What is the Importance of Khamenei's Message?

The information portal of the Office of the Leader of the Islamic Republic published a detailed message from Ayatollah Khamenei on Wednesday, February 13. In recent days, there has been extensive media propaganda regarding this message as an 'important message.' What significance does this message hold in the current circumstances? The reason for issuing the message has been announced as the '40th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the entry of the Islamic Republic into a new phase of life,' coinciding with the holding of the Warsaw International Conference. This coincidence may be planned and a targeted media effort to influence the news of this conference, but does this detailed message possess such power? Khamenei: The Islamic Revolution is ready to correct its mistakes, but it is not subject to revision. The main audience of this message is the youth. Addressing the youth has become an agenda for Khamenei in recent years. Letters to Western youth, ongoing meetings with students and young elites, the appointment of young figures, continuous emphasis on youthfulness, and the creation of keywords such as 'faithful youth' and insistence on utilizing their potential in the management and approach of the country are examples of his ongoing efforts to effectively connect with the younger generation of Iran. The content of the message can be summarized in the recommendation to take the 'second step' relying on 'jihadist management' and the continuation of 'resistance.' The Leader of the Islamic Republic, who had previously defined a five-stage roadmap including 'Islamic Revolution,' 'Islamic Government,' 'Islamic State,' 'Islamic Society,' and 'Islamic Civilization,' has attempted to describe a new roadmap in this statement, with a faint reference to the previous roadmap. This new roadmap is described as 'the second stage of self-building, societal-building, and civilization-building.' Such an approach is one of Khamenei's repetitive actions that has intensified over the past decade. 'Cultural NATO,' 'sedition,' 'resilient economy,' 'influence,' 'faithful youth,' 'Islamic lifestyle,' 'progress and prosperity' are examples of these frequently used keywords. He is an expert in creating keywords and repeating them in various speeches. Most of these keywords, despite their repetition and organized extensive propaganda, do not have the capability to become a model or discourse, but these failures have not prevented the repetition of this approach. In this new message, the Leader of the Islamic Republic has tried, with his characteristic stubbornness and obstinacy, to remain loyal to the revolutionary principles he envisions, which critics and opponents argue are the roots of significant deadlocks in Iran's domestic and foreign policy. From this perspective, he emphasized that the Islamic Revolution is 'not subject to revision' and 'will defend the theory of the revolutionary system forever.' He accompanied this insistence with his old cliché of 'insider-outsider' and stated: 'He is very sensitive to the demarcations with rivals and enemies' and, considering sanctions as a blessing, denied negotiations with the United States, emphasizing a behavior of resistance and aggression in the face of Western politics and culture. In these sections, he did not present any new words to his audience. From this angle, he has made a repetitive but undocumented claim that the Islamic Republic is among the 'most successful governments in the world in transferring service and wealth from the center to all parts of the country' and that religious behavior 'has flourished everywhere, especially among the youth, and has become more and higher quality day by day.' Khamenei, despite emphasizing the existence of a 'deep gap' between 'what has happened so far' and 'what should have happened and will happen,' has distanced himself significantly from his opposition-like tone, focusing on an absolute whitewashing of the current situation and the achievements of the Islamic Republic, and has minimized his differences with the government, emphasizing that the Islamic Revolution 'has not been ruthless and bloodthirsty' and 'has not committed the excesses and leftist deviations that are the disgrace of many uprisings and movements.' This section of the message, which is accompanied by a detailed comparison with the Pahlavi regime, can be seen as a defense influenced by the current political conditions in Iran, attempting to counter the increasing moral and social doubts of recent years, which stem from the growing public awareness of the summer 67 massacre, corruption of senior officials, systemic inefficiency, oppression of minorities, intervention in the Syrian war, regional adventurism, mistakes of the war era, and the extremism of the 60s. From this perspective, it can be said that contrary to Khamenei's insistence on the non-passivity of the Islamic Revolution, the overall spirit governing his detailed letter, which is repetitive, slogan-like, and an attempt to explain and exaggerate his record with a defensive and persuasive tone, is passive. However, the most important part of the Leader's letter is the seven headings he has recommended as a roadmap and 'second step,' calling for their pursuit along with 'hope and an optimistic outlook for the future.' In this section, Khamenei emphasizes themes such as science and research, spirituality and ethics, economy, justice and combating corruption, lifestyle, safeguarding independence, freedom, and national dignity, and again referring to 'demarcation with the enemy,' has called for scientific and ethical jihad and the pursuit of a resilient economy. Regardless of the existing controversies regarding these recommendations, the important issue is that he has not provided any practical and significant references in these areas. Eight years after the introduction of the resilient economy topic, he wrote in today's statement: 'Executive programs must be prepared for all its sectors and pursued and acted upon with power and enthusiasm and a sense of responsibility in governments.' It can be clearly predicted that the rest of the Leader's recommendations will end up similarly. After years, no one will exactly understand what he meant and what should be done. As he introduced the idea of a development model in 2005, this year, after 13 years, when the 'Vision Document 1444' was presented following meetings, planning, consultation, and expertise in this area, it was revealed that this document has neither new words nor anything to say. Another notable example is the Leader's emphasis on the necessity of pursuing the fight against corruption and justice. Ayatollah Khamenei issued an 8-point command regarding the fight against corruption, poverty, and discrimination addressed to the officials of the Islamic Republic in 2001. Over the past 17 years, he has never published a report on the outcome and results of this command and continues to emphasize the slogan of fighting corruption. In this regard, it can be said that the influence, credibility, and importance of today's message from Ayatollah Khamenei, which is a letter to Iranian youth, is as significant as the letters he has written to Western youth. The reality is that a brief survey of social media clearly shows that this message does not even answer the questions and ambiguities of the so-called value-oriented, revolutionary, or Hezbollah youth. In recent years, alongside the exposure of widespread corruption, managerial and economic deadlocks, increasing political divides, and social and moral crises in Iranian society, explicit questions have been raised by the Hezbollah base supporting the leadership about why, despite all these problems, the Leader of the Islamic Republic does not personally intervene and take effective action to resolve the crisis. Forty years after the 1979 Revolution, Khamenei is recognized more than ever as the 'responsible' for the current situation and the record of the Islamic Republic and is under strong questioning and demands for accountability. His letter today is written in the guise of a 'revolutionary mentor.' However, his letter today does not provide any clear and new answers to the multitude of questions about the present and future of the Islamic Republic; it is a lose-lose game.