Why Sanctions Do Not Affect the Regional Influence of the Islamic Republic?

One of the arguments made by domestic and foreign defenders of the return of unilateral pre-JCPOA sanctions by the United States is its deterrent effect against the regional influence of the Islamic Republic, which has negative impacts on the stability of the Middle East. They believe that the lifting of sanctions and the release of confiscated financial amounts have opened up the Islamic Republic's hands in the Middle East and increased its power. This note aims to explain the inaccuracy of this claim in light of historical data. In fact, the claim of this article is that sanctions have not had and do not have a binding relationship with the regional influence of the Islamic Republic. Sanctions neither increased nor decreased Iran's regional power. The factors influencing the emergence of this phenomenon must be sought in the realities on the ground, conflicts in the Middle East, geopolitical equations, and the intended and unintended consequences of the policies of global powers. A brief historical review of the evolution of the Islamic Republic's regional power is useful for understanding the examination of the above two variables. After the revolution, Iran lost the legacy of the Pahlavi monarchy in managing the Persian Gulf due to extensive changes in foreign policy, which included entering into confrontation with the United States and adopting a non-alignment policy with less of a gap with the Eastern bloc. However, the formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the expansion of relations with the Syrian government allowed Iran to gain a firm foothold in the political arena of Lebanon and use this card to advance its desired policies in the region. Additionally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the formation of Islamic resistance in that country also created a favorable environment for the Islamic Republic's role. The war with Iraq also led Iran to once again cooperate with Iraqi Kurds opposing the Ba'ath regime, which had been suspended after the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Thus, after the end of the war and the de-escalation with the Arab countries allied with the United States in the region, the Islamic Republic had a not very extensive influence in the Middle East. The U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was a turning point in the growth of the Islamic Republic's regional power. The fall of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq and the power vacuum allowed Shiite groups aligned with the Islamic Republic to take power in Iraq. On the other hand, Iraqi forces that had operated in Iran during the war as part of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq returned to Iraq as part of the Badr Brigade and became a strong military-security lever for the Islamic Republic. From 2003 onwards, the Islamic Republic gradually expanded its influence in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the environment also became favorable for the Islamic Republic's role, but the extent of influence did not expand as much as in Iraq. Therefore, the unintended consequences of the policies of the then U.S. government provided a golden opportunity for the Islamic Republic to take actions to enhance its regional power by removing the obstacles posed by Saddam and the Taliban as two rival and restraining forces. Another transformative event that led to a different outcome was the Arab Spring. The emergence of widespread protests in Arab countries against the ruling dictatorial regimes, especially in Syria, initially posed a serious threat to the Islamic Republic. However, later on, the Islamic Republic was able to not only eliminate the threat through military intervention in Syria but also turn it into an opportunity to expand its regional influence. The next significant event was the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, which allowed the Islamic Republic to advance its regional ambitions, which were framed around strengthening the discourse of Shiite-centered Islamic fundamentalism, under the guise of fighting terrorism. Furthermore, in Iraq, the Islamic Republic formed the Popular Mobilization Forces with the leadership of the Quds Force. The expansion of the Houthis' power in Yemen and the crisis that occurred after the ousting of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the ousted dictator of Yemen, also provided another opportunity for the Islamic Republic to add Yemen to its sphere of influence. As a result, the Quds Force and its commander Qassem Soleimani, by leading Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces, Syrian militants, and the Houthis, became one of the pillars of power in the region from 2011 onwards. As seen in this brief historical overview, the unilateral U.S. sanctions and the multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations, which placed the Islamic Republic under restrictions on arms purchases and extensive commercial transactions, have not played a significant role and have failed to create deterrence. The nuclear sanctions from 2011 onwards, with the expansion of unilateral U.S. and EU sanctions, especially the sanctions on the Central Bank and the limitation of oil sales, imposed heavy pressure on the Islamic Republic. However, during these years, specifically from 2011 to 2015 when the JCPOA was approved, the regional power of the Islamic Republic increased to the extent that it was able to save Assad from falling in Syria and push back the opposition. In Yemen, the Houthis captured Sana'a, leading to the flight of Mansour Hadi to Saudi Arabia and the fall of his government. This level of influence has been unprecedented in contemporary Iranian history and can be compared to the mid-Safavid monarchy period. Of course, the cooperation of the Russian government has also been influential in the success of the Islamic Republic. The JCPOA did not have a specific impact on this process, and due to the power dynamics in the region, concerns about the dangers of the rise of terrorism, and some random factors, the Islamic Republic was able to continue its progress in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. The fall of the ISIS caliphate, which had created a common interest between the Iranian and U.S. governments despite all contradictions, improved the position of the Islamic Republic in Iraq. However, there is no guarantee that the current superior position, which is fragile, will persist, and maintaining it requires high costs. It can be said that the Islamic Republic has taken on a burden far greater than its capacity, but changing conditions ultimately requires a transformation in the field equations, not U.S. sanctions. The leadership of the Islamic Republic considers having the upper hand in the region, especially near Israel, referred to as the strategic depth, an effective leverage for neutralizing the U.S. government's aggression and, at a higher level, the West's perspective. Therefore, it insists on maintaining its current regional policy with determination, and there is a relatively high convergence in the power bloc regarding this, and the Rouhani government also has a positive outlook in this regard. From the perspective of financial assistance to allies, sanctions have not had a deterrent and significant impact. Based on estimates whose accuracy is not certain, the Islamic Republic has provided an average of three to eight billion dollars annually in financial assistance, including loans, investments, arms shipments, and training to the Syrian government. This figure has not changed significantly in the years before and after the JCPOA, as evidenced by the Iran Task Force at the U.S. State Department. The same situation applies to the financial support of the Islamic Republic for its allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine. Therefore, there is no binding relationship or significant correlation between sanctions and the regional influence of the Islamic Republic. Of course, if the ultimate goal of crippling sanctions is the downfall of the Islamic Republic, then it could be said that heavy U.S. sanctions may become an obstacle to the regional influence of the Islamic Republic, which is primarily proxy-based. However, this event is firstly uncertain in its success, and secondly, it requires a long time, and ultimately, as long as the forces aligned with the Islamic Republic hold a strong position in the balance of power of the target countries, it cannot lead to the desired outcome for the West. The views expressed in this note do not reflect the perspective of Radio Farda. Ali Afshari is a political analyst and human rights activist residing in the United States.