What Will Rouhani Do in the Face of Pressures?

Note - Government: The state/government is not the domain of charitable associations. Mother Teresas live outside the political realm - in civil society - dedicating their lives to the poor and alleviating the suffering of the desperate. Power is the subject of political science. Political science and political sociology explain the production, control, and distribution of power. In other words, they analyze the competition, conflict, and war over power. In all democratic and non-democratic societies, competition and conflict over scarce resources of power, wealth, knowledge (information), and social status shape the domain of the state/government. The interests in these scarce resources are so great that they will do anything to possess them. Politicians sell religion and ethics in the market of governance to increase their power with the revenues from it. When an ideological approach prevents the visibility of reality, the power struggle in the Islamic Republic is considered a puppet show. While the following four realities show the opposite: A - In advanced and established democratic political systems, politicians tear each other apart to seize power. B - In non-democratic systems, the power struggle is not pursued through democratic means. C - So far, no one has provided evidence or indications that the rulers of the Islamic Republic are morally and humanly superior to politicians in democratic societies. D - The power struggle in the Islamic Republic is not only real but pursued much more ruthlessly than in democratic societies. Khamenei Leads the Anti-Rouhani Conservative Faction Ayatollah Khamenei leads the conservative faction against Hassan Rouhani. Over the past four years, he has publicly responded to every statement made by Hassan Rouhani. If Rouhani spoke about the negotiation of Imam Hussein, Khamenei publicly responded that this is a distortion of history and the character of Imam Hussein. If Rouhani spoke about the peace of Imam Hassan, Khamenei quickly responded. If Rouhani spoke about Ayatollah Khamenei, Khamenei gave a lengthy speech about 'the distortion of the Imam' and harshly criticized the secularization and liberalization of the Imam. Ayatollah Khamenei has fundamental disagreements with Hassan Rouhani on cultural, social, media (controlling and closing social networks), economic, domestic and foreign policy (America, Europe, Israel, and the Middle East), etc. Hassan Rouhani seeks negotiations with America and a regional JCPOA. Ayatollah Khamenei considers America to be absolutely treacherous, unreliable, and the head of global arrogance, and believes that no negotiations should take place with it. He is also opposed to a regional JCPOA and considers resistance and challenge to be in favor of Iran's national interests and identity (refer to the article 'Regional JCPOA, Yes? No? The Costs of Compromise and Resistance'). Hassan Rouhani advocates negotiations on human rights with Western governments and human rights organizations, but Ayatollah Khamenei says that in the issue of human rights, we are the claimants and the Westerners are the violators of human rights. The only action of the Islamic Republic is to appoint a corrupt opportunist land grabber like Javad Larijani as the head of the human rights department of the judiciary, and he participates in some UN meetings and makes statements that are exactly similar to those of Saeed Jalili in nuclear negotiations with Western governments. On cultural issues, Ayatollah Khamenei is strongly opposed to the cultural actions of Rouhani's government. He has said that he cannot sleep at night due to cultural issues. He has boycotted the 'Tehran International Book Fair' during Rouhani's presidency, as he opposes many of the books that are published. The Friday prayer leaders appointed by him have also initiated a government movement against concerts. On economic issues, during his 28 years of leadership, he has constantly defended justice and opposed corruption, unemployment, smuggling, inflation, recession, oil-based economy, etc. He has criticized and rejected the policies and economic performance of the governments of Hashemi, Khatami, and Rouhani more than he has criticized the policies and performance of Ahmadinejad's government. He considers economic science to be Western and based on non-divine assumptions, rejects socialist and liberal economies, and his unclear Islamic economy has culminated in 'resistance economy'. This open conflict is pursued with greater intensity behind the scenes. Because there, Hassan Rouhani seeks to lift the house arrest, free political prisoners, and lift the media ban on Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. They must also agree in private negotiations over ministers. The IRGC and Basij's totalitarianism The IRGC has had and continues to have a very active presence in political, cultural, media, economic, and social realms. However, it is not satisfied with its holdings and seeks an ever-increasing share of scarce resources. Hassan Rouhani has repeatedly expressed his opposition to the presence of the IRGC and Basij in these areas, and in the latest case, he said that people fear the executive power, which is a 'gunless government', let alone the IRGC and Basij, which are a 'gun government'. The IRGC is not satisfied with the appointed institutions of the regime and has an active presence in elections. However, despite all the unjust interventions and use of military resources to the detriment of rivals, whenever there is a rival, it has always been the loser. The increase in conflicts between Hassan Rouhani and the IRGC and Basij in recent weeks indicates that the IRGC wants a larger share of the government's economic projects for the next decade. The IRGC is pressuring to shape the cabinet according to its wishes. The failed totalitarian conservatives Ibrahim Raisi was not only the candidate of Ayatollah Khamenei, the military, and appointed institutions, but he was also the official candidate of all traditional and extremist conservative groups. They suffered a severe defeat despite all the fraud in the election results. It is true that Hassan Rouhani has never been part of the reformist groups, but the reformists were the main supporters and social base of Hassan Rouhani. Just look at the list of the City Council of Tehran and major cities. In Tehran, despite all the hesitations surrounding the reformists' city council list, when Seyyed Mohammad Khatami officially supported that list, despite the individualism of some reformist individuals and groups, all members of the list approved by Khatami were elected. If it were not for the support of reformists, and most importantly, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, Mehdi Karroubi, etc., it is unclear whether Hassan Rouhani would have become president again. His presidency was the result of his taboo-breaking statements and their support. But now conservatives are making three demands: A - The 'seditionists' (supporters of the Green Movement) should not be present in the executive branch at all. This demand is achievable because Ayatollah Khamenei and the principlists in parliament will not agree to it. B - Reformists should not demand a share from Hassan Rouhani. Reformists, contrary to democratic principles that the winning side takes power, have said that they will not demand a share from Rouhani at all. Their issue is to form an efficient, young, non-corrupt government that is coordinated with Rouhani. C - Hassan Rouhani knows that he won the election with 16 million votes against 24 million. The cabinet composition should be a 40 to 60 mix of minority and majority so that no faction protests. Moreover, the government deprived millions of people of voting, and if they had voted, Ibrahim Raisi would be president now. Mohammad Reza Bahonar, who was active in the JEMNA, should replace Eshaq Jahangiri as the first vice president. Traditional and extremist conservatives have held all appointed institutions in their grip. For example, in the past 38 years, not a single reformist cleric has been appointed to the Guardian Council. In the past 28 years, not a single reformist has been appointed to the presidency of the judiciary or the prosecutor's office or as the first deputy of the judiciary. Mohammad Yazdi, Hashemi Shahroudi, and Sadegh Larijani have been appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei to the presidency of the judiciary to suppress opponents, critics, and rivals alongside suppressors like Ibrahim Raisi, Mohseni Ejei, Saeed Mortazavi, Ali Razini, and Mohammadi Reyshahri. They also seize electoral institutions by broadly disqualifying opponents, critics, and rivals. In the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council has disqualified all reformist and critical jurists to keep this assembly in the hands of extremist conservatives. Everyone remembers that during Ahmadinejad's eight years, not only was no reformist used, but all of them were thrown off the regime's ship and suppressed and imprisoned. Even if we ignore the widespread election fraud of 2004 and 2009, they did not say that in 2004, the total votes of reformists were much higher than the votes of principlists in the first round, and in the second round, if we take the announced fraudulent votes as a basis, reformists should have been present in Ahmadinejad's government according to that ratio. Recent Actions of Ayatollah Khamenei Ayatollah Khamenei has launched a new round of obstructive attacks against Hassan Rouhani. First - He did not congratulate Hassan Rouhani on his victory and instead announced that this vote was a vote for the regime. Second - He considered the UNESCO 2030 document as a document violating the country's independence and annulled it by decree. With this decree, and the atmosphere that Friday prayer leaders and conservatives raised regarding colonialism and homosexuality, etc., Hassan Rouhani was forced to accept its abandonment in the meeting of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei. Third - He compared Hassan Rouhani's polarization to the polarization of Banisadr and emphasized that the regime will dismiss a polarizing president. Fourth - He issued the 'fire at will' command to the IRGC, Basij, Hezbollah forces, mourners, and reciters against Hassan Rouhani. Khamenei's 'fire at will' forces attacked Hassan Rouhani during the Quds Day rally and later recited insulting poetry against him during Eid al-Fitr prayers in his presence, and they were highly praised as part of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression and 'fire at will' actions only apply to electoral institutions that are at odds with the leadership, not to appointed institutions (refer to the article 'How the Judiciary Became the Stability Front'). Fifth - The economic reconstruction of Iran will not be solved without massive foreign investment and the entry of modern technology. The contract with Total is the first step and a gateway for subsequent steps. Ayatollah Khamenei and the IRGC oppose this. General Abdollah Abdollahi - commander of the Khatam al-Anbia headquarters - opposed this contract, stating that it was done without a tender and that the IRGC is fully capable of carrying it out. Ayatollah Alam al-Huda considered it a 'colonial and exploitative contract of the West' and called for the judiciary to prosecute its signatories. Hossein Ali Haji Deligani - representative of Shahin Shahr, member of JEMNA and supporter of Ibrahim Raisi - announced that they have prepared an urgent plan to 'temporarily stop the Total contract'. In such an environment, Hassan Rouhani must first obtain Ayatollah Khamenei's approval for the ministers of intelligence, culture and higher education, culture and Islamic guidance, interior, foreign affairs, and education. The next step is the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The widespread attacks of the military, court-appointed Friday prayer leaders, and extremist conservatives are the birth pains of the twelfth government. However, with the formation of the twelfth government, the power struggle has not ended and will intensify.