Why and How Rouhani Won? The Counter-Engineering of Elections and Convincing the Boycotters

After the announcement of Rouhani's victory, the most important question is why and how he won, and why and how Raisi lost. What strategies and tactics did both sides pursue? How could a government that failed to address a significant portion of its promises, had its doctoral thesis questioned by a research group and an author, faced scrutiny from most institutions under the Leader's supervision, did not perform well in the first and second debates, and whose current situation is unsatisfactory for various social groups (20 million marginalized, two-thirds below the poverty line, environmental crisis, increasing homeless population, economic recession, and six million unemployed) manage to win? The answer can be sought in two points: counter-engineering of the elections and convincing the boycotters to participate. Political learning process After four decades of the regime's existence and experiencing various elections, all forces involved in the power structure engage in election engineering, and this is not limited to the IRGC and the Leader's office. In the 1990s, it was mainly appointed institutions (security, military, propaganda, and judicial) that engaged in election engineering, but with Ahmadinejad's presidency, the government also entered this game, especially to maintain its power in the second term. Rouhani's government copied Ahmadinejad's methods for its second term and did so in 2017. Parallel engineering Reformists and moderates protested against election engineering in the 1990s and 2000s, but when they saw that these protests had no effect, they also engaged in election engineering using public resources and whatever they had at their disposal. While the propaganda apparatus close to the IRGC and the Leader's office (state radio and television, Kayhan and Javan newspapers, and Tasnim and Fars news agencies) were unified and tirelessly in service of Raisi and Qalibaf's campaigns, the state propaganda apparatus (Iran newspapers and other semi-state newspapers) promoted the government. Introducing a cover candidate was another aspect of election engineering, a tactic used by Rouhani and Khatami's opponents in previous elections but failed, while the reformists succeeded in this round. In previous elections, only Basij members and plainclothes agents tore banners and set them on fire, but this time, Raisi's banners were burned in Isfahan. If Raisi's campaign's claim of a shortage of ballots in some polling stations in Mashhad is true, this too was another method of vote engineering by Rouhani's government. Just like in 2009, when Ahmadinejad dedicated a significant portion of his provincial trips to the days leading up to the elections, in 2017, Rouhani, who initially showed little interest in provincial trips, was constantly engaged in them two months before the elections using public resources. During these provincial trips, officials mobilized forces to attend election rallies. Rouhani's government began months in advance to pay farmers' arrears, assist individuals under the coverage of the Welfare Organization and the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, increase the salaries of retirees and government employees, triple the subsidies for those under the coverage of the Relief Foundation, and even announce subsidies for those who had been deprived of them. Thus, those concerned about their livelihoods were somewhat appeased during the election period. Ahmadinejad's government resorted to similar methods in 2008-2009 and was accused by its opponents of manipulating the elections. Another fall Almost all the actions that Ahmadinejad's government took in 2009 to win, which were protested by reformists and presented as evidence of the election's lack of integrity, were followed by Rouhani's campaign in this round, including distributing money close to the elections, distributing food packages, provincial trips with government planes during the elections, and bringing government employees to Rouhani's gatherings in cities. Reformists and moderates who claim to participate in the electoral process in the Islamic Republic to utilize the created space for advancing democratic programs and strengthening civil society have themselves been transformed in the engineered elections and adopted Ahmadinejad's methods from 2009. How to deal with the boycotters However, Rouhani's campaign knew that with the 18 million votes from the previous round (51 percent), which could potentially decrease, he could not return to the presidency. In addition to the votes of those focused on livelihoods, he needed the millions of votes from the boycotters to overcome the opposing faction. Eight reasons were cited by the boycotters for not participating in the 2017 presidential election: 1. Two decades have been enough to reach the conclusion that the regime is irreformable. The unsuccessful experiences of Khatami and Rouhani's first term are sufficiently clear; 2. The political process allows for gatherings and the expression of demands and problems only every two years (elections are no longer held every year), and even if many do not feel it, participating in an election where the main competitors are a security figure and a judicial executioner leads to normalizing crime and repression in society; 3. All stages of elections in Iran are engineered, and voters cannot trust the protection of their votes; elections in the Islamic Republic are neither free, competitive, nor fair; 4. Candidates differ, but their differences are like execution by rope, bullet, or guillotine; these differences do not significantly impact people's destinies; the Islamic Republic is leading society towards collapse, and voters only want to slow down this collapse; 5. The head of the executive branch in Iran has no power. Determinative policies in international relations and domestic and economic policies are set by the unelected leader; the president is merely a beautiful name for the leader's agent or logistics officer; 6. The 2017 election focused on economic and livelihood issues, and none of the candidates can bring about serious change in this area; their differences will be in determining rent-seekers and beneficiaries; the competition is between the financial empires of the leader and the IRGC on one side and the empire of state-owned companies on the other, not between supporters of the deprived and non-deprived; 7. Rouhani's four-year record is indefensible even with minimal demands. During his term, the population of homeless individuals, dropouts, and environmental destruction in Iran has increased. The number of the poor, unemployed, and addicted has not decreased. The JCPOA would have been concluded without Rouhani as it was related to the survival of the regime; 8. Since Ahmadinejad's time, elections in Iran have not been program-based; they are personality-based. Changing faces cannot lead to changes in policies and programs. However, despite these points, millions of those who know these facts and did not want to vote (in large cities like Tehran) went to the polls and voted. Rouhani's campaign managed to bring a significant portion of these boycotters, especially the youth, to the polls by 1) briefly referencing the 38 years of the regime's crimes (repeating the terms execution and prison) and contextualizing these crimes in the rival's campaign for those who have not witnessed them firsthand, 2) surpassing the Leader's red lines (in reference to the shadow of war before the JCPOA and providing false information to Khamenei), which helps to alleviate the protests of the youth, 3) mocking the principlists who have been and are serious supporters of repression and intimidation, and 4) creating a joyful atmosphere at rallies (even hiring a DJ that was also copied by Raisi's campaign) to bring people to the polls. Of course, none of these will help resolve the country's issues because Rouhani and his friends have themselves been part of the executioners and jailers, and most of the Leader's red lines have always been their own red lines as well, and they will not go beyond them in practice. This vote, emotionally, was a vote against the 'judicial executioner' and his repressive companions, and rationally, it was a vote to delay the collapse of Iranian society. Environmental destruction, rising crime, increasing poverty and unemployment, intensifying school dropouts, rising addiction, and other social harms all indicate a worsening situation in society. In this context, the dissatisfied and critics of the current situation voted for someone they thought would not make things worse than they already are. Why did Raisi lose? Raisi/Qalibaf's campaign reminded most voters of Ahmadinejad: livelihood promises that did not lead to an improvement in people's lives even after implementation, exposing issues that both the people know (abuse of power by officials) and are complicit in, and creating tensions with the world based on national pride (nuclear program) whose consequences people experienced in sanctions. Populism is not always successful, especially if populists are quickly discredited. The people of Iran did not have a good memory of corruption and waste with about $700 billion in oil revenue. Rouhani's campaign was more successful in social media advertising and debates, while Raisi's campaign was more successful in advertising through religious institutions. In street advertising, both campaigns utilized all their forces and resources and appeared almost equal. Raisi's campaign entered more heavily into negative advertising. Considering the advertising, Rouhani's campaign managed to appear on par with the heavy advertising of the government's opponents (in addition to state radio and television) by relying on social media for informing about rallies and disseminating news. Another sponsorship? In such a situation, can one see a light at the end of Rouhani's tunnel? This election, like other elections in the Islamic Republic, has no function in helping the transition to a democratic society or practicing democracy and alleviating societal problems. In election campaigns, no vision of the future was presented because candidates, including Rouhani, have neither a vision nor think about this issue. Instead of waste, corruption, and foreign intervention being attributed to Raisi, these actions will be carried out by Rouhani's government. Politics in Iran is sponsored by another entity.