Where is Turkey Heading?

The increase in terrorist incidents over the past two months since the beginning of 2016 in various cities against the police, military, and especially in Ankara and Istanbul seems to be a warning bell that has sounded for Turkish officials. On one hand, some domestic experts attribute the recent incidents to the weakness of the country's security and intelligence systems, while others consider it a result of the power-hungry policies of the 'AK Party' that have caused this crisis with their wrong policies both domestically and internationally. Many politicians believe that the current incidents stem from Turkey's intervention in the Syrian crisis, arguing that if Turkey had not intervened in Syria, attempted to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and supported opposition groups alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, there would be no pressure from Syrian migrants on Turkey's economy and social system, nor would there be enmity and reckoning between the government and ISIS. Most importantly, there would be no need to archive the peace negotiations between the Kurds and the government, and the bitter events resulting from the relentless battles between the military and the PKK Kurds would not have occurred. Accordingly, after the bomb explosion on Istiklal Street in Istanbul, which resulted in the deaths of over seven people and injuries to 36 others, it is now necessary to examine the blurred image of Turkey's political-social system under the current conditions. Where is Turkey heading with this situation? What is the way out of these unwanted conditions? Why have both ISIS and the PKK, along with other splinter groups like 'TAK' (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks) or 'KCK' (Union of Communities in Kurdistan) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party, engaged in a campaign against the Turkish government, causing unfortunate incidents and the deaths of innocent people during terrorist attacks? Is ISIS settling scores or taking revenge? Considering that in recent years, the terrorist group ISIS has facilitated its financing through Turkey and the private oil trade in that country, the pressure from Western coalition forces and the increase in Russian attacks against its positions, along with the public exposure of trade relations between this group and the Turkish government, forced the Turkish government to change its approach and limit its borders to ISIS terrorists under pressure from countries united against terrorism in Syria and Iraq. Although this has not been fully accomplished, the arrest of a significant number of ISIS operatives in Turkey and the insecurity of their operational space in the country have caused ISIS to suffer substantial material losses, and Turkey is no longer seen as a transit route for new supporters to join the fighting front inside Syria. This has led ISIS to consider exerting pressure against the Turkish government. After the Sultan Ahmed incident, it has effectively regarded fighting against the Turkish government as a given and has continued its terrorist activities. The recent incident on Istiklal Street in Istanbul, while not operationally similar to the type of suicide bombings by ISIS, according to the Turkish Ministry of Interior, the DNA analysis of the suicide bomber named Mehmet Ozturk from Gaziantep, who joined ISIS over a year ago, indicates that this heinous crime was executed by ISIS. It seems that ISIS will periodically make the social environment in Turkey unsafe. Some security analysts and prominent retired experts from Turkey's intelligence agency (MIT) believe that this group does not merely act in line with its own goals but rather as an operational arm of foreign intelligence agencies that wish to harm Turkey's interests in foreign policy and aim to target its economic infrastructure through terrorist operations. What strategies do the PKK and other Kurdish rebel groups pursue in carrying out terrorist operations? With the end of the peace negotiations between the Kurds and the Turkish government, all paths leading to hope and tranquility in Turkey seem to have been closed, and the Turkish government, believing it can easily influence the PKK and ultimately force the weakened Kurdish political structure to the negotiating table, has launched military operations against this group. However, both the Kurdish rebels and the government have entered a stage where the survival of both sides is rooted in weakening each other. Therefore, today the military has acted against the Kurds in the southeast, while in return, Kurdish rebel groups have resorted to bombings in cities, targeting military transit routes, or attacking military bases and police stations in various cities. What should not be overlooked is the innocent lives lost in this political-military posturing between the opposing groups and the government. The PKK aims to expand the battlefield across all of Turkey to succeed in its positions. Although this move will lead to the struggle for democratic rights being stifled and the actions of this group being perceived as a rebellious movement, ultimately, this group seeks to overthrow the AK Party government. For instance, Cemil Bayik, a leader of the Kurdish rebels, previously spoke of continuing the battles until the current Turkish government falls. The People's Democratic Party, which has managed to present a somewhat successful political image as the political base of the Kurds, has weakened its political stance against Turkey due to its continued ambiguous policy towards the PKK and its failure to clearly state its position regarding the creation of defensive trenches in Cizre, Sur, and Silopi. Meanwhile, a parliamentary representative from the People's Democratic Party attended a mourning event after the Ankara explosion, thereby paving the way for the condemnation of this party by the government, other parties, and even public opinion. As a result, the current discussion of arresting and stripping the political immunity of parliament representatives from this party stems from this political misstep. Today, the conditions of the dispute have reached a level of political-social sensitivity where the People's Democratic Party can only express condolences or condemn terrorist incidents without making any progress. Various parties in parliament, including the AK Party, the Republican People's Party, and the Nationalist Movement Party, have issued a statement condemning terrorism and emphasizing the need to fight it, and the exclusion of the People's Democratic Party from this group clearly indicates political polarization. What is the way out? Erdogan, under the pretext of fighting Kurdish rebels, has taken full advantage of the current situation, forcing his opponents into silence and increasingly emphasizing the need for a unitary authority and individual leadership. In line with this goal and under the pretext of maintaining political-social security and stabilizing economic conditions, he effectively employs legal institutions, parliament, and the media system. Efforts to remove political immunity from representatives and eliminate all existing legal obstacles can be seen as a clear example of this claim. However, what should not be overlooked is that Turkey has entered a very dangerous political-social situation. The continuation of internal conflicts, the dismantling of various institutions that stand against the ruling government, the disregard for Supreme Court rulings, and even the neglect of the constitution, along with the internal turmoil and the tarnishing of the country's image on the international stage and Turkey's isolation in its relations with neighbors and even allies, have created a dark horizon for Turkey. It seems that in the short term, there is no way out for Turkey, as the current conditions resemble those of the 1990s. Additionally, the lack of stabilization of political-social order in Syria and the unextinguished flames of terrorism at Turkey's borders provide further justification. This is while the government, in agreement with the European Union regarding the return of Syrian migrants to Turkey and the creation of a homeland space, is attempting to change the demographic makeup of southeastern Turkey. In other words, with the destruction of war-torn areas in southeastern Turkey and the government's control over those areas and the establishment of newly built cities, Syrians will be replaced in those areas, and thus, in the long term, there will be no issue known as 'Kurdish regions in southeastern Turkey.'