Why Does the Islamic Republic Not Leave the JCPOA?

Abbas Araghchi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, recently stated at Chatham House in London: "If the nuclear agreement does not benefit Iran and if banks continue to refuse to cooperate with the Islamic Republic, Iran will exit the JCPOA." Now, this government official says: "The benefits of the JCPOA for Iran are close to zero." Therefore, it should not be unreasonable for the Iranian government to leave the JCPOA. Even before Abbas Araghchi, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, stated in an exclusive interview: "We have the right to leave this agreement (JCPOA), but there is also another option, and we must see how they can secure the interests of our people." It should be emphasized here that it does not seem that the interests of the people play a role in the decision-making of the government within the framework of undemocratic regimes like Iran's. Therefore, Zarif's reference here is to the interests of the "government" of Iran. The priority of the Iranian government is also "survival" at any cost. Furthermore, Zarif is not officially and legally the spokesperson for the "people" in such cases, but rather the spokesperson for what is called the "government" or at most the "system." Stronger statements have also been heard from Foreign Ministry officials. For instance, Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said in Ordibehesht of this year: "If Trump faces this comprehensive agreement with delay, procrastination, and major violations, it means the collapse of the JCPOA, and it is not in our interest to restrain ourselves any longer." However, the course of events has shown that the Iranian regime is exercising restraint, and it is doing well. This regime does not have a fixed and defined strategy in foreign relations, and it reacts based on the developments and the strength of the opposing side. Iran's diplomacy, especially in the current conditions, is locked and waiting for an initiative from the European side. Various reasons justify this. First, the social capital (public trust) is not so extensive that it can take an initiative based on it. Remember that the Iranian government's "terrorist actions" in Europe have even frustrated its European supporters. Moreover, in today's world, a significant portion of a country's international credibility is the product of its economic situation, and in this regard, the Iranian government has no winning card. The first scenario is the acceptance of the current situation, resulting in "benefits close to zero." The European actions to block U.S. sanctions have not yielded results so far. European companies, institutions, and banks have no desire to cooperate with Iran, and the special mechanism for exchanging Iran's exported oil and gas with goods made in the European Union still has no clear outlook. Although such a scenario is not desirable for the Iranian regime, in the absence of an initiative from the European side and the Iranian government's inability to influence, there is no escape from it. Of course, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, warned the European Union that if it does not fulfill its commitments regarding Tehran's economic benefits from the JCPOA, this situation will have "unfortunate consequences." However, he did not specify what he meant by these unfortunate consequences. Does he mean the continuation of enrichment like the pre-JCPOA period? Or missile ambitions, or a combination of both? The internal challenges of the Iranian regime, however, cannot tolerate such a situation - that is, a zero situation. Hardliners within the government and war-hawks will pressure the government to leave the JCPOA, relying on the fact that the benefits of the JCPOA are close to zero. This option is, of course, desirable for the U.S. government. Because the U.S. government will ask the European side to join the sanctions based on Iran's exit from the JCPOA. But the question is whether leaving the JCPOA is a desirable option for the Iranian regime? The second scenario is the Iranian government's exit from the JCPOA. However, if the government leaves the JCPOA, it will lose its European supporters. In an optimistic scenario, Europe may not actively join the U.S. government and sanctions, but even this passive cooperation will have significant negative consequences for Iran's foreign relations and economy. However, if the more pessimistic scenario occurs, it is likely that Europe will also join U.S. sanctions. Thus, the sanctions ring will tighten, and their effects will increase. The challenges between Iran and Europe regarding the development of Iran's missile program, or Iran's interference in the internal affairs of regional countries, or even "terrorist actions" in Europe could justify Europe's joining U.S. sanctions. Such a scenario is, of course, desirable for some of the hardline tendencies within Iran and the war-hawks in the regime. They can use the government's weak position to force it into more compliance and take control of the executive power. Beating the war drum is a tool for this group to gain more rent and power and take over the executive branch. Otherwise, it is no secret that this group's power is limited to a kind of war-mongering display, and there is no capacity left in the regime for war. Considering the analysis of existing scenarios, it seems that the scenario of "benefits close to zero" is the most desirable option for the Iranian regime, and this is the scenario that, despite complaints and grievances, has inevitably been accepted by the Iranian regime.