Why Khamenei Opposes Ahmadinejad's Candidacy?

According to a report published by the Fars News Agency, the unofficial news of Ayatollah Khamenei's opposition to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's candidacy for the 1396 presidential election has gained official and definitive status. Mehdi Fazeli, former CEO of Fars News Agency, reported on Sunday, September 28, that Ahmadinejad met with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and wrote: "It is certain that he is facing a clear prohibition from the Supreme Leader to enter the competition for next year's presidential election." Previously, the Ammar Cyber Headquarters, close to security and military institutions, also confirmed the news of Ahmadinejad being prohibited from participating in the presidential election, citing "reliable and trustworthy sources." Earlier, Abbas Amiri-Far, former head of the Cultural Council of the Presidential Institution, also announced the impossibility of Ahmadinejad's candidacy for the 1396 election, stating that based on the "advisory opinion of a high-ranking official of the system," his provincial trips are also "not advisable." It seems that based on previous data, Khamenei's opposition to Ahmadinejad's candidacy should be considered definitive and serious. But why has the head of the political system adopted such a policy? Prevention is better than cure. In the face of the adventures and defiance of someone who has a record of an "eleven-day sulk," the most appropriate action may be to prevent the recurrence of the incident. Since Farvardin 1390, when Ahmadinejad refused to comply with the Supreme Leader's opinion regarding the continuation of Heydar Moslehi as Minister of Intelligence, the rift and challenge between the Supreme Leader and the then-President has increased. This situation led to the distancing of the Revolutionary Guards and significant layers of principlists from Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad, of course, had previously shown his potential for defiance and audacity against the will of the Supreme Leader, particularly concerning his first vice president (Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei). Ahmadinejad's adventures and autocracy were not acceptable to the central power core. He became an unreliable player for the core of power. Thus, from the perspective of the Supreme Leader, "prevention" of his costly and problematic entry is considered the best possible action at this time. This is also what the former CEO of Fars News Agency refers to as "preventing the recurrence of costly and damaging experiences" and "avoiding problems." Ahmadinejad's candidacy could mean a new round of challenges and polarization in society. In this case, on one side stands someone who labeled the Greens as "debris" and emerged after the electoral coup, and on the other side are millions of citizens who still see their protest movement leaders under house arrest after 67 months. It is evident that Ayatollah Khamenei, alongside Ahmadinejad and opposite the Greens, will once again become a focal point, will be targeted for criticism on social networks, and his legitimacy crisis will deepen. From this perspective, Ahmadinejad's candidacy, whose name is intertwined with the problematic and ambiguous 1388 elections, means reopening a case that the central power core has tried to marginalize and consider concluded, at least since the 1392 presidential election. Ahmadinejad's presence in the upcoming elections, while heating up the competition, will simultaneously fan the flames of the Green Movement—as a protest movement beneath the surface of society and in the shadows. This situation is likely unwelcome for the top of the political system, especially in the context of regional crises and amid Iran's economic and social crises, as well as in the absence of democratic authority from the core of power. Ahmadinejad's candidacy also means a renewed unveiling of financial corruption cases and strange embezzlements that occurred during his presidency. The case of the three thousand billion tomans embezzlement in Iranian banks is a famous instance; a case that forced the Supreme Leader to warn the media in Mehr 1390 that "this issue should not be dragged out." At that time, Ayatollah Khamenei also defended Ahmadinejad's government, stating: "Some want to exploit these events to hit the officials." Ahmadinejad's candidacy—whose leadership was considered close to the views of the Supreme Leader in the famous Friday prayer after the 1388 electoral coup—will mean a renewed unveiling of inefficiencies, embezzlements, and astronomical financial abuses in a government that had the Supreme Leader's firm endorsement during that time. The case of Babak Zanjani is just another case related to Ahmadinejad's government; a shocking abuse that has not only made society sensitive but has also placed Rouhani's government in the position of a complainant. The data available to Rouhani's government regarding the waste and embezzlements of Ahmadinejad's government is not insignificant. The information about Ahmadinejad's gang from the power structure is also considerable. Therefore, perhaps it is in the interest of the ruling authority not to further alarm society about the depth of corruption in the political power structure. This situation will not yield anything for the political regime except for deepening the rift between the nation and the government. No Iranian president has had the opportunity to participate in presidential election competitions for a third time. The only person who had this chance was Hashemi Rafsanjani, who later announced his candidacy in the 1392 elections. However, the qualifications of the head of the Expediency Discernment Council were rejected by the Guardian Council. Two presidential terms have become a political tradition in the Islamic Republic (except for the first and second presidents, one of whom was dismissed and the other assassinated). In the most optimistic view, disregarding the repercussions of Ahmadinejad's candidacy for the government and his marginalization, his candidacy for the upcoming elections will violate the established method and tradition in the Islamic Republic. From a different angle, among the pragmatic, moderate, and expedient principlists, there are many critics of Ahmadinejad's faction and claimants to the presidency. Ayatollah Khamenei does not want the principlist camp to be so impoverished and devoid of players that they are forced to align with Ahmadinejad. Regardless of these factors, from the perspective of the head of the system, the internal and external costs of Ahmadinejad's candidacy, considering his political behavior history, will outweigh the benefits of his candidacy in the 1396 elections. On another level, given the Supreme Leader's negative view of Ahmadinejad's candidacy, disqualifying him could also come with unnecessary costs for the core of power. Thus, Ayatollah Khamenei has tried to prevent Ahmadinejad from entering the election scene and imposing new and unnecessary costs on the political authority by clearly stating his opinion. How much Ahmadinejad pays attention to the Supreme Leader's prohibition is a separate issue; however, it can be confidently stated that after the head of the political system's opinion is clarified, Ahmadinejad will be further marginalized, and more principlists will distance themselves from him.