Why Did the Guardian Council Purge Candidates?

It seems that apart from understanding the symbolic representation of a- a kind of "lumpen rationality" and b- "a security-oriented, conspiracy-focused perspective that is always in fear during this sensitive moment!", the purge of electoral candidates by the Guardian Council and the extremist faction (likely connected to the IRGC intelligence) behind this council cannot be understood or explained. "Lumpen rationality" is a type of rationality akin to "practical reason", not theoretical reason based on logic and truth-seeking; it is a rationality seeking solutions, but with its own specific characteristics that must be examined separately. One feature of this type of rationality is extremism and exaggeration in friendship and enmity; another is either defiance and bravado or servility and prostration. Extremism; what we saw in the attacks on the British and Saudi embassies, both backed by the IRGC. Exaggeration; the same actions taken in June 2009 regarding the "vote counts" (which left a heavy burden of casualties and prisoners on their hands and inadvertently opened a new path for civil society that had previously been less explored; the path of the streets and neighborhoods). This time, we are witnessing the same exaggeration: the slaughter of candidates. The nature of this behavior is reminiscent of the statistical behavior of 2009, which declared the votes of Karroubi less than invalid votes due to some of his outspoken remarks, while Ahmadinejad's votes broke all previous presidential records! The manner of announcing the 2009 votes, the attack on the Saudi embassy, and the way disqualifications are handled are all of the same nature and have a unified command. But why the exaggeration again? It seems that this time the extremist faction (based in the IRGC intelligence) is taking revenge for its significant intellectual and psychological defeat from the JCPOA issue and anyone who leans towards that tribe; with a show of power and humiliation towards the opponent that: yes, this is who we are, see what we do to you! Like the interrogators' phrase that says we can do whatever we want with you and keep you in solitary confinement and prison as long as we want, and no one can stop us! (Of course, hardships always pass, the hinge of the cell and the prison door will eventually turn for freedom, and the shame will remain with the coal). The exaggeration aimed at demonstrating power and humiliation that this time manifests itself in the manner of disqualifications can be attributed to this type of lumpen rationality of the extremist faction behind the scenes. These extremists do not fear God, but they have a great fear of the people and foreigners. The people become dangerous when the lower-class city dwellers join the upper-class city dwellers. Also, if the people are numerous, they are very dangerous. But aside from this "exaggeration", the "essence" of the effort to shape a desirable and controlled parliament must be explained with another element, namely the security-oriented perspective of "always in fear and conspiracy-focused in this sensitive moment". The faction always relying on a security perspective (of course for the preservation of power, wealth, and influence!) believes that on one hand, two branches of the government should not fall into the hands of one faction (moderate, reformist, etc.), and on the other hand, in the post-JCPOA/sanction environment, the cultural middle class, which is the driving force for changes in Iran (changes that are not at all desirable for them and their interests and are also the executor of the enemy's "plan"), should not gain movement, motivation, and hope. The cat must be killed at the altar. According to some analyses and statements from security officials (in closed interrogation rooms discussing and advising and threatening and bribing critics), 15% of the people are staunch supporters of the regime, 5% are staunch opponents and hostile, and 80% are in between. They must not be allowed to move towards that five percent! And according to repeated field statistical works of the "trusted institutions of the regime", a large portion of this so-called middle group has suffered a cultural rupture with the values accepted by the regime. These individuals (according to some security analyses) are prone to oppose the regime through various cultural and political means (including meaningful and directional voting). Here too, the cat must be killed at the altar, and through common lumpen behaviors, including demonstrating power in disqualifications, they must be made to understand that they and those who rely on them are not that "significant!" (one of the favorite phrases of lumpen rationality!) But behind this bravado, there is a real sense of "fear". Fear of losing the second power and handing it over to outsiders or intimidated insiders and fear of the people's ambitions and the ambitions of foreigners towards these two! The favorite method of lumpen rationality is "victory through fear"; both must be intimidated and discouraged. These extremists do not fear God, but they have a great fear of the people and foreigners. The people become dangerous when the lower-class city dwellers join the upper-class city dwellers. Also, if the people are numerous, they are very dangerous. They are always under the constant temptations of devils. Most are weak-willed and ignorant and lack insight, seeking worldly pleasures, especially among their younger generation. They perceive foreigners as "demons"; they are everywhere, and we do not see them, and they are constantly conspiring against us to bring us down from our throne. In summary, lumpen rationality is about bravado and power, and thus it is also about power that it fears and backs down from, of course, according to another feature of this type of rationality, "the neck of the lord should not bend". If they back down and sheathe the knife, it is also "heroically" and has wisdom and expediency that has nothing to do with "losing" (again from the vocabulary of the same ilk)! On the sidelines of this issue of power and its importance, it should also be noted that unfortunately, some critics and protesters, who must be understood to be under severe security pressure, sometimes show even more caution than the actual situation, failing to realize that the power center still needs popular legitimacy from elections. The claim that those who do not accept the regime (the pseudonym of the regime's leader) should come and vote to showcase the glory and greatness of the country to the world carries the subtle point that for the regime's leadership, the external and diplomatic perspective of elections is significant. A bit of political-strategic sharpness was required for the reformists under pressure to take sufficient advantage of this issue. Unfortunately, however, a significant portion of them acted completely in reverse and raised white flags and declared that they would participate in the elections regardless and would play on any ground given to them, and even with a simplistic one-sided interaction said that problematic individuals would not register on our behalf so that the opponent would approve more candidates; and we saw where this minimum demand (in contrast to some past grand ambitions that unfortunately seem to have become a secondary essence for the emotional and dualistic and extremist nature of Iranians!) led to; and now after the death of Sohrab, they are looking for anesthesia because the leader has said that even the regime's opponents should come and vote, so why is there no one to vote for? Would it not have been better if you had stated this discussion and criticism earlier and conditioned your entry? The government can negotiate persistently behind the scenes and also publicly engage with the people and public opinion in a calm and logical manner, but firmly clarify and express its views. Now, however, it seems that civil society should not be intimidated and discouraged by this lumpen show of power. Protests, extensive correspondence from disqualified candidates and their re-publication, issuing statements, and negotiations, etc., can continue, and of course with the final message that "we may not participate". Now, with whatever language each faction and group has the capacity and pull, for example, we will have no motivation to participate. It is true that in Iran, people in cities and villages participate in elections to the extent of political standards that cannot be called a boycott, but in terms of internal and international reflection, when recognized professional and civil institutions and political parties declare that they do not consider the elections competitive and will not participate; the power center, even if it shows indifference, will not achieve its goal of international display. Perhaps some well-known political figures (in the domestic and global arena) can use this lever to bring back some of the disqualified individuals, as this is the only "power" that is possible and effective in their hands, alongside and in parallel with their negotiations and advice and goodwill; but (and "certainly") they must express and employ it. The government and the president have the greatest responsibility. All the irreparable weaknesses and shortcomings of the past two years and more on one side, the "opportunity" and possibility of compensation in the coming two weeks on the other side. The government's advisors must strategically realize that playing in the upcoming elections is a serious, sensitive game, and in a sense, a matter of life and death for their political future and for society and the peaceful approach in Iran; otherwise, the extremists will again rampage and will severely and energetically obstruct the gradual improvement of economic conditions, regional and global foreign policy, and efforts to expand (at least) legal freedoms in the country. A significant part of the policy to push back the far-right from the gradual movement towards "relative prosperity" for the people and "relative opening" for political, civil, and professional activists is now in the hands of the government. According to the old saying, the artilleryman is fed for a lifetime to shoot on time; the time for action is now. The government can negotiate persistently behind the scenes and also publicly engage with the people and public opinion in a calm and logical manner, but firmly clarify and express its views. This parallel movement requires precise executive engineering. Among other things, a (temporary) center could be opened in the Ministry of Interior or the Presidential Office for the grievances of illegally disqualified candidates who have no documentation (and according to the law, this documentation must be provided to the candidate themselves, not just "claimed") and in any other way, the political space should be made conducive to pressure on the power center to rein in and moderate the extremists relying on the power center who are currently acting behind the Guardian Council. Leaving the electoral scene should be the last option. An option that, of course, should not be removed from the table. This is both a strategic mistake and a moral mistake. Discussions based on real national security (not the claimed security of extremists) and the regional and global needs of the country and the "system" for this security can even pressure the leader and be somewhat effective. Experience has shown that the leader only moderates his support for extremists in the face of discussions based on national security and the potential for danger to the regime. Mr. Rouhani must understand that if society, especially the youth who were the driving force behind his rise, become disillusioned, he too will lose his political future. This is separate from the more important issue of disrupting national and popular interests that have peaceful ways to solve the country's major problems and crises. The issue of the purge of candidates and unilateralizing the elections and the bullying inherent in it in the upcoming two elections and its short-term and long-term consequences is of such national and long-term importance that the president should use all his levers that he sometimes encounters in stages where the nuclear negotiations have reached a deadlock with the power center and the so-called extremist experts, (that is, threatening to resign). The president can use the same language he employs in hidden negotiations with the political apex (that he cannot manage the country in this situation and by announcing this without accusing anyone or any faction, he resigns and holds the next presidential elections) this time also in his behind-the-scenes discussions and in his negotiations at least to provide one or two competitive opportunities for each parliamentary seat for the so-called moderates. Some reports and rumors indicate that the president has entered serious discussions with the power center and has requested that the model of the JCPOA abroad also be applied domestically with those who are willing to engage with the regime (and of course the leader and the guardianship). Initial reports indicate dual news (both positive and negative) in this regard, which is sincerely hoped that the positive reports are accurate. Although many, like the author, hopelessly think that only a few will return to the ranks of the approved candidates. In any case, for now, patience is required, and based on subsequent conditions, the manner of confrontation and policy must be determined. Leaving the electoral scene should be the last option. An option that, of course, should not be removed from the table. This is both a strategic mistake and a moral mistake. If we pay attention.