Why Does the Parliament Want to Review the Nuclear Agreement?

Why did a letter with more than 200 signatures suddenly emerge from the Guardian Council's parliament requesting a review of the nuclear agreement? Previously, the parliament had effectively disempowered itself by passing a single article that made the decisions of the Supreme National Security Council the basis for all matters. When a few extremists from the Stability Front prepared a text stating that the parliament should be the 'authority' to approve the nuclear agreement, Ali Larijani became active and, by allegedly diluting and changing the content of the draft prepared by those individuals, linked all issues to the Supreme National Security Council and openly stated from the podium of the parliament's presidency, 'We should not tie the hands of the Leader!' He later reiterated that the parliament did not approve the acceptance of Resolution 598 or the peace agreement in relation to the war. According to parliamentary reporters, the day the single article was approved regarding Haddad Adel was busier than previous days; everyone wanted to understand the message and desire of the Leader's office! Since then, the Leader of the Islamic Republic, despite all his ambiguous statements and even emphasizing the approval of that 'text' (without even mentioning the word agreement), has never explicitly stated that this matter should be addressed in parliament. Accordingly, the approved single article only mentions that the agreement should be 'presented' to the parliament, not that the parliament should approve it. Araghchi, a direct representative of the Leader in the negotiation team (who was also a member of Jalili's nuclear negotiation team), has also stated several times that it is not in the interest of the parliament to approve the agreement, and Nobakht, the government spokesman, has tried to create a legal and judicial basis for this matter. Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, also stated that while he personally believes the agreement should be approved in parliament, he emphasized that there are two opinions on this matter, and it is not in the interest of the issue to remain suspended. The reality is that contrary to the slogan of Ayatollah Khomeini that 'the parliament is at the head of affairs,' the parliament has never been at the head of affairs in Iran after the revolution, and all important decisions have been made outside of the parliament. In the matter of hidden and open negotiations with the U.S. and the nuclear issue, the situation is the same as before. The Guardian Council's parliament, whose public sessions often resemble demonstrations by pressure groups and plainclothes individuals, and where the hardliners circle around and chant slogans against the leaders of the sedition, is too characterless, weak, and timid to enter 'rational matters' and forbidden points, and the nuclear issue, as the head of this parliament puts it, is not a matter of potatoes that anyone can enter. So what has happened that more than two hundred people are calling for the government's bill on this matter? The gathering of signatures from two hundred so-called representatives who just a few days ago approved that single article indicates that this matter cannot have originated from within the parliament and is likely influenced by external lines, which is why we see an independent commission being formed to review this agreement. Various parliamentary committees could have handled this matter. The formed commission also has a mix of different factions from the parliament that apparently aims to put everyone's hands in a common bowl! As a possible speculation, it can be said that this situation and the entry of the Guardian Council's parliamentarians with external signals and designs stem from a situation that has arisen in the U.S. The rejection of the agreement by the U.S. Congress is almost certain. However, achieving a two-thirds majority for the opponents of the agreement to prevent Obama from using the veto seems somewhat unlikely, although it is not entirely out of the question. The heavy investment and activity of pro-Israel lobbyists against the agreement, some Arab countries, American Republicans, neoconservatives, and parts of the opposition to the Iranian government to reject the agreement have been significant and intense. Therefore, among the Leader's advisors and the think tank of security-military forces around him, the possibility of the opponents' votes reaching two-thirds cannot be overlooked, and plans must be made for it. Now, let’s assume with a very slim probability that Obama cannot use the veto and the agreement becomes nullified from the American perspective; in that case, Iran and the world will face a new and complex situation. In this scenario, Iran has only two paths: either it will continue the path of the agreement with the Europeans, or due to the withdrawal of the Americans, Iran will also back out of the agreement. The first option, considering the UN Security Council resolution, is a more reasonable and national path for Iran and will lead to the gradual lifting of all sanctions except for unilateral American ones, and it will also deepen the potential rift that has arisen between the Europeans and Americans in this regard, rather than pushing the Europeans towards the Americans. The entry of the Guardian Council's parliament into the nuclear issue can be seen as a precautionary and preventive measure for the upcoming month in case the agreement is forcibly rejected by the U.S. This path is likely to be the proposed route of the Rouhani government, civil society, and political critics of the government, as well as many economically dissatisfied segments in Iran. However, the second option will be desired and approved by hardline factions and military-security forces benefiting from sanctions. Of course, the final and main decision must be made by the Leader of the Islamic Republic. Perhaps the significant economic pressures on Iran will push his inclination more towards the first option. However, this very important decision will be psychologically very difficult for him, and it can even be said that he will feel a kind of humiliation from it. Because continuing the game in the face of American obstructionism, and even what can be termed as mockery, for him with all his anti-American and anti-imperialist slogans, which regarded the nuclear challenge era not as a time of hardship but as a time of victory and triumph, will also be humiliating. In this case, the best way is for him not to personally take responsibility for this decision and to let the Iranian parliament, in appearance, bear the burden of this humiliation and the decision that follows it, based on the report of the selected joint committee in which all factions are present. However, if for any reason the decision of the 'system' of Iran is to adopt the irrational and anti-national second approach, which is for Iran to also back out of the agreement, Mr. Khamenei is prepared to jump onto the stage more readily than others and announce this decision with a grand speech against America. Of course, in this regard, he may also have the caution that he does not personally take internal responsibility for this decision, especially in front of economic dissenters (who in small towns and villages are considered the voting base of his faction and showed their inclination towards which policy in the 92 elections), and again the Guardian Council's parliament can serve as a scapegoat and a scapegoat. Therefore, the entry of the Guardian Council's parliament into the nuclear issue can be seen as a precautionary and preventive measure for the upcoming month in case the agreement is forcibly rejected by the U.S. If such a weaker possibility does not occur, at least the Iranian parliament has also mimicked the U.S. parliament, with the difference that it is more obedient than to deviate even a little from the decisions of the 'system'.