Why So Much Hatred and Hostility Against Bahá'ís?

In recent months, the violation of the rights of Bahá'í citizens in Iran has intensified. Security agents on the morning of Monday, March 26, 2017, visited the homes of five Bahá'í citizens residing in Isfahan, searched their homes, and arrested them. In February 2017, six Bahá'í students were expelled from university. The businesses of 104 Bahá'í citizens were shut down by public security agents on November 3 and 4, 2016, due to the owners' belief in the Bahá'í faith. These events have continued for four decades. Why does the repression of Bahá'ís in Iran not stop? Bahá'ism is a religion born in Iran, and it is recognized worldwide as an Iranian religion with a global message. The primary language of many of the sacred texts of this religion is Persian. This religion has the closest affinity to Islam, and its point of leap has been the critique of Islam. Bahá'ís have lived peacefully alongside other Iranians for over a century and have never raised the banner of separation from other Iranians. The conversion of people from other countries to Bahá'íism has also served as a window for them to become acquainted with the culture, customs, and thoughts of Iranians. Instead of bringing devout Muslim Iranians closer to Bahá'ís compared to other religious communities, unfortunately, these factors have caused them to distance themselves from Bahá'ís. What is the reason? Why have Bahá'ís and the Bahá'í faith been the most despised individuals and religion for Shiite clerics and their supporters, and why have they faced the most oppression in the past four decades (compared to other religions and sects in Iran)? What have Iranian Bahá'ís done against their fellow countrymen, apart from adhering to their faith and beliefs, that some Shiites harbor such hatred and animosity against them that they destroy their cemeteries, deprive them of university education, confiscate their property, torture them, imprison their leaders, demolish their homes, refuse to employ them in government offices, deny them government benefits, strip them of civil rights, execute believing Bahá'ís solely for not renouncing their faith, and commit various crimes against them? Within the Bahá'í faith, there is no special element that is absent in other religions. The structure of the Bahá'í faith is similar to that of other religions (belief in a sacred entity, a messenger, life after death, specific rituals and ceremonies, a special calendar, prayers and pilgrimages, and religious commandments). It is not the case that this religion contains elements that are generally absent in other religions to justify such enmity. Moreover, Bahá'ís do not define their identity by negating or depriving others, nor have they resorted to violent actions to consider these matters as grounds for animosity from some Shiites against them. Of course, significant lies, such as the permission for marriage with relatives, have been attributed to the Bahá'í faith to create a demon in Iranian society. If the irrationality of beliefs is considered, religious beliefs cannot be measured by the scale of reason, and this is not specific to the Bahá'í faith, Judaism, or Islam. In all religions, elements can be found that contradict common sense. It is also noteworthy that all religions have not left a record of mercy and humanitarianism. Interestingly, Shiite Muslims mock Hindus' respect for animals, yet servitude to other humans (the Guardian Jurist in Shiite Islam) is normal and even necessary for them. Therefore, the cause of hostility and hatred cannot be sought in Bahá'í teachings, and one must look for external factors (outside of the Bahá'í faith) to find the reasons for this hatred and animosity. The historical decline of Shiite clerical authority coincided with the presentation of the Bahá'í faith when the Shiite clergy was at its lowest point after the Safavid dynasty. When a social institution is in its weakest condition, it interprets any movement as the end of its era or a final blow and finds the most opposition and enmity against it. The enmity and hostility of loyal Iranian Shiites to the Shiite clergy and its authorities towards the Bahá'í faith (and other religions and beliefs in Iran) stem from a profound sense of weakness they have felt in recent times. Even the politicization of some Shiite clerics and their attempts to gain political power stem from a feeling of weakness in responding 'religiously' to the needs of the time. Clerics believed that by launching anti-Bahá'í, anti-Christian, anti-intellectual, anti-Sunni groups or gaining political power, they could free themselves from the theoretical humiliation and spiritual crisis they were entangled in. The problem of the Shiite clergy in modern Iran is not its rivals but its teachings, doctrines, tendencies, and methods. For this reason, the repression of opponents, dissidents, and other believers has not helped the Shiite clergy in expanding its ideas and teachings. Intolerance The Shiite clergy is an institution against tolerance and moderation. The historical behavior of Shiite clerics towards Iranian dervishes and Sufis, who have shown the most tolerance and moderation towards others, reflects this characteristic. During the Qajar period, the clergy had the power to compel Qajar kings to massacre and suppress Bahá'ís, and for this reason, clerics prayed for the kings from the pulpits. However, during the Pahlavi era, the official policy of the government was tolerance and moderation towards religions. One of the reasons the Shiite clergy could not come to terms with the Pahlavi regime was the religious tolerance of the government to the extent that Bahá'ís, Zoroastrians, Sunnis, Jews, Christians, and Iranians were promoted to high administrative, educational, and industrial positions in the country. The opposition to Zoroastrian, Christian, Jewish, and Sunni minorities in Iran is recognized, although 1) devout Shiites under the teachings of the clergy believe that all their followers will go to hell, and 2) every day, the institutions and believers of these religions face official and unofficial pressures, and their religious freedoms are violated. However, these religions are tolerated due to their antiquity and longevity equal to or greater than that of Shiite Islam, but the rights and freedoms of their followers are not equal to those of Shiite believers in the Guardianship of the Jurist. However, Bahá'ís have no right to education, life, occupation, housing, or even cemeteries because this 19th-century religion is viewed as more 'incorrect' and 'heretical' than older religions, warranting greater enmity. The Bahá'í faith effectively challenges the finality of Islam. Muslims, with a kind of religious narcissism, believe that they are the last beloved of God, to whom God has conveyed a message. Therefore, if someone claims revelation or prophethood, they face the harshest reactions from them. They claim to have established the last shop in the market of religion, and after that, no one should enter this market. The perception of the finality of Islam has added to the totalitarian tendencies of Shiites compared to other religious adherents. The perception of the end of messianism Ali Muhammad Bab (whose account is separate from Baha'u'llah, the founder of the Bahá'í faith) is seen by many Shiites as the founder of the Bahá'í faith. Ali Muhammad Bab became a controversial figure by claiming to be the deputy of the Mahdi, a claim that undermines the clerics' claims to the Mahdi's representation and removes the messianism and eschatology from their control. This was a significant challenge for the Shiite clergy because it stripped them of the future, the establishment of a global government, and all the promises and threats of Shiite leaders. A group or individuals who pour water into the ants' nest cannot expect their anger and hatred. The Bahá'í faith has posed a significant challenge to the business of Shiite clerics, and for this reason, they view it as a threat. The myth of the English religion For about two centuries, the Shiite clergy has labeled every religion, belief, theorist, group, and institution that does not follow it and criticizes it as foreign. The existence of powerful European states with extensive colonies during a period facilitated this attribution. Even a single case of opponents or critics of the Shiite clergy and religious government (even up to the presidents of the Islamic Republic, from Banisadr to Ahmadinejad, who have challenged some Shiite clerics on issues) has not been found that has not been accused of being linked to Britain, the United States, and other Western countries (and at one time, the Soviet Union) and working for their intelligence agencies. When an accusation is so widespread, there is naturally no need to refute it, although, according to Shiite jurists, the burden of proof lies with the accuser.