What Happens in the Islamic Republic with the Death of the First Generation of Rulers?

The mortality rate of the first generation of rulers and senior politicians of the Islamic Republic has significantly increased in recent years. Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Mohammad Mohammadi Gilani, Abolqasem Khazaeli, Habibollah Asgaroladi, and Ali Akbar Parvaresh were religious revolutionaries who rose to the highest positions in the Islamic Republic following its establishment, were present during the political events of the past four decades, and ultimately all passed away due to natural causes in the last couple of years. With the death of these important decision-makers of the Islamic Republic, what will happen? And what is the impact of their absence on Iran's governing system? Majid Mohammadi, an analyst of Iranian affairs in the United States, believes that the deaths of these individuals will lead to three transformations in Iran's political structure and power relations. Mr. Mohammadi tells Radio Farda that "the first transformation is the reduction of the influence of the upper tier of the power pyramid": "We see evidence of gerontocracy in the Islamic Republic. Many clerics are followed by parts of society simply because of their gray beards. Naturally, when the gray beards decrease – which they are rapidly doing – it is expected that younger individuals will replace them." This Iranian affairs analyst considers the second transformation to be "the intensification of disagreements among the upper echelons of power": "Recently, the youngest member of the Assembly of Experts resigned solely due to a disagreement with another member of this assembly. Older figures, having been present since the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, have relationships that help resolve disputes among them. Among the newer cohort, such relationships do not exist, and it can be expected that disagreements among them will be greater." Majid Mohammadi continues that "the third transformation is the weakening of beliefs in the ideological foundations of the regime," which he believes "one of its results will be an increase in corruption": "During Ahmadinejad's presidency, with the youth orientation in the government, we witnessed an increase in corruption in the Islamic Republic, and this third element is primarily what has caused Mr. Khamenei's concern about the future of the Islamic Republic." The last meeting of the members of the Assembly of Experts with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic; Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, at 67 years old, is the youngest person present in this photo, while Ahmad Jannati, at 89 years old, is the oldest. This Iranian affairs analyst refers to the recent remarks of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, who told the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that "foreigners and enemies" are waiting for "the nation and the regime to fall asleep and, ten years later, when I am no longer here, to achieve their goals." Majid Mohammadi believes that with the death of traditional and conservative figures of the Islamic Republic, it will lead to the weakening of the Iranian government rather than its strengthening. He states that part of this weakening is "ideological" and another part is "institutional" because the Islamic Republic "had a founding layer" and "when the founders give way to the next generation, that regime will no longer have the color and flavor of its past, and younger figures will not be able to have the authority of the old personalities." But who will these newer figures be? And to which faction of the Islamic Republic do they belong? According to Majid Mohammadi, these younger successors do not actually belong to any of the traditional factions of the Islamic Republic, namely conservatives or reformists: "Among the clerics, the successors of the current older figures will be the students of Mr. Khamenei. The Supreme Leader has trained a multitude of students over the past 20 years who attended his lessons and are completely loyal to him. In the non-clerical sector, they will mainly be security and military forces." This Iranian affairs analyst believes that the rise of both of these currents "will create problems for the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic" because they "have no social base, and this issue will lead to an increase in the gap between the nation and the government." However, Morteza Kazemian, a political analyst in France, states that the "composition of effective political actors" in the Islamic Republic has undergone a "gradual and meaningful change" in recent years, so that "in addition to aging, fatigue, and the death of some of these actors, another significant aspect of this transformation relates to the marginalization or, in other words, the elimination of critics and actors who do not align with the system's top figure." Mr. Kazemian, in an interview with Radio Farda, cites Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who have been under house arrest since February 2011, as "two prominent examples of the Supreme Leader's purging of the first generation of political actors in the revolution" and states that even Mohammad Khatami, who "has been a close friend of the system's leadership," has also been "driven out of power" for several years. According to this Iranian affairs analyst, Mr. Khamenei, as the "top of the political system pyramid," has also tried to "retain some of the old actors and first-generation revolutionaries who have continued to act in alignment with him within the government and beside him." Morteza Kazemian names Ahmad Jannati and Mohammad Yazdi as "two important examples" in this policy of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Both of these individuals mentioned by Mr. Kazemian are simultaneously present in the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council; the only difference is that Mr. Jannati is the head of the Guardian Council, while Mr. Yazdi is in the Assembly of Experts. However, one of the similarities between these two, aside from their completely obedient stances towards the Supreme Leader, is that both are over 80 years old. Ahmad Jannati is 89 years old, and Mohammad Yazdi is 82 years old; Mr. Yazdi was elected as the head of the Assembly of Experts when he was being moved around in a wheelchair by his bodyguards. Perhaps the significance of this advanced age becomes more apparent when we recall that in the past eight years, 16 members of the Assembly of Experts have passed away. Additionally, out of the current 70 representatives, 24 are over 70 years old, and 24 are over 80 years old. Morteza Kazemian believes that "the changes arising from the aging or death or marginalization of a generation of actors" in the Islamic Republic have coincided with "the elevation and highlighting of some of the younger actors from yesterday who have turned into experienced middle-aged individuals." Mr. Kazemian identifies the important characteristic of these "young actors" as their "authoritarian outlook and alignment with the system's top figure" and names Sadegh Larijani, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, Ebrahim Raisi, and Hossein Taeb as symbols of this current, or as he puts it, "anti-democratic clerics entrenched in judicial and security institutions." This Iranian affairs analyst, like Majid Mohammadi, believes that in addition to clerics, the Supreme Leader has organized a range of political actors "emerging from the IRGC" such as Aziz Jafari, Qassem Soleimani, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, and even figures like Ali Larijani, Saeed Jalili, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Hossein Shariatmadari. Kazemian also states that Mr. Khamenei's efforts in "deepening interaction with the security sector governing the IRGC" to "create his desired Islamic Republic" has faced and will face "serious resistances and significant obstacles." Mr. Kazemian names Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hossein Ali Montazeri, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha, Behzad Nabavi, and Abdollah Nouri as some of the figures obstructing the Supreme Leader's program and emphasizes the importance of the "active and different actions" of individuals like Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri or Hassan Rouhani in this path. He also mentions the "effective role of civil society actors, especially during electoral periods" as one of the "important and effective obstacles to achieving the desired situation of the central power in the Islamic Republic." According to this Iranian affairs analyst, what are the "realities imposed on the leadership, especially in the area of managing the country and in the economic sphere" is another obstacle to such a situation. Morteza Kazemian concludes by stating that "the future of the Islamic Republic, in addition to the different strategies of effective actors, remains tied to some unforeseen events" that "the absence of Ayatollah Khamenei itself could be an important event and factor" in this area.