Ismail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose fate is currently shrouded in ambiguity, is not considered a particularly influential figure within the IRGC or even among the Islamic Republic's proxy groups abroad. His main influence over the past decades has been primarily among Afghan Shia militants close to the Iranian government, and he has had little influence in proxy wars across Iran's western borders. Following the Israeli attack on the 'Dahiyeh' area on the evening of October 12, targeting Hezbollah's base in southern Beirut, which primarily aimed at Hashem Safi al-Din, a potential successor to Hassan Nasrallah, unofficial reports emerged about Qaani being injured or even killed. Hezbollah is a militia group and also a political party in Lebanon that controls a large part of the southern region of the country. The U.S. considers it a terrorist organization, while the European Union has only blacklisted its military wing. The New York Times reported on October 15, citing three Iranian sources, that Ismail Qaani was last seen in Beirut the previous week. However, Iraj Masjedi, the deputy coordinator of the Quds Force, stated on October 16 that Qaani's health was 'good.' Nevertheless, since then, no sound, image, or video of Qaani has been released, and Iranian officials have not clarified his whereabouts. Why didn't 'Qaani become like Soleimani'? Joining the IRGC and organizing Afghan militants Ismail Qaani Akbarnejad was born on August 8, 1957, in Mashhad and lived there until he received his high school diploma. After the establishment of the IRGC in 1979, he joined this ideological military organization, then moved from Mashhad to Tehran for training and completed his military education at the Saadabad barracks, now renamed 'Imam Ali' barracks. After finishing his military training, he returned to Mashhad and began his work in the IRGC as a cadre member. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, Qaani commanded the 21st Imam Reza Division (later the 21st Brigade) and the 5th Nasr Division, which were the two main military units of the Khorasanis during the Iran-Iraq War. Most of the Afghans who fought alongside Iranian forces during the war were active in one of these two units. Khorasan is the main center of activity for Afghan forces affiliated with Iran, such as the 'Fatemiyoun Brigade,' and Qaani's cooperation with Iran's proxy groups in Afghanistan, like the Fatemiyoun Brigade, dates back to this period of the Iran-Iraq War. After the war ended, Mohsen Rezaei, the then-commander of the IRGC, appointed Qaani as the deputy commander of the 8th Operations Unit of the IRGC's Ground Forces based in Mashhad. He served for over a year, from 2006 to 2007, as the deputy of intelligence for the IRGC's Joint Staff. In the early 1990s, when Qaani joined the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani was still the commander of the 41st Tharallah Division in Kerman and had not yet joined the Quds Force. During those years, Qaani served as the deputy to Ahmad Vahidi, the first commander of the Quds Force, and was simultaneously responsible for the Afghanistan dossier within the Quds Force. He was the liaison between Iran and Afghan Mujahideen groups fighting against the Taliban for years. In 2007, Qaani was appointed as the deputy to Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force. In this position, he was a close aide to Soleimani and was effectively still responsible for the Afghanistan dossier. The Fatemiyoun Brigade, one of the most important proxy groups of the IRGC, was formed mainly by Afghans residing in Iran and later expanded into a division, playing a crucial role in the Syrian war to preserve Bashar al-Assad's regime. Members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade fell into three categories, all connected to Qaani in some way. The first group consisted of those who fought against Saddam Hussein's army in the units under Qaani's command during the Iran-Iraq War. The second group included Afghans who received support from the IRGC and commanders like Qaani during Afghanistan's civil wars. The third group comprised young Afghans residing in Iran, mainly in Khorasan, who joined the Fatemiyoun Brigade either for religious motives or in exchange for money and residency documents in Iran. Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, immediately appointed Ismail Qaani as the commander of the Quds Force following Qassem Soleimani's assassination in January 2020 due to a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad. In addition, during the entire period that Qassem Soleimani was outside Iran, especially in Syria, Qaani was responsible for managing the Quds Force within the country as his deputy. After assuming command of the Quds Force, Qaani stated that revenge against the Americans for killing Soleimani meant 'expelling them from the region.' Qaani has been sanctioned by the U.S. for aiding extremist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad and for participating in a financial support network for 'terrorist activities and arms shipments' to these two groups. However, Reuters reported, citing individuals familiar with Qaani and Soleimani, as well as Western military and political analysts, that Qaani has never commanded the same respect among the Islamic Republic's proxy groups as his predecessor Soleimani and has not established close ties with the Islamic Republic's allies in the Arab world. Qaani also lacked experience in IRGC operations beyond Iran's eastern borders, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, before becoming the commander of the Quds Force. Unlike Soleimani, who easily conversed in Arabic with Iraqi militants and Hezbollah commanders, Qaani does not speak Arabic. He is less interested in public appearances than Soleimani, and little information about him exists in social media or leaked diplomatic documents. Unlike Soleimani, Qaani is not considered a charismatic figure among supporters of the Islamic Republic. In contrast to Soleimani, who had many photos taken alongside IRGC-supported militants during years of war in Iraq and Syria, Qaani has preferred to remain in the background and conduct most of his travels and visits to neighboring countries privately. The UK has also sanctioned Qaani, and in June of this year, the European Union officially announced that it would add the Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic and the commander of the IRGC's Quds Force to its sanctions list for sending missiles and drones used against Israel and Ukraine and in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Who is Ismail Qaani, the 'missing' commander of the Quds Force?
Ismail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, is currently unaccounted for following reports of an Israeli attack in Lebanon. His influence has primarily been among Afghan Shia militants, and he lacks the charisma and respect that his predecessor Qassem Soleimani had among proxy groups. This situation raises concerns about the stability and effectiveness of Iran's military operations abroad.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Ismail Qaani's fate is uncertain following reports of injury or death after an Israeli attack in Beirut.
- Israel attack Hezbollah's base in southern Beirut
- Ali Khamenei appoint Ismail Qaani
- Iraj Masjedi report Ismail Qaani
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The uncertainty surrounding Qaani's fate poses significant implications for Iran's military strategy.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%