Where is Iran headed after the JCPOA?

Recent statements by Masoud Jazayeri, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, indicating that "we have a clear plan for after the JCPOA and soon the roar of missiles will be heard," signal the continued resistance of the military and hardliners in the ruling establishment against the potential transformation of Iran's future and an effort to prevent the gradual change of the country's political structure from a revolutionary protest government to a conventional political entity aligned with its neighbors. Four days prior to Jazayeri's remarks, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, had threatened Saudi Arabia with a "hard and harsh" retaliatory action in response to the government's misconduct towards Iranian victims of the Mina disaster. The simple meaning of the Supreme Leader's threat, which received widespread coverage in international media, is a military threat against Saudi Arabia, while none of the other Muslim countries that lost their citizens in the Mina incident expressed their dissatisfaction beyond criticizing the mismanagement of the Riyadh government. In harsher statements, Morteza Ghorbani, another senior IRGC official who heads the Islamic Revolution and Sacred Defense Museums Organization, threatened Israel and Saudi Arabia with the launch of 2000 missiles, conditional on the "declaration of the Supreme Leader's will." The primary goal of the government in reaching a nuclear agreement with the international community and halting Iran's nuclear activities, which were suspected of having military dimensions, was to lift punitive economic and financial sanctions and begin rebuilding Iran's stagnant economy. However, lifting foreign sanctions on paper alone, without significant and positive changes in the internal and foreign policies of the government, can never lead to a positive movement towards improving the economic situation and pulling Iran out of the current recession, as evidenced by a recent protest letter from four ministers in Rouhani's government indicating the continuation of the crisis and a warning of worsening conditions even after the implementation of the JCPOA. After the JCPOA, if Iran's blocked currencies are released and more crude oil exports are allowed, but without changes in other major policies and behaviors of the ruling establishment, the conditions for foreign participation and investment in Iran will not change, and the security coefficient for investment and the business environment with the outside world will not improve. If the previous path continues without reform, Iran will reach the same destination in the post-JCPOA era as the two four-year governments of Ahmadinejad did, and despite having over $800 billion in foreign income, Iran's economy experienced an annual negative growth rate of over 3 percent and became correspondingly poorer. To achieve the JCPOA and during negotiations with foreign parties, the government attempted to neutralize tensions with neighbors, especially the Saudi government, and even adopted a policy of silence and tolerance regarding Bahrain to some extent. Despite deep dissatisfaction and protests from the IRGC, the government either suspended or minimized missile maneuvers and tests (which are generally perceived as provocative and threatening abroad). Regarding Syria, there was an effort for a while to pragmatically accept a reasonable and possible situation in that country. With the achievement of the JCPOA and the gradual cessation of nuclear programs, Iran's cards for engaging in threatening policies in the region have weakened, and therefore, there should be a convergence in regional crises and in relation to extra-regional powers and neighbors, and a shift towards de-escalation instead of escalation should be adopted in defense of the national interests of the country. Nevertheless, in the post-JCPOA conditions, Iran's position in Syria, due to the formation of a new Moscow-Tehran military axis to defend the Assad regime, has become more aggressive than before; Iran's military and political presence in Iraq has been maintained, and more tensions have arisen in Yemen and Bahrain, exemplified by the recent expulsion of Iranian political and diplomatic representatives from Manama and Sanaa. The threat of hard and harsh action or the threat to launch 2000 missiles at Saudi Arabia undoubtedly places Tehran's tense relations with Riyadh in a more critical situation. Due to the specific geographical situation of the common borders between Iran and Saudi Arabia and also Iran's defensive depth, it is certain that even one attacking Saudi soldier will never find a way into the main territory of Iran, but the Iranian islands located in the waters of the Persian Gulf could be subjected to aggression based on territorial claims from neighboring Emirates or even under the pretext of preemptive defense. Beyond the risk of direct confrontations resulting from escalation and provocation on one side, the danger of a new regional war threatens to emerge, which is not aligned with Iran's national interests. In this case, Iran's missile capabilities and threats, which are mostly retaliatory rather than deterrent, will only lead to an increase in crises and further destruction of Iran (and of course the facilities of neighboring countries). To help Iran overcome the current economic crisis, strengthening internal stability, securing employment and investment, accelerating the flow of money, and creating hope for the future on one hand, and on the other hand, de-escalating tensions and creating calm relations with neighboring countries and adopting policies based on regional cooperation is an unavoidable necessity. However, based on evidence, the post-JCPOA path appears to be drawn differently by factions within the ruling establishment than the government's strategic roadmap, and these centers continue to attempt to maintain the government's micro and macro policies, especially in relation to regional crises, along the same previous lines.