Where is Masoud Pezeshkian's Foreign Policy Taking Iran-Israel Bipolarity?

The escalation of military conflict between the governments of Iran and Israel following the death of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the former Secretary-General of Hezbollah Lebanon, due to heavy bombardments by the Israeli army, presents an opportunity to better and more accurately understand the fourteenth government of the Islamic Republic. The positions of Masoud Pezeshkian, Abbas Araghchi, the Foreign Minister, and the overall reformists indicate that no significant changes have occurred in foreign policy. It was already clear that the policymaker and determinant of the main lines of the country's diplomacy was the institution of the Guardian Jurist, and the Quds Force of the IRGC (field) dominates diplomacy; however, contrary to Pezeshkian's statements during the election campaign, his foreign policy is also similar to that of the principlists and does not demonstrate the claimed moderation. From the moment individuals affiliated with the 'Resistance Front' had a prominent and unprecedented presence at Pezeshkian's inauguration and swearing-in ceremony, the perception grew that the confrontational foreign policy in Pezeshkian's government would continue with greater intensity. Previously, Pezeshkian's article in the 'Tehran Times' had also clarified the mindset of him and his advisors, who have no doubts about advancing a 'enemy-based' foreign policy with the West and reliance on the East. Now, at a time when reformists have once again taken apparent control of the executive branch, the country is on the brink of war with Israel and, subsequently, the United States more than ever; a situation that previously led to criticism of figures like Saeed Jalili for placing the country in a state of war. This event contradicts the promises made during the election competition, which claimed that Pezeshkian would seek reconciliation with the world and pursue de-escalation with the West. The absolute support of reformists and Pezeshkian's supporters for risky retaliation and backing for Khamenei, as well as inviting the community to participate in the Friday prayers of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, reflects the dual behavior and theoretical and political contradictions in the outlook of this current, which ultimately reflects deception. These contradictions in the past also prevented the JCPOA from reaching a conclusion and creating sustainable openings. Of course, this event goes beyond the dual approach of the reformists. They have played no role in the policymaking and design undertaken and have, in fact, been utilized. The formation of Pezeshkian's government was the product of a security scenario. Until the escalation of tensions in foreign policy, it was believed that security objectives had an internal dimension and aimed to halt the prevailing approach of the 'Women, Life, Freedom' revolutionary movement and the demand for structural changes through limited and superficial actions. This project failed at the outset due to the majority of the Iranian people's withdrawal from participating in the elections. However, now evidence and signs strengthen another hypothesis that preparing the ground for Masoud Pezeshkian's victory not only had an external dimension but also prioritized exploiting this issue internally. It seems that Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, and the hard core of power concluded after the death of General Mohammad Zahidi and the execution of Operation 'Promise of Truth 1' that escalating tensions with Israel is inevitable. Recently, Ali Akbar Salehi, the former Foreign Minister who has access to the power bloc's information, claimed that supporters of the view that war with Israel is unavoidable are increasing within the system. Based on this, it can be concluded that the main security and foreign policy decision-makers in the system have realized that they must prepare for an increase in conflict levels and transition from proxy warfare to direct confrontation. However, there is doubt whether they consider this decision desirable, but to maintain the position of the 'Resistance Front' and to contain Israel's aggressive movement in fundamental weakening, they felt compelled to prepare for increased tensions. Therefore, contrary to the perceptions and propaganda conducted, the function of Pezeshkian's government was not de-escalation in foreign policy but rather reducing the costs of escalating tensions for the system by influencing society to increase support for the system's foreign policy. Thus, the composition of the cabinet transitioned from a unified principlist governance to a joint-stock company of believers in Khamenei's hegemony and political authoritarianism with a concentration of the discourse of 'purification.' The death of Nasrallah; costly options and difficult choices for Iran. They were probably hopeless that relying on the social base of the institution of the Guardian Jurist and the ideological themes of the system could garner the necessary social support. One of the bottlenecks of the Islamic Republic in expanding the crisis in foreign policy is the deep gap between the government and the nation. Although opponents of the Islamic Republic in foreign policy are relatively fewer than in domestic policy, the lack of legitimacy and disgust for the government is so widespread that even parts of society have pinned their hopes on foreign military intervention for political changes in Iran. In this situation, the classic identity of the system and the officially governing values in regulating foreign relations have lost minimal capacity to conceal ideological conflict behind the mask of Iranian nationalism and generalizing the confrontation with Israel to enmity with Iran and depicting an existential threat from it. Therefore, it can be concluded that replacing Ibrahim Raisi with someone who appears close to reformists but is loyal and committed to the classic foreign policy of the system is a tactic to remedy the system's vulnerability due to the lack of necessary social support. Pezeshkian's government is an extension of Raisi's government, but its security characteristic is only superficially different, intended to play the role of 'good cop.' The methods are also different, and it is intended that within the limited powers of the executive branch and more at the promotional and media level, segments of public opinion that Khamenei, the IRGC, and principlists cannot influence will be drawn towards the desired direction in alignment with the system or passivity. Whether Pezeshkian's government can significantly assist the system in overcoming the bottleneck of social support in confrontation with Israel and the United States, and whether the atmosphere will shift towards a bipolarity between Israel and the Islamic Republic, is something that will be determined in the days and weeks to come. Although even now, monitoring reactions in the virtual space and political arena indicates that the likelihood of success is weak.