Why Did the 1979 Revolution Happen and What Has It Done to Us?

The 1979 Iranian Revolution remains a significant topic of interest for a substantial portion of Iranian society as its repercussions and results still tightly grip them. In the first and second decades following this event, most researchers sought to answer the question of why this event occurred, how it succeeded in overthrowing the previous regime, what forces were involved, and how this event unfolded. However, in recent years, there is a growing interest in understanding the outcomes of this event for the country. Even serious defenders of this event focus more on promoting its achievements (mainly for the ruling class) than on its causes. The government does not want people to forget this event because it wants to present itself as revolutionary despite its absolute and established power. Opponents, with different goals, want to remind people of this revolution, either to deter them from another revolution or to call them to another revolution. This is why questions related to this event are raised every year, especially on the anniversary of its victory. In this writing, I will attempt to present a summary of the research conducted in response to these questions. Revolutions are neither stolen nor diverted. Violence against the established regime and then the power struggle among revolutionaries, followed by the transformation of revolutionaries into new tyrants, is the trajectory of all violent revolutions. However, the attachment of revolutionaries to the movement they participated in prevents them from seeing these realities. Why did the 1979 Revolution occur? The endogenous causes of the revolution included: 1. A deep gap between increasing expectations (due to greater familiarity with developed societies) and the economic, social, and political realities in urban and peri-urban classes; 2. The production of ideology from Islam based on leftist discourse that created an imaginary ideal world for the audience; 3. The freedom of religious forces to establish their institutions and expand their networks throughout the country while suppressing secular nationalist and communist forces; and 4. The closed political space and the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party without ideological backing to divide society into insiders and outsiders. Of course, revolutionary discourse in the world during the 1960s and 1970s provided a suitable intellectual and mental context for its emergence. This was not the cause of the revolution but rather removed obstacles from its path. Why did the Pahlavi regime collapse? The causes of the collapse of the Pahlavi regime included: 1. The slowness and inefficiency of the repression machine: unlike the Revolutionary Guards and Basij, the army and the imperial police were not built to suppress a widespread social movement; 2. An international environment conducive to political movements: the Cold War, Carter's human rights, a non-critical and non-investigative media environment for revolutionary movements, and a critical media environment for political regimes; and 3. The absence of a decision-making core in the regime to manage political crises and especially the king's little appetite to remain in power (due to illness), alongside the lack of necessary processes for public intimidation and the construction of a loyal and defending class for the regime. Did the rulers of the Islamic Republic learn any lessons from the revolution? The lessons that the rulers of the Islamic Republic learned from the 1979 Revolution included stricter control and harsher repression (a more effective repression machine), intense hostility towards the West, and open opposition to human rights. They crushed every popular movement with intensity based on their revolutionary notebook and successes. However, most people learned from the 1979 Revolution and avoided violence against the government. The Iranian Revolution was a political event that peaked and ended on February 11, 1979. What exists now is an established government that sells itself as revolutionary to label any opposition as counter-revolutionary and suppress it. The government also justifies its expansion of influence and efforts to construct Shiite imperialism by presenting itself as revolutionary. Khamenei is not the leader of the revolution; he is Khomeini's successor. Institutions that are labeled revolutionary are also ordinary governmental institutions (and of course, extralegal and unaccountable) and not revolutionary institutions. The revolutionary label is meant to cover their negative characteristics. Revolutionary art or revolutionary religion does not exist after the establishment of the government and with the support of the government. Everything the revolutionary government calls revolutionary is governmental and state-related. Regarding the achievements and damages of the 1979 event, serious and diverse research has not been conducted, but there are seven methods for measuring the achievements and damages of the 1979 event: 1. Examining the number of human losses, including the number of injured and killed during the revolution, group conflicts after the revolution, and deaths resulting from the rise of Islamists (Jews, Baha'is, Christians, Sunni and opposing Shia, political activists, and cultural figures), torture of individuals in prisons, and emigration for political, religious, and ideological reasons; 2. Comparing the economic situation and livelihood of the people of Iran with those of Turkey and South Korea at two points in time, 1979 and 2016: these two countries were in a situation close to Iran in 1979 and today have a significant distance from Iran; 3. Examining the current conditions compared to the claims made by the leaders of the 1979 Revolution regarding the provision of welfare, independence, and freedom by the revolutionary regime; after four decades, still '30% of existing schools in education are made of mud and straw.' (Deputy Minister of Secondary Education, Tabnak, January 9, 2017); Iran is more dependent than ever on Russia and China for military and non-military imports; 4. The financial damages caused by revolutionary behaviors and comparing them with what supporters and defenders of the revolution present as positive achievements resulting from the regime change; the damages from the revolution and war are estimated in trillions of dollars (considering inflation); based on a study, the amount of lost opportunities for Iran due to the regime's anti-Western stance is about half a trillion dollars; 5. Comparing indicators such as economic growth, per capita income, inflation, Gini coefficient, the number of titles and print runs of books relative to the population, and hundreds of other indicators used in the UN Human Development Report before and after the regime change; 6. Comparing social freedoms, religious freedoms, and cultural and political freedoms before and after the 1979 Revolution; and 7. Comparing the amount and number of crimes and violations, prisoners, bounced checks, charity, and civil and social institutions relative to the population in 1979 and 2016.