What is the Flaw in the JCPOA? Explanations from Former Deputy Director of the IAEA

While Donald Trump, the President of the United States, has called the nuclear deal with Iran, known as the JCPOA, the 'worst deal ever' and has withdrawn from it, European officials who signed the agreement acknowledge that the JCPOA is not 'ideal,' but they say it is a suitable option to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran denies any attempts to build nuclear weapons. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced, showing what he claimed to be 'half a ton of documents and evidence obtained from Iran,' that based on these, the Islamic Republic has secretly pursued the construction of a nuclear bomb even after the JCPOA. This claim was also reflected in Trump's statements when announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has emphasized Iran's compliance with the JCPOA in multiple reports over the past three years following the nuclear agreement. What is the flaw in the JCPOA? The weight of the United States in this agreement is so high that maintaining the JCPOA seems difficult without its presence. Particularly, Mike Pompeo, Trump's Secretary of State, announced on Monday that Washington would impose 'the toughest sanctions in history against Iran, and if the Iranian government does not change its behavior, the pressure of sanctions will increase.' In a speech at the Heritage Foundation, Pompeo set 12 conditions for reaching a new nuclear agreement with Iran, three of which were directly related to Iran's nuclear program, including a complete halt to uranium enrichment, allowing the agency to inspect all facilities in the country, and disclosing all past programs and actions by Iran to produce nuclear weapons. None of these conditions are included in the text of the JCPOA, including that Iran is allowed to continue enrichment at a limited level and volume, or that Iran is not obligated under the JCPOA to open its military facilities to agency inspectors, and ultimately the focus of the JCPOA is on Iran's current actions, not past programs and actions. Olli Heinonen, former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, who is now a senior advisor on science and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the 'Foundation for Defense of Democracies,' in an interview with Radio Farda about the disagreement between the U.S. and the IAEA regarding the assessment of Iran's compliance with nuclear commitments, says: for example, the IAEA in its latest report published on February 22 stated, 'Since the implementation of the JCPOA, the agency has been verifying and monitoring Iran's commitments under the JCPOA.' These statements are somewhat vague and mysterious as they do not clearly indicate what position Iran currently holds according to the agency's assessment and full compliance with its commitments. The continued expansion of uranium enrichment in Iran occurs while there is neither a market for Iran's enriched uranium abroad nor a current domestic need for it. Meanwhile, the global uranium fuel market is also saturated, and there is no nuclear reactor in the world that has stopped due to a lack of fuel. According to Heinonen, such explicit statements should be reflected in the agency's report, as Iran has repeatedly stated that it does not allow inspections of military facilities by the agency, which contradicts the 'Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement' signed separately between the agency and Iran. Heinonen adds that prior to the JCPOA, the agency had a clearer tone regarding its assessment of Iran's nuclear program. According to the former deputy director, the JCPOA also cannot fully and permanently keep Iran away from nuclear weapons: 'For example, the continued expansion of uranium enrichment in Iran occurs while there is neither a market for Iran's enriched uranium abroad nor a current domestic need for it. Meanwhile, the global uranium fuel market is also saturated, and there is no nuclear reactor in the world that has stopped due to a lack of fuel.' In this context, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, has also recently threatened that if Europe cannot secure Iran's interests from the JCPOA, the Islamic Republic will resume 20% uranium enrichment. Heinonen states that Iran is at a crossroads. Any action it takes contrary to the JCPOA will correspondingly lose European support. He says that the existence of extensive documentation of nuclear bomb design (by Iran) and the failure to properly respond to the agency's questions not only casts doubt on Iran's compliance with the JCPOA but also fuels concerns about the non-proliferation treaty. He states that the best way for Iran is to provide clear answers to these questions, destroy related equipment and documents, and close this aspect of the country's nuclear program permanently, in a manner that is verifiable and irreversible. Iran has repeatedly denied any attempts to build a nuclear bomb and states that it will not pursue it.