What Will the Iranian Government's Reaction to the Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh Be; 'Promise of the Truth 2' or Proxy Forces?

With the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, a hot topic among supporters of the Islamic Republic is 'Promise of the Truth 2', derived from the name of an operation that took place in early spring this year in response to the killing of a senior commander of the Quds Force at the Iranian consulate in Syria. At midnight on April 14, 2023, the Iranian government launched hundreds of missiles and drones towards Israel under the title 'Operation Promise of the Truth', most of which were intercepted by Israel and its allies and did not reach their targets. Perhaps if Iran had not executed this operation, the strategic decision-making chessboard would present a simpler picture for observers today. However, that operation has set a precedent such that a 'smaller and more limited' action, especially after the operation occurred within Iranian territory, could pose challenges for Tehran's officials. One determining criterion in the Iranian government's decision regarding the form of response is the type of attack that led to Ismail Haniyeh's death; the targeting details, the weapon used, and the potential origin of the fire are still unclear, with various unconfirmed and even contradictory accounts published. Among the Islamic Republic officials who spoke at Ismail Haniyeh's funeral in Tehran, Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, the head of the Martyrs and Veterans Foundation, expressed a prevailing approach among hardliners in the Islamic Republic, stating that 'one of the main leaders of the Israeli regime should be eliminated like martyr Haniyeh.' One criterion that observers have noted in the hours following Haniyeh's assassination is that Tehran's response depends on its objective; whether it will be as Ali Khamenei stated, 'the blood vengeance of a dear guest,' or a display of military power, or a change in the balance of power in the Middle East and the nature of deterrence. Alireza Namvar Haghighi, a political analyst in Canada, considering that this incident occurred on the first working day of Masoud Pezeshkian as president, states that Iran's response should be 'legal and managed, and it will not be an action that Iran undertakes alone.' Analysts who Radio Farda spoke with regarding possible reactions from Tehran all used terms like 'measured' and 'limited' to describe this potential response. Farzin Nadimi, a strategic analyst at the Washington Institute, is among those who believe Iran will likely see a response similar to a drone and missile attack on Israel, but emphasizes that 'I don't think they will send as many missiles and drones as in that operation for some of them to eventually hit their targets; rather, they may attempt a more focused and limited action.' Amid discussions of the need for Tehran's actions to be manageable, the use of proxy forces in this arena, especially Hezbollah Lebanon, whose senior commander was killed just hours before Haniyeh's assassination in Beirut, is a plausible scenario. Hamid Reza Azizi, a researcher at the Science and Security Institute in Berlin, states that 'in this situation, logically, the response Iran will give will be limited and indirect from its side, and the only option available seems to be Hezbollah, which if the attack on its commander was meant to hope for a lack of response, those hopes have now largely diminished.' Meanwhile, concerns among Iranian citizens and leaders of various countries, who have called for restraint from all parties, are that Iran's response may ultimately spark a war that many have long anticipated. However, Farzin Nadimi in Washington believes that Tehran does not yet see the conditions for direct confrontation as favorable and is waiting 'until perhaps conditions are more favorable for it, feeling that Israel is in a weaker political and psychological position, and hoping to create a deeper rift between Israel and the United States.' Mr. Nadimi also refers to military capability, stating that Tehran wants to 'tactically acquire systems and weapons that would put Israel's defensive position in a more difficult situation.' However, Hossein Aryan, a strategic analyst in the UK, states that not only Iran but also Israel is reluctant to engage in direct confrontation, as Israel, despite its intelligence and military capabilities, is aware of its shortcomings and will not enter into a full-scale conflict with Iran unless the United States directly intervenes and secondly, has the green light from the U.S. for subsequent support. Additionally, another option has been raised; an option that the New York Times has called 'the riskiest', which is the decision and action of Iranian officials to develop nuclear weapons. Until just two weeks ago, U.S. officials stated that they had not yet seen 'signs' of Iran approaching such a decision, even if Iran's actions in expanding its nuclear program have brought it very close to the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Whichever option the Islamic Republic chooses will affect its position in the Middle East, among its proxy forces, and in the West's approach to Tehran. CNN's news network, in an analysis of the options for Iranian officials, stated that 'Iran has no good options', noting that 'the danger of this previously untested space is that the gravity of reactions is also not well-defined; actions and reactions take shape in a space that transforms daily, decision-makers change daily, and they find themselves under internal pressure.' The article concludes that 'in this chaotic market that expands daily, the opportunity for unpredictable events also grows larger every day.'