Who are the Economic 'Fire at Will' Actors?

The recent speech by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic was a public command to his supporters to rebel against the legal and official institutions of the country. Although it is not unusual for the regime leader to use metaphors of enemy, front, and war to describe political and social matters, the signal given by the term 'Fire at Will' to the leader's followers likely opens a broader field for their assault on the public sphere. The rebellion of the leader's supporters against the law is not new and dates back to the current regime's existence. However, this time, the leader's command regarding 'Fire at Will' for his supporters has been made public. The involvement of plainclothes agents in suppressing civil society activists and citizens—especially dissenters—under various pretexts is one manifestation of this 'Fire at Will' among the leader's supporters. In the economic sphere, this 'Fire at Will' is also extensive. Unofficial financial and credit institutions, money laundering processes, illegal imports of goods, land and property seizures by influential circles of the regime, and the destruction or confiscation of Baha'i properties are among the examples of 'Fire at Will' by the followers of the leadership and authoritarian figures in the economic realm. This 'Fire at Will' is neither accidental nor exceptional; rather, it is a systematic process by authoritarian figures for evading the law and seizing public assets, individuals' properties, and stripping others of their legal rights. Therefore, law evasion in Iran by power factions is institutionalized and systematic, made possible with some kind of permission from high-ranking officials, and represents a form of rent-seeking in exchange for loyalty to the leadership and executing its orders. If it is claimed that one of the most significant problems in Iran's economy is the rampage of the 'Fire at Will' actors in the country's economy, it would not be an exaggeration. Power factions use religious concepts and terms such as the influence of imperialism and resistant economy—which do not have a clear and defined economic meaning—to intimidate political rivals or eliminate them from the scene and seize a larger share of public resources. These actions are always carried out under the guise of the higher interests of the regime, such as the expansion of Shi'ism or the struggle against imperialism and strengthening Hezbollah forces. The economic duality in Iran is not unrelated to the duality between formal law and religious decree. The economic 'Fire at Will' actors represent the chaos that prevails over Iran's economy, and the consequence of such a situation will be the flight of capital and entrepreneurial investors. Instances of law evasion under the leadership's banner and within the framework of so-called 'revolutionary' institutions are very numerous. However, only a few examples will suffice here. For the first time during the previous government, the issue of unauthorized docks was raised in the public sphere, and it was announced that the Revolutionary Guards, possessing commercial docks, were engaged in smuggling goods. According to disclosures from those days, forces identifying themselves as affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards were engaging in economic activities outside the official organizational regulations of this military body. The volume of goods smuggled into Iran is estimated to be between ten to twenty billion dollars. Although the current government claims that the volume of smuggling has decreased, it is difficult to accept this claim. This smuggling requires a money laundering mechanism. Although money laundering is illegal in Iran, according to international organizations, Iran is one of the countries with a high rate of money laundering and holds a high rank in international money laundering rankings. According to the Basel Institute's governance index, Iran had the highest risk ranking among 149 countries surveyed in 2016. The main reason for widespread money laundering in Iran is that a large portion of Iran's economy operates outside the banking and tax oversight system. In this context, the share of unofficial credit and banking sectors, such as benevolent loan funds, is very extensive. Additionally, smuggling must be added to this. The official banking system in Iran is also another area where power factions, by evading the law and abusing their positions, have borrowed large sums but refuse to repay the funds. Recently, the head of the country's General Inspection Organization stated that there are more than 100 trillion tomans in overdue bank debts without guarantees and necessary collateral in the country. This volume of overdue debt, especially without guarantees, is very astonishing and indicates the extensive influence of these power factions over the banking system and their simultaneous law evasion. The unofficial monetary and credit sector of the 'Fire at Will' actors, alongside the abuse of the official banking sector, includes thousands of financial and credit institutions such as benevolent loan funds in Iran that disregard the country's monetary regulations, and the Central Bank has no oversight over them. A significant portion of the country's liquidity is held by these institutions. However, if we trust the words of the Central Bank's president, nearly one-fourth of credit and banking activities are outside the bank's oversight and belong to this sector. This problem is longstanding, and despite the Central Bank's efforts, the activities of these institutions have not ceased because influential military and paramilitary circles support the activities of these banks. According to a recent report from the Joint Commission of the Parliament and the Tax Affairs Organization, a significant portion of Iran's economy does not pay taxes. According to this data, the major share of tax evasion relates to institutions under the supervision and management of the regime's leadership, such as the economic institutions of the Revolutionary Guards and the Astan Quds Razavi, which are rent-seeking entities that utilize national common resources but simultaneously enjoy tax exemptions or evade taxes. The 'Fire at Will' actors are not to be thought of as only active in the economic sphere. They operate under the leader's command in all areas of social life and are ready to assert their superiority over 'non-self' individuals through the exercise of power. This represents a form of rent and privilege for this group of the leader's followers. This power rent to crush 'non-self' individuals is closely related to other economic and social privileges. Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, and some other Friday prayer leaders like him are among the most prominent examples of 'Fire at Will' actors who act autonomously and challenge the government within the framework of the leader's directives whenever necessary, undermining the existing laws of the country. In conclusion, although the leader of the Iranian regime has recently unveiled a movement called 'Fire at Will,' these power factions composed of the leader's followers have been evading the law for years with his permission, abusing power and wealth, and suppressing civil society.