When Ahmadinejad Became the 'Enemy' of the Leadership

Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei took a stance against Ahmadinejad and Mashai. It was predictable; it was only a matter of time. One could not recklessly attack the appointed leader of the Islamic Republic in the judicial system and expect the silence of the system's top figure. Ahmadinejad's faction expressed sharp accusations and criticisms against the head of the judiciary in recent weeks; simultaneously, they introduced and promoted themselves as committed and loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei, a stance that few believed. Thus, when the verbal attacks and the social-political maneuvers of Ahmadinejad's faction continued under the guise of a 'third current' (claiming a distinct presence from reformists and conservatives), a clear and straightforward response from the Supreme Leader became inevitable. Ayatollah Khamenei directly and indirectly introduced Ahmadinejad and his associates as being on the side of the 'enemy.' 'Be careful of the enemy's artillery fire... The enemy provides baseless statistics, lies, destroys acceptable figures for the people—whom the people should believe in—magnifying failures, weaknesses, and shortcomings.' Unfortunately, there are also groups inside that are doing the enemy's work; some understand what they are doing, while others do not, and they do it; they are doing exactly what the enemy wants.' Ayatollah Khamenei expressed not only a political stance but also an ideological judgment: 'Those who are doing the enemy's work inside lack piety; their religion is political, instead of their politics being religious; their religion is political maneuvering. They respect neither God, nor religion, nor fairness; they do exactly what the enemy wants.' This is the bitter irony of the Velayat-e Faqih's governance in the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khamenei, who after the controversial and ambiguous 2009 elections considered Ahmadinejad's views closer to his own than those of Hashemi Rafsanjani, now calls him an 'enemy' and 'impious.' This bitter irony of the Velayat-e Faqih's governance in the Islamic Republic is evident. The Supreme Leader, who at that historical juncture accused his dissenters of 'lack of insight,' must now answer for his excessive trust in Ahmadinejad and the quantity and quality of the 'insight' of the Velayat-e Faqih. The 'enemy' in the Expediency Discernment Council? Perhaps the biggest question regarding the relationship between the leadership of the system and Ahmadinejad is the continued presence of the former president in the Expediency Discernment Council. Someone who has long been playing a discordant tune and beating the drum of adventurism and factional projects is present in one of the important institutions of the Islamic Republic; a presence decided by the top figure of the system. Will the Supreme Leader's sharp words and explicit criticisms serve as a brake on the political behavior and speech of Ahmadinejad and his associates (especially Mashai and Baghai)? If the answer is negative—evidence suggests the continuation of Ahmadinejad's faction's adventurism and 'deviation from the center'—then it would not be surprising if the former president is barred from participating in the Expediency Discernment Council. Continuing in a high-ranking institution for someone who behaves like an 'enemy' poses a contradiction and an important question that must be answered by the leadership. Until now, the top of the political hierarchy has tried to prevent his exit from the 'insiders' circle and his 'deviation from the center' through bribery (keeping Ahmadinejad in the council) and threats. Ahmadinejad has sufficient information from the inner corridors of power; important data regarding power factions and key government players, the IRGC's nuclear and missile activities, astronomical expenses of the leadership's office and its affiliates, the 2009 electoral 'coup,' and more. Based on this available data and also relying on his temperament and character, he has engaged in political-ideological adventurism. It seems that Ahmadinejad's faction has initiated a 'project' that will not be halted by the recent criticisms from the leadership. The critical words and 'unsupported' attack The focal point of the Supreme Leader's criticisms may be found in this part of his sharp remarks: 'The enemy wants to destroy faith and belief; now if it cannot do so among the older generations, it wants to destroy this belief among the youth and the new generation so that the people no longer stand behind this revolution and this system; that is its goal. To discourage the people, to make the people pessimistic, to take away the self-confidence of the people, to show the future as dark.' The top of the political hierarchy is sufficiently aware of the lack of democratic legitimacy of the core of power in the Islamic Republic; he is also aware of the extent, depth, and intensity of social dissatisfaction with the current situation. As he states in another part of his speech, he is aware of some shortcomings and flaws in the judiciary and executive branches. Thus, he tries to prevent exacerbating dissatisfaction in the current economic-social situation in Iran, and in the context of post-JCPOA challenges with the U.S. From this perspective, it is not surprising if increasing restrictions against Ahmadinejad and his like-minded individuals are organized. Regardless of judicial actions against Baghai and Mashai, a security confrontation (including imposing restrictions on social mobility, field propaganda, media actions, and even unofficial 'house arrest') with Ahmadinejad himself would not be unexpected. The Velayat-e Faqih; the only 'opposition' in the Islamic Republic The Supreme Leader's sharp words against Ahmadinejad and his associates also contained another important point; where he stated: 'There are those who either today have all the management facilities of the country at their disposal or yesterday had all the management facilities at their disposal, and then, as the Westerners say, take on the role of the opposition. They must be accountable. I, who have the facilities at my disposal, cannot claim; I must be accountable and answer what I have done with these facilities. Instead of being accountable, they come and play the role of accusers against this, against that; this cannot be accepted; the people will not accept this.' The Supreme Leader criticizes Ahmadinejad's faction for their demanding and quasi-oppositional remarks and their lack of accountability regarding their management record; however, Ayatollah Khamenei himself has long been in the position of a claimant and critic and has avoided accountability. The top figure of the system has been present in the political governance longer than any other official in the Islamic Republic and has benefited from its margins to achieve his political-ideological projects. Nevertheless, he has not been accountable to any real or legal person. Throughout the 28 years of Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership, he has neither provided explanations about his record and that of his subordinates and appointees to the Assembly of Experts nor has he been willing to conduct serious and critical interviews with the media. A few years ago, Hashemi Rafsanjani referred to this issue in an important interview; he said: 'Now many of the issues attributed to the leadership are due to institutions like the IRGC, Basij, Law Enforcement, IRIB, the custodians of the Astan Quds Razavi, the shrine of Hazrat Masoumeh in Qom, and the shrine of Hazrat Abd al-Azim in Rey, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, and the Guardian Council, which are under the leadership's supervision... The Assembly of Experts invited officials for accountability. Initially, everyone we invited was happy and thanked us, saying: I will prepare and come and report. After a few days, we would see that they said they would not come. We invited other officials, and none accepted. We realized that this acceptance of invitation and then rejection was not a normal issue... None of the invited officials, even the head of the Council of Friday Prayer Policy, who was the easiest to invite, came. When we inquired about the reason, he said: 'The leadership's office said not to go!' I was surprised and asked the leader himself; he confirmed it. I said: 'This is the law of the Experts, and we have a responsibility to implement it.' He said: 'I was against the approval of this law, but I did not want to say it at that time, and now that it is going to be implemented, I will express my opinion.' Ayatollah Khamenei, in his capacity as the leader of the system, has always positioned himself as a critic and questioner of the three branches of power, and not only has he endeavored to suppress the 'opposition,' but he has also introduced himself as the only serious critic of the current situation, pursuing improvement and reform and change of the undesirable situation. The bitter irony that prevails in the Islamic Republic; perhaps similar to the poignant caricature of Ahmadinejad's faction's criticism of the ruling faction in the judiciary, while the house arrest without trial of the leaders of the Green Movement continues for more than 2500 nights.