Why Did Zarif Leave and Why Did He Return?

Two days after announcing his resignation, Zarif accepted Rouhani's request to remain in the cabinet. Why did Zarif decide to leave and why did he decide to stay? A short Instagram post by Zarif sparked a huge wave of news both domestically and internationally. In this post, he did not even use the word 'resignation.' Nevertheless, it was inferred from his writing about submitting his resignation that it had wide repercussions. Comparing his resignation to that of Hassan Ghazizadeh Hashemi, the Minister of Health, reveals that these two resignations were not equivalent in either domestic or international dimensions. The news of Zarif's resignation was covered by most global media. Federica Mogherini, the EU's foreign policy chief, expressed concern over Zarif's unexpected resignation. The dismissal of his Saudi counterpart, Adel al-Jubeir, from the Saudi Foreign Ministry did not receive such attention domestically or internationally. This all indicates Zarif's special role, which impacts both Iran and the world through his 'personal capacities.' A crucial question raised by this resignation was who could replace Zarif if he stepped down? If we consider him the architect of the JCPOA—good or bad—who could take over the negotiations amidst the uncertainty of the 'European JCPOA'? No one knows this better than the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. However, his resignation was also thought-provoking in other ways. The text of his resignation letter was not published. His absence from unexpected meetings with Bashar al-Assad and the Leader and President fueled the incorrect assumption that his resignation was a 'complaint' about such a minor issue. The inaccuracy of this speculation lies in the fact that Zarif is neither one to complain nor does he believe that the Syrian file is in the hands of the Foreign Ministry. The most prominent reason that Zarif hinted at after his resignation was that he resigned in protest against the disregard for the 'position of the Foreign Ministry.' But was the position of the Foreign Ministry secure and protected during Zarif's years in office? One must assume that in the power struggles within the government, Zarif had observed an extremely sensitive issue that he could no longer tolerate or accept. He himself stated that he wanted to give a 'jolt' to maintain the position of the Foreign Ministry. What could that issue be? Rouhani did not accept Zarif's resignation and emphasized the importance of maintaining the Foreign Ministry's position in domestic equations. Following Zarif's resignation, a perception—largely fueled by the opposing faction—was that his resignation indicated a disagreement with Hassan Rouhani. The inaccuracy of this perception lies in the fact that Rouhani himself wanted to weaken his apparatus in such sensitive conditions. However, another hypothesis—which may be closer to reality—is that Zarif protested against the encroachment of another faction on the Foreign Ministry and considers himself unable to accept responsibility for others' mischief. The most prominent example that can be mentioned in this regard is the series of terrorist actions attributed to Iranian embassies in Europe. There is no doubt about the terrorist nature of four events reported by European countries in the second half of 2018, with clues discovered by France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Albania. What was puzzling was why the most official institutions of a country abroad, namely its embassies and diplomats, would directly engage in these terrorist actions, especially in Europe, amidst the conflict between Europe and Trump over leaving the JCPOA? If we put ourselves in Zarif's shoes, who falsely claims that 'there are no political prisoners in Iran,' 'the Leader condemned the Holocaust,' and 'no one in Iran has said we will destroy Israel,' how would we feel when European officials accuse our embassy of involvement in terrorist activities with evidence and reasons? We know that a member of the Iranian embassy in Vienna—a claimed diplomat—is currently under interrogation in Belgium. Imagine being in Zarif's position, how can you convince the large cadre of Iranian diplomats worldwide that a similar incident will not happen to them? If one Iranian diplomat has been detained and interrogated in another country contrary to usual procedures, another diplomat could face a similar fate. Addressing this sense of distrust among Foreign Ministry employees falls primarily on the Foreign Minister. However, the problem is not just the insecurity felt by Foreign Ministry employees; the Minister himself (Zarif) is also exposed to instability. The failed JCPOA requires a scapegoat. The JCPOA did not yield a 'heroic flexibility.' The Leader evaluated it as 'pure damage.' Inevitably, someone must be blamed. Who better than the chief nuclear negotiator and his team? So far, the worried faction has accused elements of the negotiating team of espionage. For instance, it reached a point where some members of the negotiating team (Abd al-Rasul Daryaei Isfahani) were arrested on espionage charges. With Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, when it came time for a fateful decision, the Leader burned the JCPOA, and the 'European JCPOA' was placed on his shoulders. Implementing the European JCPOA was also entrusted to Zarif, but after ten months, a mechanism (INSTEX) was presented by Europe, the condition of which was compliance with the transparency requirements of the 'Financial Action Task Force' (FATF). This organization demands complete transparency from Iran in financial, monetary, and banking regulations, including anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws. From the critical and sharp perspective of the worried faction, complying with this transparency means yielding to part of Pompeo's twelve conditions. It was not without reason that Khamenei said in a meeting with parliamentarians that the approval of these laws indicates 'submission.' In contrast, from Zarif's expert perspective, he believes that refusing the request of the international financial group will keep Iran on the 'blacklist of high-risk countries,' and as a result, even a country like Russia will not be able to conduct financial and commercial transactions with Iranian financial, monetary, and banking institutions. His insistence on transparency reached a point where he stated that some institutions in Iran launder thousands of billions, and this is not hidden from international monitoring bodies. This expert view of Zarif and the verbal attack from the head of the judiciary, who said Zarif's words were 'a dagger in the heart of the system,' made it clear that the attacks on Zarif began at the highest levels while Hassan Rouhani did not come to his defense; this indicates the Minister's unstable position. Why did he return? Since foreign policy is under the control of the Leader, the reasons for his resignation must have been discussed with the Leader. The Leader must either accept expert opinions or allow Iran's economy to sink further into the quagmire. The first option is to accept a hard choice, and the second is collapse. Zarif's jolt to maintain the Foreign Ministry's position in the decision-making system was, in essence, a 'respectful jolt' to the Leader.