Why Did Ahmadinejad Leave?

The website 'Kalemeh' recently published news about the discovery of a financial corruption ring within the Foundation of Cooperation of the Islamic Republic's Law Enforcement Force (NAJA), which reportedly involves Ismail Ahmadinejad, the former commander of NAJA. Ahmadinejad left his position in Esfand 1393 (March 2015) while still having several months left on his term extension. The Kalemeh website even reported on Ahmadinejad's two-day detention and mentioned that at least 12 senior officials from the NAJA Cooperation Foundation, including Brigadier General Abolfazl Ghanbarpour, the former CEO of the foundation, are implicated in this case. Ghanbarpour was appointed by Ahmadinejad in Mehr 1388 (September 2009) and remained in that position until Farvardin last year (April 2022). Kalemeh also hinted at possible connections between Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the mayor of Tehran, and this case. However, the website stated that an information trench has been created around this case to prevent any information from leaking out. The NAJA Cooperation Foundation is one of the largest semi-state economic conglomerates in Iran, operating in a wide range of sectors from banking and insurance to oil, gas, energy, construction, clothing imports, food production, mining, and hospitality. But what is the story behind the financial corruption allegations against the former commander of Iran's Law Enforcement? What impacts do foundations like the NAJA Cooperation Foundation have on the country's economy? These are among the questions discussed with two guests on this program: Reza Alijani, a political analyst based in Paris, and Fereydoun Khavand, an economics professor at René Descartes University in Paris. Alijani stated that the news of financial corruption and the arrest of high-ranking officials has become so frequent that it may have diminished the curiosity and moral concern of many Iranian citizens. However, this news had been circulating in political and media circles in Iran for over a month and its dimensions were believed to be larger than this issue. One side of the story involves the NAJA, while the other involves the municipality, where Qalibaf, after becoming mayor, brought in over 150 commanders from the NAJA. There are also rumors that the son of Ejei and the son of Ejei's brother are involved in this case. Alijani mentioned that Qalibaf's son had a temporary arrest but was released on heavy bail and fled to Abu Dhabi. The son of Ejei is also said to be involved and is on the run, while Ejei's brother's son was imprisoned but has been released, with rumors in Tehran that they have fled to Abu Dhabi. This is a very extensive case, and since Qalibaf continually connects himself to Khamenei's office, especially Mojtaba Khamenei, and claims to receive orders from there, it appears that the Ministry of Intelligence has entered this case and gathered sufficient documents to present to the office of Khamenei. It seems that because the name of Khamenei's son has also come up, they have officially ordered a special investigation. Ahmadinejad's son has been arrested, and he himself is rumored to still be under observation. Additionally, there are reports that Ahmadinejad's office chief is being interrogated for espionage for Israel. Since none of this has been confirmed by any independent or credible sources, it cannot be verified accurately. However, because the media in Iran are not free and cannot pursue these matters, they cannot uncover the dimensions of the issue. But as you mentioned in the introduction, since the essence of the matter has not been denied, it has led to some engagement with the topic. In any case, until there is something, people will say things; there is something. Sometimes it later turns out that even those rumors are just the tip of the iceberg, and the dimensions of the issue are larger than this. This somewhat relates to the fact that the NAJA Cooperation Foundation, alongside three or four mega-companies, holds significant assets and impacts a large part of the country's economy. Alongside various companies of the IRGC, Astan Quds Razavi, and the Foundation of the Oppressed, these mega-companies, due to their connections to unaccountable power in Iran, are also unaccountable in the economy. Especially those who, as Rouhani said, have weapons, are security forces, and are involved in law enforcement and intelligence, their presence in the economy exacerbates economic turbulence, pushes the private sector out, and apart from benefiting from state rents and connections to appointed and unaccountable powers, because they have handcuffs and weapons, they can further ravage the country's economy, which can be elaborated on further. Alijani, before we reach the activities of the NAJA Cooperation Foundation, I have another question for you regarding what you mentioned. In your opinion, what is the reason that the investigation into these cases has started now? Is it internal and factional issues, or is it possibly a power struggle between Rouhani's government and opposing factions, or do you see other reasons? Alijani: There could be various reasons. Of course, all of these are speculation. A somewhat pessimistic view is that it is a war between economic mafias. The IRGC has arrested the Afrashtah brothers, who apparently had financial connections with Yasser Hashemi, and now other factions are retaliating. Unfortunately, in Iran, the interests of the nation are not at stake, and there has even been a moral decline among economic companies of the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence. I have even heard that during sanctions, they sometimes exposed each other's companies to get them sanctioned. When such a moral decline occurs in the country, we see it in nuclear negotiations as well. Groups that are either economic mafias benefiting from sanctions or those competing with the government are willing to jeopardize the national interests of the entire country. This has a long history. But there is also a somewhat softer and more optimistic perspective that this issue has leaked out on its own, and the government knows that the greatest weakness of the right-wing faction is its economic section, not its political section, which is strongly supported by the office and military-security forces. They have entered this weak point and, as the saying goes, have taken hold of the opponent's wounded foot and want to deliver a knockout blow. Khavand, what is your opinion on the impact of economic and financial activities like the NAJA Cooperation Foundation on Iran's economy? Khavand: Let me emphasize one point to clarify the nature of military involvement in economic affairs. We must understand that the presence of military personnel in economic activities is not unique to Iran. It is a phenomenon particularly seen in developing countries. In a large number of newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, the military quickly seized both politics and the economy. In Turkey, the most important economic organization linked to the military, called OYAK, is still very active, although Erdogan's government is trying to limit them. In Egypt, for example, the military has been running businesses for 60 years. In Pakistan, the military has a significant presence. In Iran, we see military involvement from the NAJA Cooperation Foundation to the IRGC, and this issue you mentioned, where military-affiliated companies operate in all sectors from road construction to banking, tourism, pharmaceuticals, and areas like oil and gas. Regarding the impact this issue can have on the country's economy, there can be both a pessimistic and an optimistic view. The pessimistic view aligns with the points raised by Alijani, which are correct. The presence of so many companies and these huge holdings in the hands of the military expands the scope of corruption in the country. They become competitors to the private sector and control key economic variables. If we want to take a more optimistic view, we can say (though I present this with many caveats, as the issue is very sensitive) that in these countries, they gradually enter national and especially international economic circuits. Among them, the NAJA, given that it currently has a significant share in hospitality, pharmaceuticals, transportation, and many other areas, contrary to what those who say they certainly defend sanctions claim, I conclude that since they have enormous interests, there is no reason for them to benefit from sanctions. On the contrary, when they see that, for example, because they have extensive activities in banking, when sanctions are imposed and the bridges between Iran's banking system and international banking systems are cut off, they naturally suffer losses. In any case, they will inevitably be drawn into some form of integration into the international economic system, and perhaps (I say perhaps) this could ultimately lead to changes in the power relations and their views on issues concerning Iran and international relations. Khavand, we see that practically no significant part of the country's economy is untouched by this foundation and other foundations like the IRGC's Cooperation Foundation and Astan Quds Razavi, especially since these foundations rely on coercive power and weapons. Therefore, my question is, what space is left for the growth of the private sector, and do these foundations operate in favor of the country's economic activity as they and their operators claim, or not? Khavand: One aspect of the issue is, of course, the problems and obstacles these military institutions create for economic activity in Iran. A large part of Iran's economy is in the hands of these entities, which are referred to as the gray network. They do not account to any recognized powers and responsible authorities and influence all economic variables in the country. This network likely encompasses about 110 to 130 foundations and institutions. They hold a significant portion of the country's gross domestic product. In many cases, they do not pay taxes and, by some accounts, even do not pay for their own water and electricity. Instead, they have priority in accessing foreign currency resources, banking facilities, and other state rents, and as I mentioned, they naturally reduce the scope of private sector activity. They are competitors to the private sector. However, the issue returns to the fact that they are in power. A new generation of managers among them is emerging, which is different from the generation of about 30 or 35 years ago or 20 years ago. These individuals are often fluent in foreign languages and familiar with international economic issues. If we look at examples from other countries, for instance, in China, you might think that this economic leap is largely related to influential forces connected to the Communist Party. Even now, a large part of China's economy is in the hands of millionaires who sing the International at the Congress of the Communist Party of China and are billionaires, holding a significant portion of the profits. But at the same time, as their own interests are at stake, they also serve China's economic interests. As I mentioned, if this is a positive perspective, there is hope that perhaps, perhaps, they can also, within the framework of new relations and their specific interests, take steps in line with Iran's interests by accelerating the process of integrating Iran into the international economy and that through this integration, they may be forced to abandon some of their previous ideological and political beliefs.