Why Does Rouhani Avoid Attending the Security Council?

Accepting the invitation to participate and speak at the United Nations Security Council meeting on September 26, which will be chaired by Donald Trump, is an opportunity that Hassan Rouhani, despite his personal desire, does not see himself able to accept. In September 2013, a little over a year after the imposition of unilateral U.S. sanctions that created a crisis for Iran's oil exports and foreign trade, Hassan Rouhani attended the annual UN General Assembly for the first time as the head of state. The coincidence of his speech with that of then-President Barack Obama provided an opportunity for a 'chance meeting' and handshake between the two 'hostile' parties. Despite missing the opportunity for a handshake in the hallway, Rouhani had a 15-minute phone conversation with Obama on his return from New York, which drew sharp criticism from right-wing circles in the government. The handshake between Zarif and Obama in the UN headquarters, facilitated by then-Secretary of State John Kerry during nuclear negotiations, made headlines the following year, and this time Zarif, summoned to explain the matter to Parliament, used 'observing diplomatic protocols' as an excuse for the 'direct contact.' In 1972, when the accession of Communist China to the global community and its permanent membership in the UN Security Council instead of the Republic of China (Taipei) was confirmed, the participation of then-leader Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon at the annual assembly and their handshake was seen as a symbol of thawing relations between the two countries. The Trump administration appears aligned with a policy framework reportedly drafted by John Bolton, which was presented to the President before he took office as National Security Advisor, aimed at applying maximum financial, economic, and political pressure on the Islamic Republic. The announcement of 12 preconditions for reaching a new agreement with the Islamic Republic, instead of the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's speech on July 22 this year to 'support the voice of the Iranian people' at the Reagan Library in California, as well as the announcement of the formation of the 'Iran Action Group' at the State Department headed by Brian Hook, are signs of the Trump administration's firm intention to apply maximum cold pressure on Tehran while also 'keeping the door open for dialogue with the Islamic Republic after accepting defeat.' In other words, Trump is not currently ready for one-on-one negotiations with the Islamic Republic and does not see Tehran in the same position as Pyongyang three months ago, nor Rouhani in the role of Kim Jong-un, ready to accept his demands. Delivering a speech at the UN Security Council meeting, which is chaired by the U.S. in September, is an opportunity for the U.S. President to appear as a global prosecutor, aiming to put the Islamic Republic's 'provocative actions against regional security and peace' on trial. Rouhani's appearance at the same meeting and his speech after Trump could easily take the form of a defendant's defense after the prosecutor's accusations, and even without considering the type of accusations or the content and structure of the defense bill, the Islamic Republic could be positioned as the accused in the eyes of global public opinion. If a clear image is drawn of the indictment session (Security Council meeting) taking place in the prosecutor's home (New York), under the presidency of the U.S. and the prosecution of its President (Donald Trump), the September 26 meeting is not an opportunity for the accused (Hassan Rouhani) to emerge as a winner. Another remaining option for Hassan Rouhani regarding participation or non-participation in the September 26 Security Council meeting is to implicitly disqualify the session, the president, and the prosecutor, and to refrain from attending, hoping that representatives from China and Russia, as 'appointed lawyers,' will somehow align themselves with the nuclear agreement with Iran during separate speeches. The current composition of the 15 permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., China, Russia, the U.K., and France) and 10 non-permanent members elected from among the official assembly for two years (Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, and Sweden) is such that the Islamic Republic cannot even count on the support of the majority of them, although the U.S. government will not put a resolution against Iran to a vote at the September 26 meeting. Concurrently with the news of the U.S. President's presence at the Security Council meeting and his speech regarding Iran, Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic, who hosted Alistair Burt, the Middle East Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.K. last week, gave the European Union until November 14 to present practical ways to continue oil purchases and banking transactions with Iran. The 'media' threat from the European Union, while the subject and results of the recent negotiations with the U.K. Foreign Ministry representative in Tehran were not disclosed, indicates that Tehran is not satisfied with the current state of sanctions and the type of cooperation from the European Union, and for this reason, it has resorted to the leverage of direct pressure and media threats to exit the 'JCPOA.' Araghchi's threat to exit the 'JCPOA' might encourage one of the European Union representatives (the U.K. or France) to reiterate verbal support for the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran at the September 26 Security Council meeting, but it will not stop the unilateral U.S. sanctions set to be implemented from November 14. In August, Iran witnessed a new wave of protests, and despite the renewed rapid decline of the rial's exchange rate against foreign currencies, skyrocketing inflation, rising prices, continued decrease in people's purchasing power, production halts, rising unemployment, and expanding poverty, it has only resulted in voluntary changes of officials (replacing the Central Bank Governor) or their forced changes (interrogating ministers in the Islamic Parliament) and instead of offering solutions, continues the slogans of 'the situation is normal, there is no concern,' while the Trump administration, motivated by 'system collapse' without cost, is gradually advancing a cold war against Tehran's religious government, and the September 26 Security Council meeting is yet another scene of protracted confrontation with them.