Where are the exchanges between Khamenei and Rouhani heading?

For several weeks now, the exchange of differing policies and ideas, along with implicit responses from Khamenei and Rouhani to each other, has become a routine. This back-and-forth has a history but has intensified since the 2017 elections. When Khamenei criticized UNESCO's 2030 document during the election period, Rouhani explicitly stated that Khamenei had been misinformed. Khamenei denied this: "They think we did not receive the correct report; no, our reports are accurate." (June 7, 2017) He even criticized this document on the day of the terrorist attacks on the parliament and Khomeini's shrine, addressing Rouhani directly: "The issue of the 2030 document is similar to [the issue of independence]. Now some come and say we have reservations or that we do not accept certain aspects; no, this is not the discussion; let’s assume there is nothing clear in this document that contradicts Islam, which there is. My point is that the educational system of the country should not be written outside the country... You say this document has no contradiction with Islam, whether it does or not, this is Iran, this is the Islamic Republic. Our educational system should not be written by four people sitting in UNESCO! Why?" (same day) In response, Rouhani revealed on Instagram that the submission of this document to the leadership, the judiciary, and appointed institutions occurred in September 2016 (about 9 months prior), meaning Khamenei and his appointed Friday prayer leaders have been playing political games with this issue after 9 months. A few days after Khamenei stated: "Challenges have costs, but compromises also have exorbitant costs... If a person enters a challenge with confidence, logic, and revolutionary rationality, the cost is much less than the cost of compromise." (June 3, 2017) Hassan Rouhani replied that "tolerating peace is much more difficult than fighting" and "sacrificing oneself and bravery in the battlefield is a difficult task, but nonetheless, tolerating peace is much more difficult than fighting." (June 10, 2017) After Rouhani proposed the second and third versions of the JCPOA, Khamenei rejected his proposal. (March 21, 2016) These exchanges are unprecedented in the sense that even Mohammad Khatami and Rafsanjani, who were critical of some of Khamenei's policies, did not respond to him with such clarity. They would make statements independent of Khamenei's remarks, and Khamenei would respond to them, after which they would either remain silent or retreat. An example of Rafsanjani's statement regarding missiles was: "Tomorrow's world is a world of discourse, not a world of missiles." Khamenei responded: "If this statement is made out of ignorance, it is one issue, but if it is made knowingly, it is treason." (April 1, 2016) Rafsanjani immediately retracted his statement. Looking at the fate of Khatami and Rafsanjani, despite not standing against Khamenei's words, shows what happened to them: one was removed from the position of Friday prayer leader and the presidency of the Assembly of Experts with two children and one close associate (Hosseinali Marashi) imprisoned, while the other was banned from being photographed and leaving the country. It seems that Rouhani has not learned enough from the fate of previous government heads or has misinterpreted the votes cast for him (which were not actually against his rival). These explicit exchanges with Rouhani lead to what direction? What types of confrontations can Khamenei's experiences with the three previous presidents suggest? It is clear that the winner of this debate in the policy-making sphere will not be Rouhani. However, will Khamenei be satisfied with verbal confrontations? Considering Khamenei's manual of instructions and his tendency not to limit himself to verbal responses, four scenarios for the continuation of this explicit conflict can be imagined: 1. Mobilizing supporters for a physical attack. Khamenei usually does not directly order attacks on his opponents but indirectly gives signals to his inner circle. They then leave the path open for hardline supporters to attack, and security, military, and paramilitary forces provide the necessary cover and support. His statement about "fire at will" (June 7, 2017) is a signal to supporters to attack Rouhani with stones or shoes or "hard objects" or to beat him in public gatherings, something that has been done to Ataollah Mohajerani, Abdullah Nouri, Ali Larijani, Mohammad Khatami, Natiq Nouri, and dozens of other political figures (such as members of parliament) in Iran to intimidate and keep them in line through Khamenei's indirect signaling. Rouhani has no protection against this attack. If the votes cast were supposed to provide protection, Khatami's vote would have done so for him. 2. Judicial persecution of close associates. Khamenei has shown throughout his four-decade political career in the Islamic Republic that he is vindictive and does not shy away from political revenge. In this regard, one can expect him to strike at Rouhani through one of the institutions under his control, especially the judiciary. This blow could involve the arrest of Rouhani's brother (over corruption and abuse cases) or the detention of several of his close associates or creating another crisis for the government. The judiciary has always been a tool in Khamenei's hands for revenge. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, some of his close associates were summoned to court and faced fabricated charges, while corruption and abuse of power were not limited to them. 3. Political pressure. Pressure on the head of state to dismiss one of his close officials could be another reaction from Khamenei to Rouhani's retorts. Another political pressure could be creating periodic crises (as Khatami said, every 9 days a crisis) for the government: attacking student gatherings, launching shrouded protesters in Qom, burning cinemas and bookstores, and bombing press offices are some examples of these crisis creations. Khamenei's soft war officers are all specialized in these areas and are ready for such movements. They only need the "signal" from the leader to start. Of course, the war in Syria and Iraq could be a deterrent factor since thousands of Khamenei's loyal forces are engaged in fighting in Iraq and Syria. Conversely, war could serve as a justifying factor for such suppressions. 4. Assassination of a close associate. After the 2017 elections, Rouhani has emerged among the change-seeking class and foreign media in a stature similar to that of Mohammad Khatami. He now speaks with more confidence and openly challenges Khamenei's Friday prayer leaders, his clerics, and military commanders. It seems unlikely that Khamenei will remain passive in this situation. The assassination of Saeed Hajarian (former intelligence officer and later advisor) during Khatami's presidency was a warning to Khatami to refrain from any actions toward political change in the country and to slow down the movements of his advisors. Khatami took this lesson well and did not take a step against Khamenei's demands until the end of his term. He even withdrew his twin bills aimed at abolishing the Guardian Council's oversight and increasing the president's powers from the parliament. It is hard to believe that the assassin acted without any coordination with Khamenei's inner circle, especially considering that he was released after a while. The assassination of one of Rouhani's close associates—a previously intelligence-related figure like Hessam al-Din Ashna—could serve as a necessary warning to him. Some readers may consider the scenarios presented as mere speculation. However, when we consider Khamenei's character and behavior, especially in dealing with his critics, and observe that the above scenarios have not been executed centuries ago but in recent years under similar conditions, we will take them more seriously and become more sensitive to them. Khamenei explicitly expresses concern about the situation becoming like Bani Sadr's: "In 1980, the then president polarized society and divided people into opposing and supporting groups, which should not be repeated." (June 11, 2017) This statement and positioning are very similar to his remarks and those of his supporters during the years 1997 to 1999 during Mohammad Khatami's presidency. The above scenarios, of course, do not provide a way for reactions against Khamenei and his associates either, as they themselves have graduated from the school of repression. Unlike Ahmadinejad, whom Khamenei did not perceive as a threat, Rouhani, Khatami, and Rafsanjani are considered potential threats due to their clerical status and their equivalence to Khamenei in terms of religious scholarship and position in the religious bureaucracy. Those who can consider Khamenei as the representative of the Mahdi can also imagine the same for the other three clerics. This is why Rafsanjani faced the most pressure, especially in the final years of his life. Khamenei is even unwilling to accept that Mohammad Khatami, who has no political responsibility today, could be out of the radar of his security forces for a few hours. He even feels threatened by Hassan Khomeini, and for this reason, arrangements were made to disrupt his speech at Khomeini's anniversary in 2010. With this level of sensitivity, he naturally controls them by any means and opportunity. After the 2017 elections, Rouhani has emerged among the change-seeking class and foreign media in a stature similar to that of Mohammad Khatami. He now speaks with more confidence and openly challenges Khamenei's Friday prayer leaders, his clerics, and military commanders. It seems unlikely that Khamenei will remain passive in this situation.