Why is Russia Getting Closer to the Houthis in Yemen?

From the early days of the civil war in Yemen, Russia had sought to maintain its neutrality while continuing to communicate with all parties involved, emphasizing the need for interaction and negotiation to achieve a political solution. However, since the onset of the war in Ukraine and amid severe tensions with the West and unprecedented convergence with Iran, maintaining Moscow's previous position on Middle Eastern crises, including Yemen, has become nearly impossible. The only efforts to maintain relations with Saudi Arabia (which has become an ally of Russia in controlling the global oil market) and the United Arab Emirates (which serves as a safe haven for wealthy Russians and is a major route for circumventing Western sanctions against Russia) have prevented Moscow from fully supporting Tehran's proxy forces in the region. At the same time, experts do not consider this equation stable and believe that if the ceasefire breaks down and attacks against the Houthis in Yemen resume, Russia may be forced to get involved alongside Iran and its allies. Rostam Suleimanov, a Middle East expert, writes in an article published by the Carnegie Foundation: 'The expansion of relations between Moscow and Tehran, which is based on Iran's military support for the Russian army in Ukraine, has also impacted the situation in the Middle East, including an unprecedented closeness between Russia and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.' Reports indicate the presence of Russian advisors in Sana'a, which is under Houthi control, and representatives of Ansar Allah (the Houthis) frequently visit Moscow, with the possibility of sending weapons to this group being raised. According to a senior Russian official, 'Anyone who considers the US their enemy deserves to be armed by Russia.' The history of diplomatic relations between Russia (the former Soviet Union) and Yemen dates back to 1928, and after the formation of the Arab Republic of Yemen in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south in the 1960s, Moscow became one of the main supporters of southern Yemen, although it also maintained relations with northern Yemen. This active cooperation, which included sending weapons to southern Yemen, came to a standstill after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and although Moscow later explicitly sought to revive its influence in Yemen, announced plans, including Moscow's desire to establish a naval base in Bab el-Mandeb, did not materialize. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Yemen, Russia has shown little inclination to intervene in the Yemen crisis (unlike Syria and Libya). After the start of the Saudi-led coalition's military operations against the Houthis, Russia's response to calls for 'ending all violence' was limited. Meanwhile, Russian diplomats have been in contact with all parties involved, and recently the Russian Foreign Minister hosted the Yemeni Foreign Minister in Moscow. However, for the past two and a half years, Moscow's relations with representatives of the Ansar Allah group have clearly increased, although unlike its allies in Iran and Syria, Russia has not recognized the Houthi government in Sana'a. A few months ago, the 'Middle East Eye' reported on the deployment of advisors from the Russian Armed Forces General Staff's intelligence department in Sana'a. Rostam Suleimanov, in his article for the Carnegie Center, also confirms this report and adds: 'The role of Russian advisors is similar to that of Iranian military personnel in Yemen.' Earlier, CNN reported in mid-August, citing 'informed sources', that Russia was preparing to send weapons and military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen. According to this report, the shipment was halted at the last moment only after intense consultations between the US and Saudi Arabia and behind-the-scenes meetings between Riyadh officials and Moscow. Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, warned in mid-summer that if Western countries allowed Ukraine to use long-range weapons against targets in Russia, Moscow would 'send its long-range weapons to areas where Ukraine's Western allies could access these weapons.' Although the Kremlin did not provide an explanation regarding the meaning of these threats, Dmitry Medvedev, the former president who is now the deputy head of the Russian National Security Council, stated: 'Any enemy of the United States is our friend and deserves to receive weapons from us.' Analysts close to the Kremlin have identified sending weapons and military equipment to the Ansar Allah group as the 'first option' in light of the potential increase in Russian support for Iran's proxy groups in the Middle East. Rostam Suleimanov expressed confidence in his article for the Carnegie Center that 'the Kremlin has primarily sided with the Houthis in the Yemen crisis due to cooperation with Tehran in Ukraine.' This Yemen expert believes that 'due to greater reliance on Iranian weapons in the war against Ukraine, Moscow is increasingly influenced by Tehran in Middle Eastern affairs and will naturally support Iran's proxy forces in the region.' He noted Moscow's position regarding Hamas's attack on Israel last fall, stating that not only did Moscow not explicitly condemn Hamas, but it also continued its interactions with Hamas representatives, even though at least one Russian citizen was among the hostages killed. According to Rostam Suleimanov, this position is the result of increased communications between Russia and Iran's proxy forces in the Middle East, who are ready to assist Russia in return. For example, the leaders of the Houthis welcomed the 'independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics' (occupied areas of Ukraine that Russia claims as part of its territory), Hamas supports Russia's war against Ukraine, and Hezbollah 'sends troops to Ukraine in exchange for Russian money and weapons'; a detailed report on this was published by the investigative publication 'Insider' last spring. Rostam Suleimanov believes that if the Houthis take action to occupy more areas of Yemen - or if they again become targets of attacks from Saudi Arabia and its allies (this expert believes that with the increase in Houthi attacks on commercial ships and attacks against Israel, this probability has increased) - they will need more support from their few allies. In this case, 'Russia's involvement in this crisis seems inevitable.' On the other hand, Nikita Smagin, another Middle East expert, believes that curbing the Houthis' influence is in Russia's interest because their attacks in the Red Sea have forced Russia to use longer routes for many ships, including tankers carrying its oil to India. According to Reuters, this year at least three tankers carrying Russian oil products have been targeted by Houthi attacks, while Houthi leaders have 'promised security to Russia and China.' The Kremlin spokesperson claimed to be unaware of these 'promises.' Russian officials also deny any 'illegal' arms deals. Tehran, despite abundant evidence, has always denied sending weapons to Russia.