Why Hashemi Rafsanjani Remains Controversial Even After Death?

The latest controversy surrounding Hashemi Rafsanjani is the disappearance of his will during the occupation of his office in the days following his death. Family members and their lawyer claim that there was a will that was seized by security forces immediately after his death along with other documents and has not been returned to the family. Security officials and the IRGC (it is unclear which ones) who sealed his office have remained silent on this matter. It appears that Rafsanjani's controversial status continues even after his death, while it is clear that this will likely contains neither undiscovered secrets nor points about Rafsanjani that we do not already know. Even if this were the case, his family members who are involved in politics would not expose it to public opinion. Hashemi Rafsanjani has been a highly polarizing figure in Iran: some view him as corrupt and a criminal on par with Stalin and Hafez al-Assad ('Akbar Shah'), while others see him as a servant and reformer akin to Amir Kabir ('Sardar-e Sazandegi'); some accompany his corpse to the grave, shedding tears for him, while others use his death as an opportunity to recall the assassinations, executions, and tortures that occurred during his time in power. For some, he is one of the founders of the terrorist regime of the Islamic Republic, while for others, he is a leader of the Green Movement. What characteristics did he possess that led to such judgments, and why do some still want to know more about him? Why does his will have buyers? What is the state of Iranian society and the government under the Islamic Republic that such dual products exist? Is the leniency of some towards the crimes and suppressions during Rafsanjani's power due to a transformation in his character after the decline of his power, or does it relate to more structural issues? Can the transformation in Rafsanjani have been significant enough to influence his followers? These questions can be partially answered by mentioning four dualities: The duality of security and civil rights. Hashemi Rafsanjani has been a highly polarizing figure in Iran: some view him as corrupt and a criminal on par with Stalin and Hafez al-Assad ('Akbar Shah'), while others see him as a servant and reformer akin to Amir Kabir ('Sardar-e Sazandegi'); some accompany his corpse to the grave, shedding tears for him, while others use his death as an opportunity to recall the assassinations, executions, and tortures that occurred during his time in power. The first and most important value and normative spectrum for judging politicians in all societies is prioritizing security over the enforcement of civil rights. At one end of the spectrum are those who believe that even cemetery security (in the sense of the absence of any social protest that could potentially lead to unrest or violence) is a priority, and to maintain it, civil rights can and sometimes (perhaps always) must be trampled. At the other end are individuals who prioritize civil rights and believe that one cannot violate individuals' rights under the pretext of security. Supporters and fans of figures like Rafsanjani stand at the end of the spectrum that prioritizes security (even if they do not have a strong enmity towards civil rights). Of course, in a democratic and open society, the government seeks to find an optimal point between the two, but in non-democratic and closed systems, the government's propaganda apparatus fundamentally denies the existence of such an optimal point. Those who prioritize civil rights cannot forget and forgive the crimes of Rafsanjani and his colleagues over the past five decades. From this group's perspective, even if there is a criticism of the regime in his will (which would certainly be milder than his criticisms during his lifetime, such as military intervention in Syria or the missile program), it does not diminish his crimes. Rafsanjani naturally did not want his death to mark the end of his family's political life, and such a person cannot criticize the foundations of the regime. However, those who prioritize security ignore these crimes (such as the assassinations during his time). The historical memory of part of the Iranian people, which has erased the crimes of governments like Rafsanjani's, belongs to the security-minded. The duality of political stability and change. Within this duality, some prioritize political stability while others prioritize change. Those who favor stability see some of the eliminations and crimes as necessary for political stability or at least sweep them under the rug. However, those who seek change consider the consequences of change, such as some damages caused by public demonstrations (which may sometimes lead to destruction and violence) or the 58% inflation rate (during Rafsanjani's time) or the election of inexperienced individuals in democratic elections, as tolerable. Those who praise figures like Rafsanjani even after his death and await his will recommending the preservation of the regime stand on the side of stability without explaining how much his or similar figures' behavior has truly contributed to the country's political stability. Of course, proponents of an open and democratic government believe that political stability is impossible without allowing for change. The duality of corruption and economic development. At one end of this duality are individuals and groups who believe that economic development can be experienced without corruption through transparency, accountability, and free flow of information. At the other end are individuals and groups who believe that a certain level of corruption and plundering of public assets during economic development is inevitable and that it is better to tolerate that corruption to benefit from the results of this development. This is why some segments of the Iranian elite and educated individuals overlook and do not emphasize the corruption and abuse of power during Rafsanjani's time (some also turn a blind eye because they benefited from this corruption), while the development during his era is also questioned (such as dams that have led the country to bankruptcy in terms of water resources). However, the experience of open and democratic societies has shown that development can progress without corruption if the government is transparent, accountable, and guarantees the four freedoms (of media, expression, assembly, and association). The duality of authoritarian ideology and nation-state. Despite the few instances where Hashemi Rafsanjani stood for change and some freedoms for factions within the government (and not for human rights and secularism), he was generally a supporter of authoritarianism, security-mindedness, stability, and Islamism. His will will certainly not change this orientation. The part of the reformists who saw a glimmer of hope in him are those who have not distanced themselves much from these matters. Religious reformists in Iran still carry many traces of Islamism and authoritarianism and have a security-oriented (not legal) view of events. If the opposite were true, they should not have turned a blind eye to the crimes of the Islamic Republic in Syria. On the other hand, Rafsanjani's political style was not only bargaining at the top but also had a half-eye on active social movements and public demands, sometimes riding the wave of them. In this regard, groups felt that under his protection (which was never reliable), they could pursue some of their goals or achieve certain benefits and privileges. The seizure of his will by security agencies is aimed at 1) preventing the advancement of such goals and 2) reducing the possibility of his canonization. However, Rafsanjani never firmly and steadfastly stood behind like-minded individuals and those aligned with him (an example of this was the trial of former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi), which is why it is very unlikely that his like-minded individuals will stand behind him after his death. No one is currently seeking to canonize Rafsanjani, and the fears of the security forces are unfounded. Of course, Khamenei has unconditionally supported even the most notorious of his loyalists (like various IRGC commanders and mourners). Khamenei's forces can count on his support, but those who worked with Rafsanjani did not have such confidence. The only case where Khamenei could not or did not want to stand behind someone was the case of Saeed Imami, who was said to have committed suicide.