What is the Relationship Between Recent Protests and the 'People' and 'The Shah'?

In the months following the protests of December 2017 and coinciding with the emergence of newly established groups and the intensification of sanctions against the Islamic Republic, the reaction to pro-Pahlavi slogans has taken a form of political maneuvering that can be described as a 'political return' to the typical mindset of the revolutionary generation of February. This approach is characterized by the myth of the middle ground (the idea of standing somewhere in between), conspiracy theories, and appropriation for favorable ends. The denial of dualistic thinking and the promotion of desirable binaries have manifested the strangest political regression among some Iranian activists in the past year; while the people in the streets have correctly identified the main cause of their misery over four decades of wasted life, and not a single anti-American or Donald Trump slogan has been shouted, there has been a vigorous effort by activists inside and outside the country to negate the dualism of people/Islamic Republic and to prove the old dualism of Iran/global imperialism within the new vocabulary; that is, the alignment of those claiming independence or nationalism against what they call Trumpists (or in more vulgar terms, 'Trump's soldiers'). Furthermore, a perspective labeled 'society-centered' created a dichotomy between itself and state-centeredness, showing a range of reactions to the pro-Pahlavi slogans of the suffering working class in Iran that included denial and labeling as fascism to appropriation for favorable ends; it reached a point where it was claimed that those who reintroduced the term 'red and black reaction' into the political literature of Iran meant by 'red reaction' nothing other than the protesting workers. Honestly, however, with the criteria that this perspective presents in the name of defending the people, all protesters from December until now will fall under the category of Trumpists. A closer look will reveal that this approach only superficially denies the occurrence of duality in political reality and recommends standing somewhere in the middle (which has no specific characteristics) by emphasizing the word 'people' and showing compassion for them; incidentally, in their actions and even rhetoric, their desired dualism has a heavy presence, namely the dualism of nativism/foreignism, which only leads to the denial of assistance from the international system for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. This confrontation is also promoted by both the left opposition and the opposition claiming nationalism in the form of another dualism; counting on the people/requesting assistance from foreigners. Meanwhile, the people of Iran even in the Green Movement protests, which began with 'Where is my vote?' and reached 'Death to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih', expected the United States as a determining global power to choose only one side between them and the Islamic regime. At that time and until just a few years ago, the choice of the U.S. was on the side of the Islamic regime, and no protest was heard from the nativists. The volume of criticism from Iranian intellectuals centered on society in the past year has been directed at identifying hatred in the smallest political actions of the protesters. The intensity of this identification and the manner of its declaration had a direct correlation with the potentially pro-Pahlavi content of the slogans. In fact, the classical mindset that upholds the current regime decided to project what it deems desirable onto what is happening instead of understanding it by reversing and inverting the political phenomenon. The result was that people in the streets of Iran shouted 'We will take back Iran', and Reza Pahlavi, while presenting a note to Reza Outadi, who was killed in the protests of August this year, explained the slogan 'We will take back Iran' and supported it, but the reactions were such that it seemed this slogan had not been shouted by the people at all and was fabricated by the writer. In the same vein, 'anti-discrimination' in the expression of the classical mindset means anti-Pahlavi, and anti-hatred also relates to opposition to Pahlavi, and if discrimination and hatred during the entire half-century of Pahlavi rule are negligible compared to forty years of rule arising from the anti-Pahlavi revolution, it is of no importance to this classical mindset. For the protesters involved in the recent uprising, the word 'Pahlavi' and reference to the past is not a matter of subjectivity but a means; the fundamental struggle of the people against the Islamic Republic is over its sectarian construction, and in this context, recalling the Pahlavi era is the strongest tool in the fight against the bad governance arising from the February revolution. Pahlavi serves as a signpost that refers not to itself but to a path and fundamentally to something beyond itself. In other words, Pahlavi is not praised in itself, but the name Pahlavi has come to the streets of Iran because of specific characteristics, and the people are demanding a specific method of governance, some of whose most important elements they see in the pre-revolutionary era. Therefore, as the Iranian intellectual turns the name Pahlavi into the main subject of the Iranians' struggle with the Islamic Republic, it reveals more than anything the secret within and their view of the political scene, not the perspective of the deprived who see Pahlavi only as a worthy helper and an effective tool for overthrowing 'bad governance'. The blind and unbelievable hatred against the Shah continues to shape this mindset even after four decades and insincerely hides behind anti-hatred; the slogans are not heralds of hatred but rather hatred is still directed at certain names. The political fatalism of the elites against the political agency of the deprived The deprived people of Iran have paid the price for ideas with their lives, health, peace, and enjoyment over these forty years, a price that at least part of it has been the handiwork of anti-American intellectuals (from left to nationalist). The people actually know that without a responsive and developmental government, proximity to America does not necessarily bring happiness, but they have also understood well that enmity with America means that an anti-development government is certainly in power and will definitely bring misfortune. The fact that there can still be disagreement in the meaning of a happy and prosperous society while a minority has rapidly destroyed the country's human and natural resources over four decades seems to be a special feature of our region. Also, to call a possible (and not very likely) return to the previous order 'the most detested government in the history of Iran' simply means that we have once again shouted that the government arising from the Islamic revolution, regardless of whether it has resulted from our cooperation with the current rulers, is not so detested after all. Now, the lower class and the middle class that has fallen below the poverty line, with increasing protests, are entering more and more into a decisive and not merely performative participation in their political destiny and are demanding an end to the chaos that four decades ago was handed over to its destroyers with the maximum optimism of leftist activists and also the claims of independence and nationality.