Why Has the Islamic Republic Delayed Its Attack on Israel?

The Iranian government has kept the world in suspense since it promised over two weeks ago that it would attack Israel. Experts believe that such an attack could plunge the region into full-scale war. The Islamic Republic of Iran claims this attack will be a retaliatory measure in response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas's political bureau, in Tehran. The extremist group Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, stated after Haniyeh's assassination that Iran considers avenging him its 'duty' and that Israel has 'created the grounds for severe punishment.' Over the past two weeks, Iran's attack on Israel has been described as 'imminent,' and this prediction has led to widespread anxiety and concern about Iranian attacks and those of its proxy groups, including Hezbollah, being shared on social media 'in the coming hours.' Raz Zimet, a senior researcher at the National Security Studies Institute in Tel Aviv, said, 'I think they enjoy seeing Israel in a state of anticipation and the heavy economic and psychological costs that come with it.' However, the costs of this anticipation are a double-edged sword, and the Iranian government and its allies also suffer from it. Michael Horowitz, head of security at the Bahrain-based consultancy Le Beck International, stated, 'The negative consequences of this situation for Israel, including pressure on civilian defense, mobilization, and readiness of armed forces, and economic costs, are not limited to Israel. This anticipation also has consequences for Iran and Lebanon.' Israel continues to assess the potential attack from Hezbollah and Iran as 'still imminent.' Why the delay? Analysts suggest that the idea that Iran is delaying the attack to exploit the psychological consequences is more of an excuse than a calculated strategy. They note that intense and serious discussions within the Islamic Republic, coordination with proxy forces, and the assessment of the risks of such an attack are influencing the postponement and hesitation of the Islamic Republic. Raz Zimet believes that the Iranian government is facing a 'dilemma and difficult choice.' Although Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards want to restore Iran's deterrent capability against Israel, others in the government are concerned that a major attack on Israel could lead Iran to war with Israel and possibly the United States. Even if Tehran has decided how to respond to Haniyeh's assassination, coordinating with Hezbollah and other members of the network of proxy forces and allies of the Iranian government, known as the 'Resistance Axis,' is a time-consuming process. Another factor likely influencing Iran's decision-making is the increased military presence of the United States in the region, even more than in the days before Iran's unprecedented drone and missile attack on Israel on April 12 of this year. Michael Horowitz states, 'The U.S. response compared to the weeks before the April attack is significantly larger. The reason for the increased U.S. military presence is likely an indication of their calculations regarding the scale of Iran's attack, as they suspect that Iran's response will likely be broader than the April attack.' He adds, 'By deploying defensive equipment and forces, as well as potentially offensive forces, the U.S. has sent the message that its goal is to counter and contain any threats, and in the current situation, simply sending such a message is truly important and effective.' Qatar has urged Iran to 'refrain from a possible attack on Israel.' Can diplomacy succeed? The Islamic Republic has firmly rejected Western powers' requests to show restraint and avoid escalating tensions, repeatedly emphasizing that its response to Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran is its legitimate right. Nevertheless, numerous contacts from leaders of various countries, including European powers with Masoud Pezeshkian, the new president, and Ali Bagheri Kani, the head of Iran's Foreign Ministry, in recent days have fueled speculation that diplomatic efforts have delayed Iran's attack and may even nullify it. Michael Horowitz states, 'I am not sure that diplomacy alone will be enough to change Iran's calculations and decisions. Iran will do what it feels best serves its interests despite all the contacts and requests for patience.' The Islamic Republic has recently indicated that another form of diplomacy, namely a permanent ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, could convince it to 'postpone' the attack on Israel. Farzan Sabat, a senior researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute (a public university in Switzerland), speculates that 'the Iranian government may be looking for shortcuts' to lessen the intensity of its response, and a ceasefire in Gaza could be a 'diplomatic victory' that Iran needs to temper its reaction. Raz Zimet also states that a ceasefire in Gaza may not be very important for the Iranian government, 'but it provides a good excuse for them to justify the delay in attacking Israel both domestically and especially externally.' He believes that a ceasefire in Gaza may lead Iran to either reduce the scale of its attack or choose a completely different method of retaliation that does not involve a direct attack on Israel. Khamenei described military warnings as 'the enemy's psychological warfare' aimed at creating 'fear and retreat.' There are no good options. The timing and manner of Iran's response remain shrouded in ambiguity, but it currently seems that Iran has no good options. Farzan Sabat states, 'The decision-making process in Tehran to find the 'Goldilocks' option [neither too weak nor too strong] appears to have fallen into a level of confusion.' According to this expert, the dilemma facing decision-makers in the Islamic Republic can be described as: 'A retaliatory attack that is not weak in terms of symbolic values and deterrent power but also not so strong that it leads to a cyclical and uncontrollable escalation of reciprocal conflict, the result of which could be full-scale war.' As a result, it can be said that the Islamic Republic generally faces two options: a weak response or crossing the threshold into full-scale war. Mike Horowitz believes both options carry significant risks: 'If Iran's response is weak, it jeopardizes its regional power projection and display. If Iran's response is too severe, it will cross a red line and consequently become the target of serious attacks.'