What Threatens the Iran Nuclear Agreement?

What factors might threaten the stability of the Iran nuclear agreement with world powers? What changes has this agreement brought to decision-making processes in the field of nuclear energy? And ultimately, what will happen to the dream of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons? David Albright answers these questions in an interview with Radio Farda. David Albright is the founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. Mr. Albright has written numerous books and articles on nuclear energy and collaborated with the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iraq's nuclear program and its history in the 1990s. Do you think the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 will be sustainable? Its sustainability is uncertain. This agreement is supposed to be permanent. Iran is a member of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), and the goal of the JCPOA was to guide Iran towards a path where it does not possess nuclear weapons and acts transparently. Whether it will act this way or not is something no one knows, in my opinion. There are certain timeframes in the JCPOA that could be crisis-inducing, and it is impossible to predict what will happen. One negative aspect is that this agreement will not moderate the Iranian regime or lead to a relationship with the United States. It also seems that trade with Iran will not be facilitated for Western merchants because many sanctions remain that threaten them. Currently, there is much speculation about the next U.S. president, which will affect economic exchanges with Iran. As a result, a weapons control agreement has been reached, but it does not lead to relations with the U.S. or moderation in Iran's behavior, and this could be corrosive over time. Do you think issues like the next U.S. president can threaten the agreement? Certainly. I don't think the Iranians will back down. After all, Iran has gained many benefits from this agreement. They managed to escape sanctions and continue working on ballistic missiles. Therefore, if necessary for weapon production, they know how to enrich uranium to high percentages and produce plutonium. The program has been suspended for a while, but they know how to make a bomb, and at least as the agency has said, they conducted a lot of research in this area until 2003. However, they do not have many long-range missiles necessary for carrying a nuclear warhead, and they are free to do this. They have lifted sanctions, legitimized their nuclear program, and now they can work on ballistic missiles. For this reason, they will not walk away from the agreement. However, if someone like Trump, meaning Trump himself, becomes president, he is very committed to abandoning the agreement. It is not an easy task, but it is possible. This agreement derives its existence and legitimacy from the United Nations Security Council. There are challenges to reject the agreement, but there are always ways to threaten it. If he is smart, he can manipulate this agreement in ways that lead Iran to take the first step towards violating the agreement. They will say the U.S. has violated its commitments, but they may think the agreement is falling apart and take a preemptive action that leads to a violation of the agreement. Then Trump will accuse Iran. If we look at the framework of the U.S.-North Korea agreement, at that time the Bush administration came to power and said it did not like this agreement, but everyone remembers that it was North Korea that took the first step. The Bush administration created a kind of atmosphere that motivated North Korea to walk away from the agreement. North Korea was accused of having a high-enrichment program and was labeled a lawbreaker. If we look back, the reality was that the Bush administration walked away from the agreement, but it was North Korea that officially did this first. And this could happen with the JCPOA as well. Iran does not think this will be in its favor. The Iranian regime is unchanging and somewhat nationalist, and at times aggressive, and such a regime can be provoked to walk away from the agreement. Do you think reaching an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has changed the dynamics of decision-making in nuclear energy and created a new precedent? Yes. What the JCPOA showed is that one can cheat and enrich uranium. This means anyone can have uranium enrichment. We must wait and see the day when Saudi Arabia or South Korea does this. We do not know, but we can no longer say 'no' to these countries. They must certainly operate under the agency's safeguards. This is a lesson Iran learned: do not do this secretly. Do it publicly and under safeguards. Then you can somehow gain the ability to produce weapons in a public space. Based on officials' statements, the country I am most concerned about is Saudi Arabia. They do not seem to be taking steps to produce weapons because the lesson they learned from Iran is that if you want to produce weapons and then your hand is revealed, you will be punished. Therefore, they must seek the so-called necessary components. The biggest component is the ability to enrich uranium to high percentages and produce plutonium, which you can do under international inspections. We are trying to understand whether Saudi Arabia's industry is moving towards the ability to produce a nuclear fuel cycle or not. I do not consider the Brookings article on this matter credible because none of the official officials of the countries admit that their ultimate goal is to produce weapons and say they want to conduct enrichment under safeguards. The Brookings article stated that regarding Saudi Arabia, it does not seem to happen because they will not receive the necessary assistance they wanted from Pakistan. They will not go to Pakistan for weapons, but Islamabad can help them with uranium enrichment. At the same time, Saudi Arabia can turn to other countries. We do not know how much knowledge they have about centrifuges, but they can obtain technology or components from a country like China and gradually build them. The problem with the Brookings research is that it did not pay attention to the complexities of the industry in Saudi Arabia and only stated that they do not have the capability to do this; maybe this is true, but Saudi Arabia can acquire this capability over time, and the signs we have indicate that they have begun some actions in this regard, which could be concerning. A country like Pakistan can provide some materials that can have dual-use in centrifuges. Will the U.S. prevent this? Saudi Arabia can buy these materials from China, just as Iran did and bought many of these materials from various countries. As a result, there are various ways for countries to sometimes secretly or illegally access different materials and build the infrastructure. I think Saudi Arabia could be a cause for concern. Current or former officials have stated that if Iran acquires weapons, they will also build weapons. And if you hear such comments, it means they will not wait for Iran to do something first. In Saudi Arabia, it will take years for the infrastructure to be ready. For years, we have been hearing about unsuccessful attempts to create a Middle East free of weapons. With this description, do you think this program will be an unattainable ideal? In the short term, the picture does not look good for us because Israel will never give up its weapons, especially when it is unclear what the outcome of the JCPOA will be. In a way, they agree with Saudi Arabia that this is a temporary agreement, and in the long run, Iran will not adhere to the effective power of this agreement, and they believe Iran will likely build a bomb in the next 10 or 15 years, and at that point, Israel wants to have its weapons because Iran is its main enemy in the region. As a result, although it is regrettable, this agreement will not lead to a Middle East free of weapons, as it does not resolve any issues. Part of the problem with this agreement is that over 20 or 30 years, you will face different generations of engineers, like a football team that has an average age of 20 years in the Premier League but cannot compete with 50-year-old players in the main competitions. However, if the limitations are to be short-term, Iran can significantly develop its nuclear program after 13 years with some limitations. But this program will be under the agency's supervision, and by that time, Iran must have also ratified the Additional Protocol in the Parliament. In terms of monitoring and inspection, Iran, according to many, has violated laws while under supervision. As a result, when it has a very extensive program with a large number of centrifuges, it can still cheat or leave the NPT and build weapons. There is no way to stop it, and it can quickly build weapons. You can mislead inspectors even under the Additional Protocol. One of the things Iran does is not allow access to military facilities for agency inspectors. As a result, you cannot verify compliance with the NPT or the Additional Protocol without these inspections. Fordow was built in a military facility, and research work for militarizing the nuclear program was conducted in military facilities. If Iran cooperates, the Additional Protocol is effective, but if it does not cooperate, the situation is not good. You can have good inspections regarding declared sites, but the concern is generally not about nuclear weapons related to Iran's declared sites. Of course, in 15 or 20 years, when hundreds of thousands of centrifuges are spinning in declared sites, they can produce the materials necessary for a bomb in a few hours; and the agency may not be able to understand this quickly. As a result, if the agency is not allowed to enter military sites, it will not know what is going on there. And this is one of the current challenges for the agency. It is not enough to act quickly only when we hear about a secret and covert operation; this must happen continuously to ensure that illegal activities are not taking place. So what is the solution? Iran's logic for not granting access is that these sites are military, and it cannot share its defense issues with the international community. The agency must request access to military facilities, and Iran must choose whether to grant this permission or not. And I think Iran will try to accept and act based on the agreement. But the agency must make this request. It should go to Parchin or other locations. The JCPOA has set conditions, including prohibiting certain actions in research and development or computer research, which the agency must say it needs access to military facilities to verify these matters. Based on the agency's safeguards and the Additional Protocol, the agency must return to Parchin because it found uranium there, and it must return to these facilities to understand why this material was found there. Why doesn't the agency make this request? We do not know. They do not answer our questions. We have published reports on this matter and will continue to do so. But they must do this soon, as it is necessary to verify actions in the JCPOA and also the NPT. This request is one of the challenges. However, another timeframe that could create a challenge is when Iran ratifies the Additional Protocol, which must happen in the eighth year, and the U.S. must completely lift its sanctions against Iran, which does not seem likely to happen. In my opinion, the first major crisis for the JCPOA will be this timeframe. The actions of the parties are interdependent. Congress may do something, or other countries may take action. At this time, the Security Council's restrictions on ballistic missiles must also be lifted. The issue here is what the U.S. will do, and most frightening of all is that Trump may be president at that time. At this point, the agency must also provide a general conclusion about the nature of Iran's nuclear program. If Iran does not know that these sanctions will really be lifted, it will not have enough motivation to cooperate with the agency to provide a general and final conclusion, such as allowing access to its military facilities. I think this is one of the weaknesses of this agreement. At the level of this agreement, it is good that it provides many accesses to the declared possibilities, but it does not help the agency regarding undeclared sites. And of course, there is also the option of reversibility that can be used when the agreement ends, so it is not the best motivation for the agency to know that it has enough power to maneuver. So do you think the future of Iran's nuclear program will be an extensive program that could lead to the production of nuclear weapons? It may be. Our job is to prevent this from happening. And we must do this regarding Saudi Arabia as well, and if they go towards covert work, we must prevent that. You can imagine that if Saudi Arabia goes towards uranium enrichment, it will be interpreted in Iran as Saudi Arabia seeking to produce weapons. Therefore, it is very important to stop Saudi Arabia very soon from taking steps to produce weapons. Do you think the U.S. can take action in this regard and use its influence? No. Only if the international community surprises Saudi Arabia while doing this. These days, the Saudis are acting out due to issues like Syria and Iran, so I think the U.S. cannot do anything alone.