What Will Iran's Nuclear Program Be Used For After Reaching an Agreement?

If the negotiations in Lausanne yield results, the limitations of the potential nuclear agreement will not only prevent Iran from potentially moving towards building a nuclear bomb in a significant timeframe but will also delay the country for at least a decade from starting to develop industrial-scale nuclear fuel production capacity. Before the final round of nuclear talks in Lausanne, which is expected to lead to a political agreement regarding the 'overall framework' of the contract between Iran and the 1+5 group, there are speculations about a mutual understanding and friendly atmosphere between American representatives and envoys of the Islamic Republic. If the current trend of negotiations continues, reaching an agreement on the generalities will not be out of reach. Assessing the benefits of a preliminary nuclear agreement or a potential final contract with the Islamic Republic is not difficult for the current U.S. government, although America's regional partners (Israel, Saudi Arabia) find it unpleasant. If a mutual understanding is reached with the Islamic Republic regarding limiting its nuclear programs, the U.S. will effectively place Tehran on a path toward new collaborations with itself. Monitoring the implementation of sanctions relief, providing operational facilities in foreign trade and banking transactions, and addressing issues arising from the lifting of sanctions will make bilateral communications and cooperation between Iran and the U.S. inevitable. The U.S. expects that the continuation of these collaborations will gradually transform the Islamic Republic from a revolutionary political system into a conventional government. Conservatives in Tehran present this plan as a prelude to changing the Islamic regime in Iran, which is fundamentally a correct interpretation considering the nature of 'change,' although the goal and outcome is not 'overthrowing the regime.' The current U.S. government believes that the Islamic Republic, due to its awareness of the heavy costs of failing negotiations, will not withdraw from them. If the Islamic Republic is forced to accept the basic conditions of negotiations and surrender parts of its risky nuclear activities, the Obama administration can claim a significant victory in international relations without incurring any costs, thereby strengthening the position of the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in the U.S. If an unlikely and unexpected retreat from the negotiating table occurs in Tehran, the Obama administration will claim to the public, Congress, and its regional partners that it has remained committed to the policy of 'welcoming a good deal and avoiding a bad deal with Tehran' and has not responded positively to the Islamic Republic's excessive demands. The third option, amid the situation of declaring failure or definitive success in negotiations, is the formal or informal continuation of the status quo. Choosing a middle path by Tehran (implementing the Joint Action Plan under the radar) under the pretext of unresolved remaining issues guarantees the continuation of the status quo and is the best possible option for the U.S. In this situation, the U.S. government will keep the sword of 'imposing more sanctions against Iran' raised with congressional support while witnessing the gradual decline of Iran's economic strength and the ongoing restrictions against the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities; a cost-free win-win option for Obama! The Islamic Republic entered the current nuclear negotiations with the U.S. partly motivated by the desire to reduce the costs arising from sanctions in the last year of Ahmadinejad's presidency. The decline in global oil prices over the past six months and the corresponding increase in the Islamic Republic's need for more foreign currency revenues have strengthened Tehran's financial difficulties and the government's motivation to reduce costs. Turning away from nuclear negotiations today will be much more costly for Tehran than it was two years ago. For this reason, the Rouhani government and the Islamic regime will strive to remain in negotiations while continuing to bargain with the U.S., hoping to achieve concessions that can be presented to domestic public opinion. If the Islamic Republic does not leave the negotiating table—even after the designated time in July of this year has passed—it will either have a comprehensive nuclear agreement with verifiable commitments or, to avoid a crisis in its internal situation and security against external threats, it will accept the continuation of the status quo. The implementation of the 'Joint Action Plan' has significantly reduced Iran's quantitative nuclear capabilities and increased the time to potential access to a nuclear bomb. Agreeing to any type of nuclear agreement (comprehensive or temporary) will further reduce quantitative nuclear capabilities and prolong the time to access nuclear explosion capacity; achieving the ultimate goal of the U.S. In the best-case scenario, if all 9,000 active centrifuges in Natanz are maintained and their production continues uninterrupted, and with a simple calculation of the annual fuel needs of a reactor and the capability of producing 1,000 centrifuges (of the P-1 type), Iran will not be able to produce fuel even for a nuclear power unit the size of the Bushehr reactor in less than ten to fifteen years. (Bushehr currently provides less than one percent of Iran's electricity needs). Thus, the remaining nuclear capacity of Iran after the ongoing nuclear negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the U.S., after incurring such a heavy cost, will not meet any of the economic or potential political goals that were envisioned for it.