When Do Islamic Republic Officials Resort to Thugs and Rascals?

One of the days in the first week of Ordibehesht, street vendors selling fresh fruits were confronted by individuals accompanied by municipal sidewalk clearing agents who attacked them with sticks and clubs, beating them. Green tomatoes and unripe fruits from these vendors were scattered across the street. The attackers were muscular and used vulgar language. In the course of pursuing the case of the beating of four green tomato vendors on Azadegan Highway, the lawyer for this case stated: "The police in part of their report mentioned that recent news indicates that the municipality has been daily recruiting thugs and rascals in the sidewalk clearing unit (Shahrban) and sending them to disperse individuals obstructing the sidewalks." (Shargh, 31 Khordad 1395) The investigating judge of this branch and the investigations and interrogations conducted by the city security police base in Shahr-e Rey confirmed in an official report that these thugs and rascals are employed by the municipality for tasks that officials want to carry out without getting directly involved. Even in the police's official report, the names of companies related to the municipality and their addresses are mentioned, and during the interrogation of one of the deputy mayors of the region, this individual also confirmed this issue. (Same source) What tasks do Islamic Republic officials not want to get directly involved in? In what environments are thugs and rascals hired and employed? In what other cases do Islamic Republic officials resort to thugs and rascals? Are these thugs and rascals satisfied with a daily wage? Where can their traces be found in organizations and institutions? Officials do not want certain actions to take place but do not want to intervene directly and do not want the intervention to be attributed to them. The phenomenon of plainclothes agents is born from this mindset. For example, concerts are held with the permission of the Ministry of Culture. Those who do not want these concerts to take place cannot resort to the police or the Basij unless they can obtain a ruling from a judge or provoke a Friday prayer leader to take a stance against the government. For this reason, in many cities, plainclothes forces and thugs from the paramilitary party have been used to cancel concerts. Furthermore, officials do not want individuals to act in ways that are outside the lifestyle and behavior of Shia clerics at certain ceremonies. The presence of thugs and rascals, dressed in velvet hats, at these venues serves as a means of intimidation and creating fear to deter normal behavior. An example of this was the presence of individuals resembling old-style thugs at the funeral ceremonies of non-affiliated artists like Iraj Ghaderi and Morteza Pashaei. This group of thugs also participates in various political programs of the government and Islamists. The government has introduced a collection of thugs as Basij students into universities to suppress protesting and critical students. These are the new generation of thugs in the era of the Islamic Republic. However, when the Basijis do not want or cannot suppress a movement, organized non-student thugs have also been used. In the events of Koo-e Daneshgah in Tehran and Tabriz in 1378 and 1388, these forces were employed. The government has sufficient tools for controlling the media, such as withholding permits, censorship, confiscation, and arrests by military, police, and Revolutionary Guard forces, and most suppression cases have been carried out by these institutions. However, when their knives are dull and the wishes of the leadership are not realized (such as a book published with the Ministry of Culture's permission that Khamenei and some of the clerics close to him do not approve of, or a film shown that does not align with the leader's taste), the use of thugs and rascals becomes necessary. In attacks on bookstores, newspaper offices, and cinema and theater halls, these forces have been utilized. Only thugs and rascals have been able to harass women in the streets and force them into hijab through insults or beatings. Hijab was not made mandatory by a legal decree in the Islamic Republic; the hijab law was passed five years after the establishment of the regime and four years after the street suppression of women without hijab and their expulsion from offices (if they did not comply with mandatory hijab). Hijab was effectively enforced in Iran only through the actions of thugs and rascals. Even after 38 years of the regime's existence, the police are still insufficient to enforce mandatory hijab, and thugs and rascals who collaborate with various Sharia enforcement headquarters or the Basij remain involved in this issue. Khamenei introduces these individuals as revolutionaries to society because without them, the regime cannot impose its wishes. Official institutions have never been sufficient for totalitarianism and Islamization and will not be. For this reason, unofficial forces, most of whom are made up of these thugs and rascals, have been organized and employed. If you refer to the films and photos taken from the suppression of protesters during the 2009 elections, you will see that the suppressions were mainly carried out by plainclothes forces. These forces, which operated entirely under the supervision and organization of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij, fit perfectly into the mold of thugs and rascals; their uncontrolled violence and insults, to the extent of running over people with cars, throwing individuals off bridges, and their use of brass knuckles and sticks, fit entirely into this framework. Their motorcycle parades for public intimidation also follow the 38-year-old tradition of thugs and rascals in suppressing women and youth. When the government does not want to suppress the people officially in the uniforms of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij to maintain the sanctity and national defense aura of these forces and evade responsibility for suppression, it resorts to thugs and rascals. The recourse of Islamic Republic officials to thugs and rascals indicates four characteristics of them: 1. An old connection with this class; many officials, especially those from security and protective institutions and military and security organizations like the Basij and Revolutionary Guard, have roots in these classes and can easily communicate with them and understand their language; 2. The perception of violence as the only and simplest solution; thugs and rascals specialize in bullying and violence, and the officials who turn to them actually want to solve a problem before them through intimidation and violence; 3. Being under the authority of Shia clerics, who have always looked to this class for finding obedient followers; there are many clerics who have had very close relationships with local thugs and have sought their help to suppress their opponents and critics. This issue is not limited to the modern era and has been observed during the Safavid, Qajar, and Pahlavi periods as well; and finally 4. Presenting suppression as popular; the government has always wanted to attribute suppressions to the people of the streets and the "revolutionary, suffering, and caring nation" and evade responsibility for itself. Organized plainclothes forces, which are indeed thugs and rascals, are always introduced as the people in the regime's propaganda apparatus so that all government actions appear "popular." But if these actions are "popular," why do they always act according to Khamenei's wishes and the leadership's directives?