Why Are Attacks on Embassies Not Prevented?

Attacks on foreign embassies have not been unprecedented during the Islamic Republic's existence. The first instances were the two occupations of the U.S. embassy in February 1979 and November 1979. These attacks occurred amidst the chaos following the revolution, the lack of a new governance structure, and the weakness of intelligence and security agencies. However, recent attacks on the diplomatic missions of countries such as Denmark, Britain, and now Saudi Arabia have taken place at a time when the Islamic Republic's security and intelligence apparatus is at its peak. It could be said that the government was unable to deal with the 'beginning of the occupation' of the U.S. embassy in 1979 or 1980, but in other cases, the intelligence and security agencies have had the necessary oversight to control the situation. Nevertheless, no effective measures have been taken to prevent these attacks. Why? Are the intelligence agencies truly lagging behind in information in these cases? Do they lack the will or ability to prevent such actions? Are they refraining from dealing with these actions due to the inclination, hint, or request of higher officials in the political power hierarchy? Answering these questions not only helps to understand the limited question of why attacks on embassies are not prevented but also reveals the nature of repression and the forces carrying out this repression and their interaction with the government. The issue of attacks on embassies is not separate from other attacks on opponents and dissenters. For years, such actions in Iran's political space have been attributed to 'self-directed forces' and 'spontaneous movements.' However, these 'self-directed' forces, whose 'spontaneous movements' are a familiar occurrence in Iran's political scene, are actually the most zealous supporters of the government. The term 'self-directed forces' was introduced by the government itself to absolve itself of responsibility for the actions of its most radical defenders. This absolution of responsibility is key to understanding the nature and actions of these groups. In other words, in cases where the center of power in Iran (which is concentrated in the leadership apparatus) is unable or unwilling to bear the costs of confronting phenomena they deem 'undesirable,' it does so through self-directed groups. These phenomena that require confrontation encompass a wide range. One day, political parties and their gatherings are the subject of confrontation; another day, publications and press offices and cinemas; another day, women with loose hijabs; another day, intellectuals and political critics and speeches; and nowadays, music concerts and now foreign governments that have embassies in Iran. In all these cases, the government benefits from the actions of these self-directed forces to confront undesirable matters without paying the costs. Of course, whether this benefit to the government is also a benefit to the country and the people is not a question that troubles the minds of the power center. The nature of self-directed forces is less in doubt as they are among the most radical supporters of the government. Their political identity can be discerned not only from their apparent symbols and slogans and placards but also from their freedom of action in organizing, gathering, and taking actions within defined limits, and their exemption from punishment further highlights their identity with the powerful sectors of the government. These forces are usually known to the intelligence and security agencies. Some of these forces have been or still are members of intelligence and security institutions and have organic cooperation with intelligence and security forces in formal or informal ways. The intelligence and security agencies have used them as their intelligence and operational arm in various cases. These groups are not necessarily creations of the government. Sometimes they are literally spontaneous and emerge from within the analyses of circles and 'nooks' and 'cliques' of the radical supporters of the Islamic Republic. However, due to the historical identity of the forces that make them up (which is related to the war or the IRGC and Basij) and their connection with the main layers of the government - especially the intelligence and security agencies - their spontaneity usually has a specific direction and ultimately aims to defend the continuity and deepening of the rule of the Supreme Leader. The intelligence and security agencies are aware of these initial surges and are sometimes informed about them and even strengthen them. Leadership and self-directed forces It has often been stated that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic is dissatisfied with the actions of self-directed groups or is unaware of them. To understand this relationship, one must consider the dual approach of the leadership towards these forces. This dual approach can be seen in the difference between official and public statements and practical dealings with these forces. The leadership and the agencies related to the leadership officially condemn the actions of these forces (such as condemning or disavowing the attack on the university dormitory or the attack on the British embassy), sometimes remain silent in the face of them, and even sometimes attribute these actions (such as the chain murders or acid attacks) to 'enemy infiltrators,' but do not take serious action against them in practice. What is the reason for this dual approach? As mentioned, these forces are among the most zealous followers of the leader. They have played a crucial role in consolidating the leader's power outside the framework of formal institutions. They have done things for the leader that formal forces have not been able to do. They can destroy the houses of critics of the leader in Qom, something the formal apparatus is unable to do. They can beat reformist ministers in the streets or kill political and cultural opponents and 'those flaunting immorality.' They instill a fear in the hearts of the people that the police and security apparatus are unable to instill. Because their power is exercised without accountability and regulation; it appears anywhere and in any guise; its identity and source are unknown; and it cannot be pursued or complained about. Such fear is much more controlling and ultimately more repressive than the fear of formal apparatuses and their legal and bureaucratic processes. They are backed by the leadership, and the leadership knows their worth. Therefore, they are wise enough not to disavow them. They know that if 'the boss' distances himself from their actions at some point, it is for 'the interest.' Otherwise, the leadership does not want to dull its sharp sword. They are capable of reading the leader's heart and understanding his intentions from the apparent opposition to their actions. They can even move ahead of the leader but in the direction of his desires and be assured that he will follow them. They have tested this method many times and have seen its correctness in practice. They know that the government, at the leader's signal, knows that it should not confront them. That is why the police spokesperson says about the attackers on the Saudi embassy, 'It is often not possible to hit the people [the attackers on the Saudi embassy].' And we know that this police is part of the same security-intelligence apparatus that easily suppresses even the smallest oppositions to the leader and has become skilled at identifying them 'often.' Dealing with Saudi Arabia and the need for self-directed forces Apart from dealing with internal opponents, sometimes the weakness of the Islamic Republic's ability to confront other countries officially also falls on these self-directed forces. For example, in the recent incident, the Islamic Republic could do no more than summon the Saudi chargé d'affaires, expel diplomats, or sever relations. That is, it had neither the political and diplomatic tools to align other countries (as Saudi Arabia did) nor the economic tools (such as oil production capacity) to punish the Saudis, nor justification for using military tools. However, in the political culture of the ruling elites in the Islamic Republic and its supporting body, despair and deadlock have no meaning. Because despair is a sign of weakness, and weakness is discouraging, and discouragement reduces the possibility of mobilizing and organizing a force that does not believe in itself and its power. Therefore, in cases like the execution of Sheikh Nimr, even if it incurs more damage than the benefit gained from an action, something must be done, at least from a symbolic perspective, to display a sign of decisiveness, revolutionary spirit, and uncompromising stance and not losing the rhythm, to keep the self-directed forces hopeful. This reassurance for a force that must feel its leader is a revolutionary, not a diplomat, is essential. Because their obedience to the leader is not based on organizational hierarchy but on a kind of influence and spiritual authority that should not be undermined. Using self-directed forces to change the political landscape Another thing that pleases the leader about these events is the opportunity that such actions provide to regain control of the internal political arena at his discretion. The leader should not be too pleased with the political rise of Hassan Rouhani and his supporting forces. These forces range from his 50-year rival and friend (Hashemi Rafsanjani) to reformists. These forces have gained more power after the nuclear agreement. This newfound power has enabled them to have the upper hand in the upcoming elections, at least in the parliamentary elections. The takeover of the majority of the parliament by them is not something the leader would be satisfied with. The leader, who said negotiations would not bear fruit and is not optimistic about them, should not be too pleased with the success of the JCPOA in this way and the easing of tensions with the world. Especially since an agreement with the West can not only 'de-enemy' the external scene but can also - at least symbolically - keep the moderate government's hand raised for a while in the internal political scene. After the success of the JCPOA, the leader felt that his supporters might lose ground against the supporters of the government and reformists. Therefore, by adopting a harsher stance that indicates inflexibility and also launching a new plan (such as confronting the 'infiltration' of the enemy), he seeks to change the game scene. One way to change the scene is to increase tension - both internally and externally - and to further securitize the atmosphere, which gives his supporting forces room and motivation and also puts the government - like the incident of the embassy attack - in a defensive position. The second leader of the Islamic Republic still wears the cloak of the first leader in some of these critical moments, who, after accepting the ceasefire resolution, issued destructive fatwas such as the executions of 1988 and the murder of Salman Rushdie. Now is the time to intensify and agitate the situation and keep the self-directed forces ready, which have been essential for the survival of the crown and throne.