrounding Astan Quds have realized during Raisi's electoral defeat that the formal process of power transfer is merely an illusion and cannot be relied upon. They also discovered that without financial resources, organized human resources within an institution, and finally the street-level supporters and rent-seekers, absolute power cannot be seized. In the aftermath of the electoral defeat, Raisi initially organized the forces active in the media and economic factions of the authoritarian current within the framework of the Astan Quds party. In this regard, Raisi had previously attempted to expand his power by establishing a bank belonging to Astan Quds, aiming to complete the power puzzle. However, this initiative faced indifference from central bank officials, and the establishment of the Astan Quds bank went nowhere. To expand power, Raisi and his influential factions established a television network for the Razavi shrine, which continuously showcases the courtyard of the eighth Imam's tomb. This move could be a step toward establishing an independent radio and television network for the Astan Quds party. Indeed, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the 'Kayhan' newspaper, also suggested that Astan Quds establish an independent global television network to 'transmit the message and culture of Razavi to the world.' However, Raisi does not find this sufficient; he told several media managers: 'Astan Quds has extensive activities and can provide the groundwork for documenting these capacities and services.' The scope of Astan Quds activities is not limited to Khorasan. Raisi is trying to expand his rent distribution network by establishing Astan Quds representative offices in other provinces of the country. For example, according to Astan News, the news agency of Astan Quds, the inauguration ceremony of the Astan Quds Razavi representative office was held with the presence of Seyyed Mortaza Bakhtiari, the deputy of Astan Quds Razavi, Parviz Sarouri, the representative of Astan Quds Razavi in Tehran, provincial officials, families of martyrs and veterans, and servants of the shrine of Ali ibn Musa al-Ridha at the Martyrs Mosque. The geographical expansion of Astan Quds is such that, according to the Etemad newspaper, 'for nearly a year, representative offices have been established, covering cities from large urban centers to remote towns, and in some cities, they have established up to 10 representative offices instead of just one.' The same newspaper noted: 'There are no accurate statistics on the number of Astan Quds Razavi representative offices in cities and towns in the media related to this institution.' Now it is reported that the 'Protection Unit' of Astan Quds Razavi has begun operations with the approval of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Raisi stated at the inauguration of this 'Protection Unit': 'One of our missions is to protect holy places from any harm, as these places are always coveted by malicious and fraudulent individuals.' It seems that with the establishment of the 'Protection Unit' of Astan Quds, Raisi is gradually trying to employ hard power resources, namely military power, directly alongside soft power resources—such as rent distribution, free food distribution, media establishment, and hiring followers and disciples. Thus, with the establishment of the 'Protection Unit', the Astan Quds party prepares its armed wing to navigate through the power crisis.