Who Will Be Candidates for the Early Presidential Elections?

The crash of Ebrahim Raisi's helicopter unexpectedly disrupted the political chessboard of Iran; the government must quickly rearrange the chess pieces it had carefully placed, which are now in disarray. The Islamic Republic has not yet recovered from the pressure of the historically low public participation in the elections and now must prepare for the presidential elections on July 8, less than two months after the parliamentary elections. The public's votes in the recent elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts showed frightening signs for the government, with many candidates receiving half or even less than half of the votes compared to previous elections. What direction will the political landscape take after Raisi's death? The fear of low public turnout has also frightened Ebrahim Raisi. He lacked the courage and confidence to run for the Assembly of Experts from Tehran, where he received two million votes just two and a half years ago; instead, he went to Birjand to run from there, where he was elected, a less risky and somewhat more respectable option. Sadeq Amoli Larijani, head of the Expediency Discernment Council, ran from Mazandaran, but voters did not see fit to elect him to the Assembly of Experts. Now, the 'hard fall' or, as the Interior Minister put it, the 'hard landing' of Ebrahim Raisi's helicopter and his unexpected death a year and a half before his four-year term ends have made it harder for presidential candidates. Almost no one seems ready; neither the government, nor the usual candidates, nor even Mohsen Rezaei. However, the constitution mandates that elections must be held within 50 days after the president's death. What is the process for electing Iran's next president, and who are the candidates? Ebrahim Raisi was the president that Ayatollah Khamenei wanted; obedient and compliant, he and his ministers were in sync with what the leader said, without any buts or ifs, without the criticisms and behaviors that some former presidents exhibited, which the leader of the Islamic Republic disliked or disapproved of. However, Raisi was not like that, even if his critics and opponents considered him weak and ineffective in management or accused him of being poorly educated, unable to read aloud without mistakes from a written text. But the leader of the Islamic Republic saw other virtues in him: complete obedience. As Ayatollah Ali Khamenei described Ebrahim Raisi in recent messages and speeches, he called him a 'popular president,' 'knowledgeable,' 'capable,' and 'one of the best,' while others referred to him as the 'standard president.' Now, in this unexpected situation that has arisen after Ebrahim Raisi, the government must make 'hard' choices for selecting a new president; first, choices that align with the leader's preferences and principles, and then gaining the people's votes; votes from a populace that sees hardship, suffering, unkindness, harassment, despair, and hopelessness from the government. In a situation where the rulers of the Islamic Republic refer to Raisi's 'hard fall' as a 'hard landing' and the least participatory election in the history of the Islamic Republic as an 'epic,' what individuals might be willing to take the risk of accepting the people's vote in the strangest historical period of the Islamic Republic in terms of legitimacy and inefficiency in governance? Mohammad Mokhber was favored by fortune and luck during Raisi's government. In a government where critics say the president lacked sufficient managerial ability, he was the 'wheel-turner' of the government. Mohammad Mokhber could be the preferred figure for the leader of the Islamic Republic, just as he was entrusted with the regime's piggy bank in the Executive Headquarters of Imam's Order. Without a challenging intellectual-party background with the leader, obedient and compliant, and a continuator of Ebrahim Raisi's government path, which Mokhber had laid out in the government under Raisi's name, he can now continue in the role of president. This path is also desirable for the leader of the Islamic Republic, and in the current sensitive situation for the regime, the current structure of Raisi's government will be largely maintained, and there will likely be minimal changes in the cabinet. Is Mohammad Mokhber the president Khamenei has in mind? Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has aspirations for the presidency; aspirations that have been dashed every time from 2005 to today. This July, he has the best and most exceptional opportunity to reach the presidency. If he fails this time, it is unlikely he will find the star of luck for the presidency again; the political developments in Iran are unclear. However, Qalibaf today is not the same Qalibaf of yesterday for the principlists; his voter base has also experienced a 'hard landing.' In the parliamentary elections in March, although he managed to enter the twelfth parliament in the first round, he came in fourth, behind three hardline principlists and critics: Mahmoud Nabavian, Hamid Rasai, and Amir Hossein Sabati. Mr. Qalibaf was the first in Tehran in the eleventh parliamentary elections with over one million two hundred thousand votes, but in the March 2024 elections, he lost over 800 thousand votes, only managing to secure just over 447 thousand votes. He set a record for vote loss in the first and second rounds of the twelfth parliamentary elections. Despite the vote loss and criticisms against Qalibaf, he remains one of the influential figures in the structure of the Islamic Republic, despite various scandals of corruption surrounding his family and associates. Although he has elevated himself within the power structure and has created a trustworthy image for the leader and his office, there are still discussions about the corruption surrounding him, which history has shown is not a priority for the leader of the Islamic Republic regarding the loyalty of his circle. Just as to this day, he has not withdrawn his support from Qalibaf or, despite the corruption of Kazem Sediqi in the case of the land scandal in Azgol, he has returned him to Friday prayers to speak of 'piety,' even if it results in a loss of votes from the religious and government-supporting class, as seen in the recent parliamentary elections in Tehran. Nevertheless, although Qalibaf's image among some supporters of the government and principlists has been tarnished due to corruption cases, he knows how to resist and play his game within the power structure. He can still, with the help of circles within the power and principlists who are referred to as 'Chinar' by Gholamali Haddad-Adel, launch another attempt for the presidency. Qalibaf is now one step away from the presidential palace. Although in March, the people of Tehran gave him only about 400 thousand votes, for the principlists, the end justifies the means, and low public votes do not matter. Alireza Zakani is an ambitious figure. This political ambition makes him a figure who, if he wants to have a say in the power cake, must be a pragmatic player. In previous elections, he raised his profile by running for the presidency and finally passing the Guardian Council's vetting. In the 2021 elections, Zakani entered as a supporting candidate for Ebrahim Raisi. After that, he had to reap the rewards of criticizing Rouhani's government, especially regarding the nuclear deal, and then supporting Raisi. He rejected a ministerial offer and went to the mayoralty of Tehran to have a better run for the presidency; now, that presidential opportunity has come sooner than expected. He also possesses the qualities approved by the leader of the Islamic Republic for entering the presidential elections; a member of the loyalist circle. But for now, he is primarily warming up the electoral atmosphere. In the behind-the-scenes world of Iranian politics, however, the final minutes are decisive; just like in the 2005 elections when the government decided to bring the relatively unknown Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from the mayoralty of Tehran to the presidential palace, but this time Zakani may not want to just be a warm-up for the elections, as it is unclear whether he will remain the mayor of Tehran in the next council elections. Saeed Jalili is another trusted and preferred figure of Khamenei. The Stability Front considered him the best candidate in the last elections, but this former ally of Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi did not have much influence on the principlists and ultimately backed Ebrahim Raisi. Today, the situation of the Stability Front is different. They have become a heavier and more influential weight among the principlists due to their support and influence in Raisi's government and other power structures; Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of this front, became the first in the parliamentary elections in Tehran, albeit with a low vote, surpassing Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Now, why can't the Stability Front have their loyal candidate in the upcoming presidential elections: Saeed Jalili? With Jalili's entry, they can even negotiate for cabinet positions against other principlist candidates. However, if Jalili enters the elections, it is unlikely he will withdraw in favor of anyone else. Mehrdad Bazrpash is young (born 1980), the son of a martyr and the son-in-law of Alireza Ali-Ahmadi, the Minister of Education in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government. He is one of the most successful figures within the government who has rapidly climbed the political ladder in Iran. He has held various positions, including Deputy President and Head of the National Youth Organization in Ahmadinejad's government, CEO of Pars Khodro and Saipa, a member of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Head of the Court of Audit, Minister of Roads and Urban Development in Ebrahim Raisi's government, and many other posts. Bazrpash has been involved in various cadre-building efforts over the years, and in the parliamentary elections, a significant number of his like-minded individuals entered the parliament. He is close to the newly established groups led by Hamid Rasai and the Iran Morning Front (Ali Akbar Raefipour); the same groups that stood against Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Gholamali Haddad-Adel (the Chinars) in the parliamentary elections. These newly established principlist groups, which oppose Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, need the presidency to achieve success similar to that of the parliament, and Bazrpash could be one of their options. However, it is likely that Mehrdad Bazrpash, with or without the support of these groups, is considering the presidency. Of course, there are other principlists who may nominate themselves for the elections, such as the ever-present figure in elections: Mohsen Rezaei. Reformists and moderates are in a strange situation. Their fortunes have faded within the government, and their supporters and voter base have turned away from them in the past. The government, recognizing this, does not give them any space and easily disqualifies their candidates in presidential, parliamentary, and Assembly of Experts elections. Despite all these rejections, a few reformists still sought 'opening windows' in the parliamentary elections; however, Mohammad Khatami, the leader of the reform front, symbolically did not vote. Now, how can this political faction introduce a candidate after almost a few months of Khatami's protest vote? In this short period since the parliamentary elections, has there been any significant change in the government's view of them? Has the perspective of their previous voter base changed meaningfully in this short time? Or has Khatami's decision to vote changed from March until now? Their moderate figure, Eshaq Jahangiri, was disqualified in the last presidential elections. Of course, the government needs to decorate the electoral table with representatives from all factions within the government. For this reason, names like Majid Ansari, a cleric close to the leader of the Islamic Republic who is a member of the Clergy Association and close to Khatami, are being mentioned these days. Perhaps the government wants to approve figures associated with the reformists like him or Masoud Pezeshkian, as these figures do not have significant electoral power; this would exacerbate the divisions among reformists and ultimately add color and embellishment to the electoral table. It seems unlikely that a figure like Mohammad Javad Zarif will be approved, as it could disrupt the electoral arrangement of the principlists in the eyes of the election engineers. However, the government faces a fundamental problem and challenge for the elections on July 8: Ali Larijani. Ali Larijani is a principlist who, if they want to 'compensate' for the 'injustice' done to him in the last presidential election, could be a serious competitor against other principlists. Although he is trusted by the leader of the Islamic Republic, in the last election, the Guardian Council took away the stars of luck from him and disqualified him. Generally, no candidate of Larijani's stature, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Eshaq Jahangiri, and Hassan Rouhani, is disqualified without the opinion of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, in the last presidential election, the election engineers needed Ebrahim Raisi to enter the presidential palace without any obstacles. Therefore, when the election engineers and the leader of the Islamic Republic felt assured of Raisi's smooth passage in the elections, Ali Khamenei publicly stated that 'injustice and oppression' had been done to Ali Larijani and that it should be 'compensated'; but how should it be compensated? The elections had already passed. Now, if Ali Larijani sees a green light to enter the elections, the Guardian Council will have to compensate for this 'injustice and oppression' and approve him? If Larijani runs for the elections and is then approved, he will likely have the support of a significant portion of the principlist base (the Principlist Unity Council - Manouchehr Motaki) and moderates (the faction of Hassan Rouhani), and presumably a large part of the reformists (the faction of Mohammad Khatami) will also support him with 'implicit or explicit shame'; although winning votes from the people is 'hard,' and as Larijani puts it, the 'purifiers' will be a solid barrier for him.